

The Yale Leibniz

Dissertation on Predestination and Grace

G. W. Leibniz

Translated by Michael Murray

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he Yale Leibniz

Daniel Garber and Robert C. Sleigh, Jr.

General Editors

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G. W. Leibniz

Dissertation on Predestination and Grace

Translated, Edited, and with an Introduction

by Michael J. Murray

Additional Contributions by George Wright

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Preface

In the winter of 1992 I traveled to Amherst, Massachusetts, to meet with Robert C. Sleigh, Jr., who had recently returned from a visit to the Leibniz-Archiv in Hanover. While there, Sleigh had stumbled across a lengthy Latin document written by Leibniz which treated a host of issues in philosophical theology and metaphysics, including free will, responsibility, election, predestination, foreknowledge, and grace. After some examination it became clear that the document was in fact a full-length monograph that Leibniz had nursed through four full revisions with what appeared to be the intention of publishing the final version.

Further investigation revealed that this monograph, bearing the title *De praedestinatione et gratia dissertatione* (Dissertation on Predestination and Grace) was produced by Leibniz in the first few years of the eighteenth century largely as part of his larger project of reunifying Protestant sects (details of which are set forth in the Introduction). A few pages of the work are reproduced in Gaston Grua's *Textes inédits*, and a small number of references to the work are found in the secondary literature. Among recent scholars, the importance of the text has been noted by Fabrizio Mondadori and Wolfgang Hübener, the latter of whom remarks that the fact that this work is unpublished is "astonishing," since it is vital preparation to his *Theodicy*, a work that has been considered "epoch-making in the history of the human mind." Hübener's remark is not to be underestimated. The *Theodicy* is the only book-length work Leibniz published in his lifetime, and *De praedestinatione* is the most important precursor to it. As a result, it stands to help us come to a richer grasp of the development of Leibniz's thought leading to the *Theodicy*, and also provides some help in understanding key portions of the later work which Leibniz left somewhat underdeveloped, often to the frustration of recent interpreters. In light of its centrality and importance, we decided that it would be valuable to produce an edition that included a transcription and translation of the fourth and final draft of the work.

De praedestinatione et gratia dissertatione is an important work for two principal reasons. First, it provides us with a great deal of additional material concerning topics that have recently attracted the attention of Leibniz scholars. Second, as noted, *De praedestinatione* fills an important gap in the available corpus of published Leibniz texts since it is without doubt the longest and most important theological work he composed between the late 1680s, when he wrote the *Systema theologiae* and the *Discourse on Metaphysics*, and the last decade of his life, when he published the *Theodicy*.

With respect to the first reason, the past two decades of Leibniz scholarship have begun to take Leibniz’s theological thought seriously both in its own right and as a tool for shedding light on many puzzling philosophical doctrines Leibniz defends. Contrary to the line adopted by Leibniz scholars a century ago, it is now agreed that one of Leibniz’s foremost aims in his philosophical theorizing was the construction of a metaphysics that would undergird his theological commitments. Thus, in examining his philosophical theology one often receives substantial enlightenment concerning the philosophy which was to sustain it.

The focus of *De praedestinatione* is the Protestant disagreement over the issues of divine providence generally and election to salvation in particular. Broadly speaking there are three main positions on these issues defended by Protestants: Calvinism, Arminianism—the view largely endorsed by most Lutherans—and Socianism. As Socianism was widely rejected as heretical, the most important theological and philosophical battles were fought between Calvinists and Arminians. The views of the Arminians had been codified in 1610 in the Articles of Remonstrance, which led to a reaction on the part of Calvinists, who in turn set out their “five points of Calvinism” in the Canons of Dort in 1618.

Leibniz sets his comments on this debate against the backdrop of Gilbert Burnet’s *Exposition of the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England* (1699). The *Thirty-Nine Articles* represents a statement of various points of doctrine assembled by Anglican divines during the sixteenth century. Rather than being a simple doctrinal statement, the document establishes boundaries for orthodox Anglican theology. Numerous commentaries were produced on the *Thirty-Nine Articles*, the most influential of which was Burnet’s. Burnet structured his commentary on the seventeenth article (the article which is the focus of *De praedestinatione*) as a discussion of the “five points” of Calvinism, and Leibniz follows suit. Although there are many fundamental issues embedded in these doctrinal disputes, the most important center on how to understand human freedom and the relation between human freedom and the workings of divine providence. Calvinists were inclined toward a version of compatibilism in which the free choices of creatures are ultimately fixed by God. Arminians, unable to reconcile the Calvinist view with the reality of evil and genuine human responsibility, largely adopted a libertarian view of freedom and a Molinist picture of providence. As a result, in trying to reconcile the Calvinist and Arminian views, Leibniz was forced to confront some of the tensions that arise in his own philosophical picture, tensions that have been the subject of significant scholarly discussion. One of those issues, for example, concerns the nature of human freedom, a vexing topic in Leibniz’s

work. *De praedestinatione* has especially interesting implications on this topic because, in it, Leibniz sides with the Arminians. If the standard interpretation of Leibniz's views on freedom are correct, this is surprising, owing to the fact that most interpreters see Leibniz as some type of compatibilist.

De praedestinatione also provides us with a glimpse of Leibniz's philosophical and theological views on these topics in the crucial period between the publication of the *Discourse on Metaphysics* and the *Theodicy*. Aside from the essays included in Grua's *Textes inédits*, those interested in Leibniz's theological thought in his later years have had little to go on but the *Theodicy*. And much of the material found in the Grua volumes is in the form of reading notes or essays in progress, rather than works that Leibniz honed into publishable form. As a result, *De praedestinatione* stands to fill an important gap in the current understanding of Leibniz on these issues.

The project of producing this volume has continued for a decade and a half, and I have incurred a number of debts of gratitude along the way. During the summer of 1993 I traveled to the Leibniz-Archiv through funding provided by a National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Research Fellowship. With the gracious assistance of the director of the Archiv, Herbert Breger, I was able to retrieve copies of earlier drafts of *De praedestinatione* as well as other supporting manuscript materials from that period. During that summer and the summer of 1994, I enjoyed the assistance of two extraordinarily able students, Angela Sung and Aaron Griffiths, both of whom worked with me through tireless (and sometimes tiresome) hours, transcribing not only the final text but also a number of Leibniz's deletions and revisions from the third draft (and in a few cases, the first and second drafts as well).

An initial version of the translation was completed while I was on a fellowship from the Institute for Research in the Humanities at the University of Wisconsin at Madison in the 1997–98 academic year. During that time I received helpful advice from two other fellows at the institute: Andrew Riggsby and especially George Wright, who provided numerous and extraordinarily helpful suggestions.

Over the past decade I have continued to revise the translation and to track down numerous references that Leibniz makes to sources, many of which are largely unknown. Much of that work was completed with the assistance of a Research Fellowship from the American Philosophical Society provided during 2003.

Throughout this project I have received helpful advice, suggestions,

and guidance from numerous individuals. I am grateful to Bob Adams, Mike Griffin, Steve Nadler, Patrick Riley, Don Rutherford, Eric Watkins, Thomas Williams, two referees for Yale University Press, and especially Jack Davidson. I owe a special thanks to my family, Kirsten, Sam, Elise, and Julia, for their loving support of my work, displayed not least through their willingness to put up with numerous sabbatical moves, trips, and patient hours waiting for me in and around libraries.

I owe an especially profound debt of gratitude to Sven Knebel, who has not only provided advice and counsel on transcription, translation, and philosophical and theological interpretation but has also been an encyclopedic font of background information in preparing this volume.

Most important, I am deeply grateful for the guidance and encouragement I have received along the way from Bob Sleigh. Although we had initially hoped to commandeer this project jointly, Bob encouraged me to take it to completion as a solo venture. Subsequently he was a constant source of support, advice, and motivation. In addition, his work (and comments while I was writing this book) provides a model of clarity, rigor, and insight to which I still aspire. It is thus with deep respect and admiration that I dedicate this volume to him.

Abbreviations

A = *Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Sämtliche Schriften und Brief*, ed.

Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften (Darmstadt and Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1923–). Cited by series, volume, and page, e.g., A.VI.iv: 109.

AG = *Leibniz: Philosophical Essays*, ed. and trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989).

Aiton = *Leibniz: A Biography*, Roger Aiton (Bristol: A. Hilger, 1985).

C = *Opuscules et fragments inédits de Leibniz*, ed. Louis Couturat (Paris: Alcan, 1903; reprint ed. Hildesheim: Olms, 1966).

D = *Gothofredi Guillelmi Leibnitii Opera Omnia*, 6 vols., ed. L. Dutens (Geneva: De Tournes, 1768; reprint ed. Hildesheim: Olms, 1989). Cited by volume, part, and page, e.g., D II.13.

DS = *Leibniz: Deutsche Schriften*, 2 vols., ed. G. E. Guhrauer (Berlin, 1838–40).

Foucher = *Oeuvres de Leibniz*, 6 vols., ed. Foucher de Careil (Paris, 1859–65). Cited by volume and page, e.g., I.95.

G = *Die philosophische Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz*, 7 vols., ed. C. I. Gerhardt (Berlin: Weidmann, 1875–90; reprint ed. Hildesheim: Olms, 1960). Cited by volume and page, e.g., G.vi.264.

Grua = *Textes inédits d'après les manuscrits de la bibliothèque de Hanovre*, 2 vols., ed. Gaston Grua (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1948; reprint ed. New York: Garland, 1985).

Huggard = *Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Theodicy*, ed. Austin Farrar, trans. E. M. Huggard (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1985).

Jordan = *The Reunion of the Churches: A Study of G. W. Leibniz and His Great Attempt* (London: Constable, 1927).

K = *Die Werke von Leibniz*, 12 vols., ed. Otto Klopp (Hanover: Klindworth, 1864–84). Cited by volume and page.

LH = *Leibniz Handschriften* (manuscripts): Neidersächsische Landesbibliothek, Hanover; as catalogued in Eduard Bodemann, *Die Leibniz-Handschriften der Königlichen öffentlichen Bibliothek zu Hannover* (Hanover, 1895; reprint ed. Hildesheim: Olms, 1966).

A Note on the Texts and Translations

In what follows I reproduce both the text of Article 17 of Gilbert Burnet's *A Commentary on the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England* and Leibniz's commentary on it. The Burnet text is a reproduction of the 1699 edition originally published in English. Because *De praedestinatione* was to be published entirely in Latin, the Burnet text from which Leibniz worked was a Latin translation produced by Daniel Jablonski, chaplain of the court of Brandenburg, who was involved with Leibniz in the project to reconcile Lutherans and Calvinists. As the Jablonski translation is straightforward, I have elected not to include it. However, there are a few cases in which Leibniz uses expressions that make sense only in light of the Latin text on which he comments. I have made note of such instances. Leibniz used lowercase letters to indicate the section or sentence in Burnet's commentary to which his remark was relevant. I have preserved this in the text below, using superscript letters.

The text of Leibniz's commentary is reproduced from the manuscript pages described in Eduard Bodemann's *Die Leibniz Handschriften* (LH) I, XVIII, held at the Niedersächsische Landesbibliothek in Hanover, Germany. Transcriptions of these texts are made with permission of the Landesbibliothek and the Leibniz-Archiv. Leibniz composed the work through four drafts, only the fourth of which is provided here. Since Leibniz had worked the text into a form that he regarded as publishable, I include only the final text. Although this transcript of the original text falls far short of the editorial standards used for the Akademie edition, this seems appropriate for a few reasons. First and most important, the revisions Leibniz makes from draft to draft do not reflect substantive changes in his view that would be considered of philosophical and historical significance. Second, unlike so many Leibnizian texts, this is a document that we know Leibniz took to be in its final form (a claim explained in more detail in the Introduction).

Introduction

1. Leibniz on Church Reunion and the Background of *De praedestinatione*

During the summer of 1700, Leibniz spent time as a guest of his friend Sophie Charlotte, electress of Brandenburg and soon to be queen of Prussia. While there he resided in quarters provided for him by the electress at her palace (Lützenburg, later Charlottenburg). While he relished the time spent with the electress, the social demands presented by palace life were taking a further toll on Leibniz's already poor physical condition. By late August of that year Leibniz decided, after a brief stop in Wolfenbüttel, to take leave in order to travel to the spa at the Bohemian city of Töplitz to rest and receive treatments for his health. After departing from Töplitz, Leibniz made a stop in Prague on his way to Vienna, where he had been sent, by order of Emperor Leopold I, to meet with Franz von Buchheim, bishop of Wiener-Neustadt, to engage in negotiations for the reunion of Protestant and Roman Catholic churches.

Leibniz's enthusiasm for the meeting, however, was low. Two years earlier Leibniz had abandoned hope for the possibility of reunion between Rome and the Protestants, at least in his lifetime. In a letter of July 1698 he remarks, "We must confess that the hope of Peace has been long deferred; it will not be the pleasure of our century to see it, and I doubt if it will be the pleasure of the century to come" (D IV.157). Nearly a year later he expressed his pessimism over the prospect of resuming his correspondence with the French bishop Jacques Bossuet on the same subject, remarking that its only value at this point was to show the willingness of the Protestant princes to work for this noble and in principle achievable end (D II.247–50). In fact, as we will see later, Leibniz's hopes for reunion of Roman and Protestant churches were abandoned no later than 1697.

Earlier, however, Leibniz's enthusiasm for reunion was quite strong, and he had witnessed a number of events that, at times, led him to believe that it might be close at hand. Soon after Leibniz took up residence at Hanover in 1676, the chief Roman Catholic negotiator for reunion, Cristóbal de Rojas y Spinola, bishop of Tina, made a visit to Hanover, in 1677, shortly after he had received permission from the pope to undertake reunion negotiations with the princes of Germany. Leibniz did not meet Rojas on this first trip, though he was aware of the visit and later sought an introduction to Rojas through his friend Johann Daniel Crafft.

Leibniz did finally encounter Rojas during his second visit to Hanover in the summer of 1679. The most significant meeting, however, was to

occur during Rojas's third visit to Hanover in 1683. At the time, the bishop had met with little success in his attempts to interest the Protestant German territories in reunion. By contrast, the Hanoverian court welcomed Rojas and went to great lengths to present him with a proposal for reunion that he might recommend to the emperor and the pope. During his 1683 visit Ernst August, the tolerant Lutheran duke of Hanover, convened Gerhard Walter Molanus, president of the ecclesiastical court in Hanover and abbot of Loccum, Court Preacher Hermann Barckhausen, and two professors of theology, one of whom was Frederick Calixt, son of the famed Lutheran theologian Georg Calixt, at the royal residence to meet with Rojas.

In March 1683 Molanus, the lead theologian in the irenical negotiations, presented Rojas with a document outlining a plan for Reunion. The document was well received and was followed by a revised document entitled "The Rules Concerning the Union of the Entire Christian Church" (the *Regulae*).¹ This document was to become the central framework for reunion negotiations for the succeeding decade.

No doubt hopes for reunion ran high with Leibniz during this period. One of the most significant developments and causes for optimism at the time had occurred immediately prior to this in 1682 when the Assembly of the Clergy of France passed what became known as the "Four Declarations." The Assembly, at which Bossuet, bishop of Meaux, played a significant role, was convened by Louis XIV largely to resolve matters bearing on royal authority over vacant bishoprics. But the declarations passed by the Assembly had implications that were taken to be far reaching. The most important of these was the fourth declaration which claimed, in essence, that the judgment of the pope even in matters of faith was not to be regarded as irrevocable until it had met with the consent of the church. Leibniz knew full well that if such an opinion were to find favor throughout France, the most powerful Roman Catholic state at the time, a significant step toward reunification would be in place. The reason is that this declaration held the pope to be under the authority of the teachings of ecumenical councils and the consent of the bishops concerning his declarations in matters of faith and morals.

In general, the Roman church held that authoritative teaching on matters of faith and morals received that authority from the consent of the bishops of the church. As a result, when councils consisting of a number of bishops within the church were convened to resolve doctrinal disputes, their results were not taken to constitute church dogma until these results were properly received by the church at large (represented by the bishops worldwide). Thus, the results of such councils were sometimes rejected in

total, sometimes only in part.² The fourth declaration put the authority of papal declarations under much the same restrictions.

The importance of this for the French clergy was that it permitted them some leverage in their Gallican efforts to resist papal authority. But what Leibniz and others engaged in church reunion saw was a way to remove the greatest stumbling blocks to reunion between Rome and the Protestants. Protestants interested in reunion were in agreement that the greatest obstacles were to be found in the declarations of the Counter-Reformation Council of Trent and the subsequent papal affirmations of those declarations. The key to Protestant reunion for Leibniz, as well as for Rojas and the theologians at Hanover, was finding an agreeable way to set the Canons of Trent aside and to submit the disputed questions to a future council composed of clergy from both Protestant and Roman flanks, the outcome of which would be binding on all of those within the reunited church. If Leibniz could make the case that Trent was not, in fact, an ecumenical council, and thus that its declarations and any affirmations of it (papal or otherwise) based on its status as an ecumenical council could be set aside, the way would be paved for convening a new and binding council, without undermining the Roman view of the authority of the church.

Leibniz's excitement over these developments led him to write to Bossuet, with whom he had already exchanged letters, expressing enthusiasm over the irenical negotiations which were taking place in Hanover. Leibniz no doubt was looking for a sympathetic ear. He realized that Bossuet was one of the most influential theologians both in France and in the Roman church at the time, and his role in the Assembly of 1682 might have made Leibniz believe that Bossuet would favor the Plan of the Regulae to set aside the Canons of Trent in favor of a later, truly ecumenical council. Leibniz's hopes were buoyed when Bossuet responded in encouraging terms. In August of the same year he wrote to Leibniz, "I am informed that the negotiations of which you told me had great results, and I have seen the extract of a letter from the Duchess of Hanover to M. de Gourville that Articles of Reconciliation have been signed. . . . The interest I take in the welfare of religion and also in your honor, since you have privileged me with so much kindness, compels me to ask you to be so good as to explain to me in detail a matter of such importance" (Jordan 146–47, Foucher I.95). Bossuet then informed Leibniz that he had communicated the progress of the unification effort to Louis XIV himself and that "The King commended your pious plans and would value them in so far as he is made aware of them" (Jordan 146–47, Foucher I.96).

By 1691, however, the plans for reunion appeared to be failing. Despite Bossuet's earlier enthusiasm, Leibniz received no further correspondence

from him on the matter until 1691, after he was prompted by Sophie, now electress of Hanover, to send his remarks on the *Regulae*, which she had earlier forwarded to him. In reply Bossuet said, “I well remember that the Duchess of Hanover honored me by sending some time ago the articles on which agreement had been reached with the Bishop of Neustadt [Rojas, who had in 1686 been made bishop of the city]; but as this matter did not appear to promise results, I confess that I have allowed the papers to pass out of my sight” (Jordan 150, Foucher I.245). Bossuet then requested a duplicate copy of the documents so that he might supply some reactions. It is worth mentioning, however, that in the same letter he makes some remarks which nearly guarantee his rejection of the plan set forth in the *Regulae*. He stated that the Roman church “will never yield any particle of defined doctrine, nor especially that which has been defined by the Council of Trent. . . . The Constitution of the Church does not allow us to think that any compromise can be made on the basis of defined doctrines; and it is clear that to act otherwise would mean the destruction of the Church’s foundations and could cast doubt over all religion” (Jordan 151, Foucher I.248).

This letter was not Bossuet’s formal reply to the reunion plan agreed to by Rojas and the Hanoverian theologians. Correspondence between Leibniz and Bossuet continued on the central issues of reunion through the spring of 1692 while Bossuet awaited a completed text of another irenicical piece by Molanus, the *Cogitationes privatae de methodo reunionis ecclesiae protestantium cum ecclesia romana-catholica*. This he received during the early part of 1692. His reply was dispatched on 28 August 1692. Although Bossuet did not altogether foreclose on the possibility of reunion, he made it clear that the Roman church could not admit the Protestants into communion with Rome pending a further council, nor could it agree that Trent was not ecumenical and thus its Canons not binding. Molanus composed a reply to Bossuet which was sent a year later, in September 1693. In the meantime, however, the correspondence between Leibniz and Bossuet continued, and it became clear to Leibniz that Bossuet was not to be moved on the matter of the ecumenicity of Trent. By Bossuet’s lights, reunion could come about only if Protestants could find a way of assenting to the Canons of Trent. Leibniz realized that such a position was tantamount to bidding “adieu la réunion” (D XII.260–64, see also Aiton 185). Despite repeated attempts throughout 1694–95 to extract formal comments from Bossuet to the 1693 reply of Molanus on reunion, Bossuet never obliged. With the death of Rojas, the leading Catholic advocate for the Hanoverian scheme of reunion, in March 1695, any hope of reunion had been effectively dashed.³

As noted earlier, by 1698 Leibniz gave explicit indications that any prospects of reunion were now by his lights passed. Things had gotten progressively worse for the cause of reunion even in the three-year span between 1695 and 1698 with the conversion of the elector of Saxony to Catholicism, a move which left only two Protestant electorates in Germany (Brunswick and Brandenburg), and with the anti-Protestant pressures brought by the treaty concluding the War of the Great Alliance in 1697. Nonetheless, Leibniz continued to engage in irenical negotiations with Rome at the request of Georg Ludwig, son and successor of Ernst August and elector of Hanover, and Leopold I. In 1698 Leibniz and Molanus drafted a memorandum to Bishop von Buchheim, Rojas's successor as bishop of Neustadt, and in 1700 Leibniz visited Vienna in order to meet directly with von Buchheim on matters of reunion.

Leibniz's motives for continuing the negotiations are not entirely clear. As mentioned earlier, he thought that continued negotiations at least made evident the good will of Protestant princes to seek union within the Christian church. But it seems likely that Leibniz's willingness to engage Bishop von Buchheim in 1700 were at least partly politically motivated. Leopold was, at the time, engaged in a concerted effort to check the power of Louis XIV, who appeared to be poised to take over the territories under the control of the King Charles II of Spain. As Charles II had no heirs to whom the throne could be passed, the central European states had undertaken negotiations to ensure the balance of power after his death and the distribution of the territories of the Spanish crown. By the spring of 1700 nearly all had agreed to a plan which would yield most Spanish territories to Leopold's son, Charles. Leopold stubbornly refused on the grounds that the territories should be passed in their entirety to Charles. It was clear that Leopold's demands would not meet with success and that there was a risk that the Spanish territories would be passed to Philip of Anjou, grandson of Louis XIV, a plan realized in the fall of 1700. It was during this time that Leibniz was sent to speed the process of reunion in hopes, at minimum, of gaining further favor with the Spanish crown.

At this same time, however, Leibniz had taken up in earnest a project he thought earlier would be even more formidable than that of Protestant-Roman reunion, namely reunion among Protestant sects. As Leibniz and Molanus were preparing their memorandum for Bishop von Bucchaim in September 1698, Daniel Jablonski, chaplain of the court at Brandenburg, arrived in Hanover to confer with them about the prospects for undertaking negotiations on the reunion of Lutheran and Reformed, that is, Calvinist (I will use the designations interchangeably below), sects. Leibniz had

become aware of the aims of the Brandenburg court a year earlier when Friedrich, elector of Brandenburg, made his designs known to Leibniz. In reply, Leibniz contended that reunion could occur in three steps. First, the parties would agree to civil unity. Second, they would agree to ecclesiastical toleration of a sort that would permit certain differences in doctrinal belief within the single communion. Leibniz seems to indicate that this alone would be sufficient for union among the sects. But he notes that a third and most difficult step might also be pursued, namely, unity of theological belief. Leibniz expressed some doubts about the prospect for this third step, noting that doctrinal differences on predestination and the Eucharist seemed to be especially recalcitrant (D II.165; see also Jordan 197–98). Still, Leibniz thought that such theological unity was possible at least in principle. With respect to predestination he comments, “The controversy on predestination proceeds from misunderstanding, and I have convinced many clever men on it” (Jordan 198). Still, it was Leibniz’s view that they should aim at the more modest goal of ecclesiastical toleration. The elector of Brandenburg had made it clear to Jablonski, however, that he was interested in more than toleration. Instead, the proposal was to seek union of the two sects into a unified communion under the name “Evangelical.”

No doubt Protestant reunion would have come to seem increasingly politically important to the Hanoverian court. With the conversion of the elector of Saxony, Brandenburg and Brunswick would have to work to preserve the political integrity of Protestants in the empire. In addition, there were close family ties between the courts (even if not always warm ones). The elector of Hanover’s sister (and close friend of Leibniz’s), Sophie Charlotte, had become Electress of Brandenburg. Both courts were tolerant in their religious convictions. In addition, Leibniz and the Hanoverians seemed to hold reunion between Lutheran and Reformed sects as a paradigm for reunion among all Protestant sects. Such prospects were not unimportant for the Hanoverians, who as early as 1698 had begun negotiations aimed at securing the Hanoverian succession to the British crown, a plan realized in the Act of Settlement of 1701.

During the period 1700–1705 Leibniz spent a great deal of time in Berlin, visiting the electress Sophie Charlotte and meeting with Jablonski on matters of Protestant reunion. In order to further the aim of theological unity, Jablonski and Leibniz agreed that they would publish a document that would attempt to show that differences between the two sects on the topic of predestination were in fact based on merely verbal disputes or other misunderstandings. As both found the dogmatic position of the

Church of England to provide a theological middle ground on many disputed points, it was agreed that Leibniz would prepare a work remarking on a recently published commentary on the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England, written by Gilbert Burnet, bishop of Salisbury.⁴ In the early stages, the plan was to have Leibniz prepare remarks on Burnet's commentary on article 17, "Predestination and Election," though there were later discussions about expanding the project to provide interpretations on the complete work by Burnet (a task never undertaken). Leibniz's remarks on Burnet went through three drafts, culminating in a fourth which was completed in 1705. The manuscript was ready to be published in 1706, just at the moment when a political rift opened between Hanover and Brandenburg which was to doom the project.

In June 1706 a second marriage between Hanover and Brunswick was planned between the daughter of the elector of Hanover, Princess Sophie Dorothea, and the son of the elector of Brandenburg, Friedrich Wilhelm. The wedding was to take place in November of that year. Sophie Dorothea objected to the planned Reformed wedding in Brandenburg since she intended to retain her membership in the Lutheran confession. Leibniz proposed that they be married in the Anglican rite, since by a decree of the British Parliament, both were regarded as English citizens⁵ and because the elector of Brandenburg was known to look favorably upon the liturgy of the Anglican church (Aiton 270). The suggestion, however, created a storm of controversy, bringing forth a rebuke of the proposal by the Reformed Bishop Ursinus and reprimand of Jablonski by the elector of Brandenburg. This in turn led Georg Ludwig to issue an order to Leibniz to cease all negotiations with Brandenburg on Protestant union. At that point the Burnet correspondence was permanently shelved.

2. The Issues Raised in Burnet's Commentary

Burnet's commentary is composed of seventy-seven paragraphs. Paragraphs 1–5 introduce the chief points of controversy concerning the topic of the article. The majority of Burnet's commentary, paragraphs 6–59, however, is focused on setting out the four major positions that were defended in this period on the topic of election, though most of the discussion is of only two of these views. The final eighteen paragraphs are given to Burnet's own commentary on the four views and their consistency with Anglican doctrine. Since Burnet lays out the positions discussed in some detail, it is of little value to rehearse them again here. However, a measure of stage setting is in order to show just what was taken to be at stake in the disputes under discussion here.

A. The “Source” of the Controversy: Unconditional Election

Burnet begins in the second paragraph discussing an issue which he calls the “head and source” of the controversy over election, namely, whether election springs first from God’s desire to make his glory manifest or whether it springs from foreseen free actions of creatures. One might be hard pressed to see a conflict between the positions so described. After all, it seems that decrees of election might be grounded in both ways: that God designs to make his glory manifest *by* electing those who will exhibit saving faith of a certain sort. But given the terms of the dispute, this solution was unacceptable to many. The reason is that the Reformed dogma concerning election took it as a clear matter of revelation that God’s decree of election takes place entirely without any consideration of the actions of creatures. This was the Reformed doctrine of unconditional election. Although a number of biblical passages are cited in support of this doctrine, the key text is found in verses 6–21 of the much fought over ninth chapter of Saint Paul’s Epistle to the Romans. The text reads as follows:

It is not as though God’s word had failed. For not all who are descended from Israel are Israel. Nor because they are his descendants are they all Abraham’s children. On the contrary, “It is through Isaac that your offspring will be reckoned.” In other words, it is not the natural children who are God’s children, but it is the children of the promise who are regarded as Abraham’s offspring. For this was how the promise was stated: “At the appointed time I will return, and Sarah will have a son.” Not only that, but Rebekah’s children had one and the same father, our father Isaac. Yet, before the twins were born or had done anything good or bad—in order that God’s purpose in election might stand: not by works but by him who calls—she was told, “The older will serve the younger.” Just as it is written: “Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated.” What then shall we say? Is God unjust? Not at all! For he says to Moses, “I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I have compassion.” It does not, therefore, depend on man’s desire or effort, but on God’s mercy. For the Scripture says to Pharaoh: “I raised you up for this very purpose, that I might display my power in you and that my name might be proclaimed in all the earth.” Therefore God has mercy on whom he wants to have mercy, and he hardens whom he wants to harden. One of you will say to me: “Then why does God still blame us? For who resists his will?” But who are you, O man, to talk back to God? “Shall what is formed say to him who formed it, ‘Why did

you make me like this?" Does not the potter have the right to make out of the same lump of clay some pottery for noble purposes and some for common use?⁶

The passage begins with the claim that although God promised to bestow certain blessings on Abraham's "children," the promise was not realized in *all* of those descendants. At least for the next two generations, the blessing was bestowed on only one member of the generation, an individual chosen without respect to merits. Thus, the promise is extended to Abraham's son Isaac, but not his son Ishmael, and later to Isaac's son Jacob, not to Isaac's son Esau. Paul seems to make the point here that this shows that God grants his salvific promises to whomever he wills on grounds that have nothing to do with the merits of the recipients. Thus, according to the Reformed position, those who argue that decrees of election take account of the free acts or other contingent facts about creatures must be mistaken.

Still, it would be contrary to the divine perfection to make decrees of election which are grounded in mere arbitrary whim. What then did the Reformed take to be the grounds of decrees to election? The answer, they claimed, was found in texts such as the following from Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians:

For he chose us in him before the creation of the world to be holy and blameless in his sight. In love he predestined us to be adopted as his sons through Jesus Christ, in accordance with his pleasure and will—to the praise of his glorious grace, which he has freely given us in the One he loves. In him we have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins, in accordance with the riches of God's grace that he lavished on us with all wisdom and understanding. And he made known to us the mystery of his will according to his good pleasure, which he purposed in Christ, to be put into effect when the times will have reached their fulfillment—to bring all things in heaven and on earth together under one head, even Christ. (1:4–10)

Here Paul indicates that the cause of predestination is what is called by the Reformed God's "good pleasure." The passage, of course, is not taken to reveal anything about the content of the reasons for God's decrees, but simply to indicate that there are such reasons and that they are according to God's good pleasure. These reasons, however, which no doubt surely exist, are simply beyond human discovery, as Paul emphasizes in the Epistle to the Romans, when he exclaims in (a verse Leibniz refers to throughout below), "Oh, the depths of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of

God! How unsearchable His judgments and his paths beyond tracing out!” (Romans 11:33).

Many outside the Reformed confession, however, held there to be equally compelling evidence that God does take account of certain contingent facts about creatures in making decrees concerning their election. In the chapter immediately preceding the text in Romans that the Reformed theologians took to provide the decisive argument in favor of their position, Paul seems to indicate that, in fact, election *does* depend on the fact that God foresees the faith of those chosen. Thus, in chapter 8 of the Epistle to the Romans one finds Paul asserting, “For those God foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the likeness of His Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brothers. And those he predestined he also called; those he called he also justified; those he justified he also glorified” (vv. 30–31).

In part the Reformed aversion to making decrees of election in any way dependent on free acts of creatures springs from a more general theological position, endorsed by all Protestants of the period, that salvation is not based on an individual’s works. All agreed that passages such as chapter 9 of the Epistle to the Romans (above) and Ephesians 2: 8–9 precluded this position, the latter reading, “For it is by grace you have been saved, through faith—and this is not from yourselves, it is the gift of God—not by works, so that no one should boast.”

Reformed theologians took this claim to entail that the complete cause of decrees of election must be found entirely in God. Those outside the Reformed camp denied this entailment, arguing that passages such as the one above entail only (a) that grace is a necessary condition of salvation, and (b) that no human free choices do anything to merit grace sufficient for their salvation.

B. Three Related Issues

Burnet goes on to mention three issues related to the doctrine of unconditional election. The choice of these three issues is by no means arbitrary. In fact, the issues presented here are three of the five central issues dividing Reformed from non-Reformed theology. In addition, as we will see, the issues are connected in the sense that one’s judgment on unconditional election will probably determine one’s view on each of these three further issues as well.

The decisive break between Reformed and non-Reformed theology on the questions of election and predestination can be traced to the early part of the seventeenth century, when the members of the Reformed confession

moved to respond decisively against the teachings of one of the former members of their ranks, James Arminius. Arminius was born in 1650 in Holland, a land that was largely confirmed in Calvinist teaching. Arminius studied at Leiden and later in Geneva, where he became a disciple of Theodore Beza, the chief Calvinist theologian of his day and Calvin's successor as master of the academy at Geneva. In 1588 Arminius accepted a pastorate in the Netherlands, after which time he began to entertain serious reservations about Beza's view of election. After his death in 1609, Arminius's views were systematized by two men, Simon Episcopius and Jan Uytenbogaert. Under their direction the followers of Arminius, in 1610, set forth their views in five articles called the Articles of Remonstrance. The five articles can be summarized as follows:

1. Election (and condemnation on the day of judgment) is conditioned by the rational faith or nonfaith of human creatures.
2. Christ died for all men (not just for the elect), yet no one except the believer has remission of sin.
3. Unaided by the Holy Spirit, no person is able to respond to God's will.
4. All good acts in the regenerate must be ascribed to the grace of God, but this grace is not irresistible.
5. Those who are incorporated into Christ by a true faith have power through the grace of the Holy Spirit to persevere in the faith. But it is possible for a believer to fall from grace.

The controversy over the teaching of the Remonstrants led the Calvinists to convene the Synod of Dort in 1618 to present a formal response. Calvinists from throughout Europe participated in the seven-month event, which resulted in the proclamation of the Canons of Dort, commonly referred to later as the "five points of Calvinism." There are four canons in all, setting out five points of doctrine, intended to provide a point-by-point corrective to the Articles of Remonstrance. These canons thus declared that:

1. God's electing decrees are efficacious and not conditioned by anything in man (later called the doctrine of unconditional election);
2. Christ's atoning death was sufficient to save all men, but God intended it to be efficient only for the elect (later called the doctrine of limited atonement);
3. the Fall, humanity surrendered the image of God, and thus became utterly unable to do any good work or contribute to their own salvation (later named the doctrine of total depravity);

4. the gift of faith, sovereignly given by God’s Holy Spirit, cannot be resisted by the elect (later called the doctrine of irresistible grace); and
5. those who are regenerated and justified will persevere in the faith (later called the doctrine of perseverance of the saints).⁷

The Canons of Dort became one of the central creedal documents of the Continental Reformed church. And it should be clear now why Burnet structures the opening paragraphs of his discussion of the controversial topic of election in the way that he does. The “source” of the controversy corresponds to the first canon, while the three derivative questions address the remainder, though point three, the doctrine of total depravity, does not receive explicit attention here.⁸

We need not dwell too long on the first of Burnet’s “main questions” treating the doctrine of limited atonement since it plays a minor role in both Burnet’s and Leibniz’s commentary. A few remarks, however, are in order. The issue of limited atonement is one decided more on philosophical than on exegetical grounds. The central claim of the Christian doctrine of redemption is that sin introduces a radical separation between God and man, a separation that is remedied by Christ’s death and resurrection. Details on exactly what sort of separation sin introduces and how that separation is remedied by Christ’s death and resurrection depend on the view of atonement that one adopts. But however those details are to be filled in, Reformed theology views that remediation, human salvation, as an event finding its complete explanation in God alone, as noted earlier. Thus, when we look for an explanation as to why certain individuals rather than others are among the saved, the answer must depend on facts about God’s sovereign choice alone.

But this raises a question about the efficacy and extent of the atonement that is offered to fallen human beings by virtue of Christ’s death and resurrection. If Christ’s work was intended by God to save all members of the human race, why doesn’t it succeed? The answer for those outside Reformed circles is that the work of Christ, while aimed at saving all humanity, becomes effective for an individual only when it is greeted in that individual by faith. But Reformed theology could not admit such an answer to the question because this would require that the explanation for an individual’s salvation be found partly in facts independent of God’s sovereign choice. Since, on their view, nothing in the creature either makes the atonement effective or is capable of rendering it ineffective, God’s intention to extend the work of atonement towards an individual could only fail to have its result if there were some failure on God’s part to realize that

intention. This of course is impossible, and thus atonement must be extended only to those who are already among the elect.

While the line of argument here seems straightforward enough on Reformed principles, critics were quick to point out the difficult fit between the view and certain texts of the Christian Scriptures that seemed to teach the opposite, for example, the following from the First Epistle of Saint John: “He [Christ] is the atoning sacrifice for our sins, and not only ours but also for the sins of the whole world” (2:2). And because those outside the Reformed confession were willing to admit that the decrees of election are conditioned upon knowledge of free acts of creatures, there seemed to be no reason to adopt the more austere Reformed view.

The second question Burnet raises treats the doctrine of irresistible grace, or as Burnet casts it, the dispute between advocates of “efficacious grace” and “sufficient grace,” respectively. Here the issue is focused on the grace which brings about the transformation from unregenerate to regenerate at salvation. Because Reformed theology holds that the complete explanation of the salvation of an individual is to be found in God alone, they claim that God’s provision of grace to the unbeliever is both necessary and sufficient for salvation. Thus, those who are among the elect are provided with an “efficacious grace,” which brings about their salvation and generates in them the faith that accompanies salvation.

Those outside the Reformed confession saw the doctrine of efficacious or irresistible grace as both philosophically undermotivated and deeply problematic. The view is undermotivated since, as noted earlier, those outside the Reformed party saw no compelling basis in revealed or natural theology for adopting the view that the complete explanation for salvation of an individual is to be found in God. Thus, critics of the Reformed view argued that God offered to all human beings a sufficient grace that becomes efficacious only when met by faith. The philosophical difficulties for the view arise from the fact that it seems to make God not only the author of salvation, but the author of a fully preventable evil as well. Since all that is necessary to redeem the non-elect is that they be provided with the efficacious grace for transforming them, God is culpable for failing to do all he can to prevent their eternal reprobation.

Caution must be exercised here to understand that the word “sufficient” has different meanings when contrasted with “efficacious” on the one hand and “necessary” on the other. What critics of the Reformed view hold is that God provides grace which is “sufficient” for salvation but only “efficacious” in certain circumstances. We might then say that such grace, while a necessary condition for salvation, is not a sufficient condition for

salvation. Thus, on this view, the grace offered to all of humankind is *sufficient*, without being a *sufficient condition for*, salvation.

Finally we turn to the third main question of Burnet, the perseverance of the saints. The point of dispute here is, as Burnet makes clear, whether one who is saved can fall from grace and become, once again, among the reprobate. The Reformed position was that this was not possible and for reasons that should now be straightforward. Since the complete explanation for salvation is to be found within God alone, nothing the creature does can effect it. But it is equally the case that nothing the creature can do can undermine it. Because God's unconditional decree and provision of efficacious grace constitute the complete explanation for the salvation of an individual, the only way in which one's salvation could be lost is if God were to revoke his decree or retract his grace. And since the decree and provision were made without regard to the free actions a creature would undertake in the first place, no actions a creature might perform could provide sufficient grounds for God's revoking his election.

C. Four Views on Election

In paragraphs 6–59 Burnet focuses on the four main views of election that were defended by Protestants in the late seventeenth century: supralapsarianism, infralapsarianism, Remontrantism (or Arminianism), and Socinianism. Because Burnet describes the views clearly in his text there is no reason to rehearse them here. It is interesting to note that most of the discussion (in fact, all of the text except for two paragraphs) focuses on the views of supralapsarians and Arminians. The reasons are not hard to discover. Because the Socinian view was almost universally regarded as beyond the bounds of orthodoxy, neither Burnet nor Leibniz has much interest in pursuing the view here. Burnet chooses to ignore infralapsarianism simply because, for his purposes, the supralapsarians and infralapsarians held views which were roughly equivalent. Both views, springing from within Calvinism, hold that the explanation of salvation is to be found entirely within God alone. Thus, they share the notion that election and reprobation are determined by a decree of election made independently of considerations of free acts of creatures.

What then distinguishes the two views? The supralapsarian view was made explicit first by Beza, mentioned earlier as the chief proponent of Reformed theology after Calvin's death. Beza argued that there is a certain order among the decrees of God (the so-called *ordo decretorum*), which is such that God first decrees the election or reprobation of each individual in the world to be created. Subsequent to this initial decree (or

these decrees) of election, God wills the fall of man, the incarnation, death, and resurrection of Christ, and so on, simply as means for effecting the outcomes specified in the first decree. Thus, the decree of election is regarded as coming before consideration and willing of the Fall (*supra lapsus*).

For a variety of reasons, supralapsarianism had fallen out of favor with most Calvinist theologians by the late seventeenth century. Among other things, the view was regarded as being excessively harsh in making the fall a means directly decreed by God for the purpose of carrying out the anterior decree of election.⁹ Later Calvinist thinkers defended the more moderate infralapsarian view, according to which God first decrees to permit the fall, and *subsequently* decrees (*infra lapsus*) the incarnation, death, and resurrection of Christ as a means of saving those individuals who are chosen by God's decree of election.

Both of these Reformed views stand in stark contrast to the views of the Arminians, who held, as noted, that God's decrees of election are not unconditional (as the first Canon of Dort declared) but are instead conditioned on God's knowing which individuals would respond if grace of such and such a sort were offered.

Leibniz, like most Lutherans from the time of Melanchthon onward, was inclined toward a view that was more consonant with Arminianism than Calvinism. Before we take a brief look at Leibniz's views on these matters as they are set out in *De praedestinatione*, it will be useful to develop one objection that was often raised against the Arminian view. Because Arminians hold that election is conditioned on God's knowledge of how creatures would respond to God's provision of sufficient grace, critics held that such a view of election or predestination was such in name only. For, it was claimed, such a view contends simply that God foresees those who will accept the sufficient grace offered and then counts those as the ones "chosen." Clearly, however, it is the creature who chooses here, not God. God simply agrees to "choose" those whom he already foresees will choose him, and this is not to "predestine" at all.¹⁰

If this characterization of the Arminian position were accurate, it would make for a serious objection. But the Arminian position was often expressed in much more subtle terms. For Arminians, predestination was not merely an acceptance of those whom God foresaw would choose to cooperate with sufficient grace. Instead, Arminians held a view drawn largely from the thought of late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Spanish Jesuits on the same topic. Like the Arminians, these Jesuits held that God's decrees of election were conditioned upon his knowledge of the choices creatures would make. But the knowledge in question here was not

simple divine *foreknowledge*, because as the Calvinists made clear, election based on knowledge of how creatures will choose in the future is, at best, predestination in name only. Instead, these Jesuits argued that election took place by means of divine *middle knowledge*, that is, knowledge of how creatures would act in all of the possible circumstances in which they might be created. Knowledge of such counterfactuals of human freedom (or “conditional future contingents,” as they are called in our period), would allow God to know who would respond to sufficient grace under circumstances of any sort. Since an individual, p , might freely accept sufficient grace under certain circumstances, say, in World a , and reject it in others, World b , God has control over whether or not p is among the elect because he has control over whether he will actualize a or b .¹¹

Thus, Arminians held that the decrees of election are conditional, meaning that they are conditioned on the creature freely responding to the sufficient grace offered. But whether God will actualize a world in which that creature exists and freely responds to such grace is entirely dependent on God’s creative decision. Consider, by way of analogy, the following case. I invite two friends, Mark and Jennifer, over for dinner. In deciding what to serve I recall that Mark has put on a few pounds recently and that it would probably be better for him if he skipped dessert. Further, I recall that Jennifer has seemed a bit thin to me and so it would be good to provide a dessert she would eat. Finally, I recall that Mark always and only eats chocolate desserts, while Jennifer always and only eats fruit desserts. I decide to make and serve a raspberry terrine, which, as expected, Jennifer accepts and Mark refuses.

One might say that even though Mark and Jennifer were in control of what they ate, since they freely chose to accept or reject the offered dessert, I too was in control of what they ate because I could have instead served chocolate cake, bringing it about that Mark has dessert and Jennifer does not. Thus, while their having dessert is conditional upon their freely accepting the dessert offered, whether they accept is in a significant sense up to me as well.¹²

Likewise, while God lacks control over whether or not I respond to sufficient grace in a given case, he can choose to create me either in circumstances in which I freely accept grace, or in circumstances in which I reject it, thus leaving me responsible (because free) while still leaving God in control. In this way, then, facts about one’s salvation need not find their total explanation in God alone, and yet God still retains a robust control with respect to election and predestination.¹³

As Burnet makes clear, allied with the Reformed and Arminian positions on predestination and election are positions on the nature of human

freedom. As Burnet characterizes it in paragraph 35, the Reformed position on freedom amounts to a version of compatibilism. As long as one “assents or chooses from a thread of inward conviction and ratiocination,” the action is free and one for which the agent bears responsibility.

The Reformed affinity for a compatibilist view of this sort is not hard to explain. Since they want to maintain the doctrine of efficacious grace, a view of human freedom that simply requires that choices spring from internal beliefs and desires is easy to satisfy. Arminians were, not surprisingly, as resistant to the compatibilism endorsed by Calvinists as they were to the doctrine of efficacious grace, and for much the same reason: both doctrines run perilously close to making God the author of sin. If provision of divine (efficacious) grace is a necessary and sufficient condition for human salvation, God’s failure to provide it renders him culpable for their sin. As Burnet describes the view in paragraph 44, the Reformed view makes God appear as if he has two wills, the first that all be saved, and the second that some (the reprobate) not be so.

The affinity between Reformed views on the theology of salvation (traditionally referred to as soteriology) and compatibilist views on freedom is a natural one, as is the affinity between Arminianism and libertarianism. As noted earlier, similar contrasts can be found in the Catholic disputes on these same issues between the Dominicans, who favor a cluster of views on predestination, election, grace, and freedom much like the one endorsed by Calvinists, and the Jesuits, whose cluster of views on the same topics closely mirrors that of the Arminians. What gives these clusters of views their natural affinity? It is clear, first, that all parties in the dispute want to maintain a genuine understanding of divine providence as well as a robust doctrine of human freedom. The former is important since it is a requirement for theological orthodoxy. The latter is important more because its absence would either turn moral evil into an illusion (making a mockery of the Fall and the Christian understanding of Christ’s work of atonement, which is the very heart of the Christian story) or make God the author of sin.

If one begins with Reformed starting points, it appears that compatibilism is thus obligatory. For because efficacious grace infallibly causes the heart of the elect to turn to God in faith, and because such causation is held to be consistent with creaturely freedom, freedom and determinism are compatible. And this is a line of argument that those in the Reformed confession would not hesitate to affirm. God justly appeals to his wisdom which holds secrets beyond human discovery and justly elects those whom he wills by his good pleasure alone.

The Arminian, in contrast, begins with the conviction that such a view

cannot be reconciled with a genuine notion of human freedom or any coherent conception of divine goodness. If God can, via efficacious grace, freely cause the will of the unregenerate to be moved to faith in Christ and thereby delivered from sin and reprobation, God could not, in light of his divine perfection, leave anyone unregenerate. The fact that some are not saved, in the end, can only be explained if God's decree of election is dependent on knowledge (more specifically, middle knowledge) that certain individuals will freely respond to grace which does not efficaciously move the creature to faith. And God's decree could only depend on middle knowledge in this way if creaturely freedom is, in the first place, incompatible with causal determinism (whether brought about by efficacious grace or purely natural lines of causation).¹⁴

It is important to trace out some of these connections between these clusters of views and the doctrines that they contain, in order to give us a better sense of the view that Leibniz hopes to carve from them. As we will see, Leibniz is, in keeping with his custom, more eclectic in his doctrinal tastes than most. In his own remarks, he attempts to stake out a position that, while most closely tied to the Arminian view, contains components that make it utterly inconsistent with full-fledged Arminian doctrine. Those who study the text are obliged to pay careful attention to the theological opinions to which Leibniz subscribes, and to ask just to what extent this menu successfully hangs together.

3. Leibniz's Remarks on Burnet

As I have argued in section 2, the various views adopted on predestination and election fall into natural clusters on the topics of the nature of election, the efficaciousness of grace, the nature of freedom, and certain facets of the problem of evil. What sort of view does Leibniz take on these matters in the *De praedestinatione*? In what follows I will present a précis of the views Leibniz endorses on these topics. Following Burnet's order, I will say a few things about Leibniz's views on unconditional election, limited atonement, irresistible grace, and perseverance of the saints. I will then note some of the views he endorses on some topics of recent and perennial interest to those who are interested in Leibniz's broader philosophical program, looking specifically at his remarks on freedom, grace and election, and the nature and problem of evil.

A. Leibniz on the Canons of Dort

One of the persistent features of Leibniz's views on creation is the claim that God's governance of the world is mediated by a single divine cre-

ative decree (AG 72). Leibniz never took this to imply that God's relationship with the world is exhausted by the singular creative act issuing from the divine creative decree. As is clear even in this commentary, Leibniz wants to maintain that God is causally related to the world at each moment of its existence, both by means of conservation of its being and concurrence with the individual actions of creatures (§§11b, 39b, 56a). Still, Leibniz consistently argues that God's individual acts of conservation and concurrence in the actual world are entailed by or otherwise contained in the single divine creative decree, because the focus of the creative decree is a possible world specified in all its detail.

Leibniz thought that important philosophical and theological advantages could be gained by regarding God's creative decree as of this singular sort, and he attempts to use the position to his advantage here in discussing the "source" of the controversy, namely, the Reformed doctrine of unconditional election. The controversy, recall, centers around the question of the order of the divine decrees: does God first will that His glory be manifest by the election of particular individuals, and subsequently will the means to such an end: the incarnation, death, and resurrection of Christ, along with the dispensation of efficacious grace to secure the salvation of these individuals, or does God will that individuals who would respond to sufficient grace would thereby be saved and thus actualize an economy of persons and means of salvation to maximize the goodness of the resultant outcome?

Leibniz denies that there is a dilemma here because his doctrine of the complete creative decree entails that question of who are among the Elect, how graces are distributed, and what sort of grace will be given are, as it were, settled simultaneously at the moment God issues the initial creative decree. Thus, says Leibniz,

In this way, then, the opposing views can be reconciled while retaining the very words of the Rev. author: God instituted His decrees, viewing men (and other things) from eternity, with this sole purpose: that (by working through the communication of His goodness in accordance with His highest perfections) He would make manifest His glory and attributes (which are most worthy of glory), having formed the great and universal scheme of creation and providence, but only after having considered all the actions of agents to be created (though prior to decreeing that they should be brought into actuality), both those of irrational things, which are blind and connected by the mechanism of matter, and the voluntary motions of rational things, which are bound together in a chain of ends and

means. Next, when it was asked which among this series of possibles should be decreed to exist, these various agents were being put forth choosing and acting in innumerable circumstances in which they could be arrayed; so that it might become clear whether this series of possibles, among innumerable others which were no less possible, should be chosen and decreed. For if only one series of things were possible, the decree would not be free but rather *necessary*. For this reason it can be said in a certain sense that all decrees of God are simultaneous, even *in signo rationis*, that is, by the order of nature, and they are all so interconnected that none is detached from consideration of the others. (§2a)

There is, then, a meta-decree to actualize this or that world which springs from God's antecedent desire to make His glory manifest. The satisfaction of this desire is realized by God's actualizing the best possible world. But achieving this end requires, as Leibniz points out, consideration of the means, among which are included the actions of substances in the various worlds, since it is these actions which determine (at least in some measure) the extent to which each world contains greater or lesser degrees of goodness. Thus, there is a sense in which God's first decree is to manifest his glory by creating a world that best reflects the divine nature, but doing this requires paying heed to the actions of creatures in the candidate worlds.

While appeal to such a meta-decree might serve to bring some harmony to the disputing Calvinists and Arminians, it is unlikely that this appeal would take them all the way to theological unity. And Leibniz himself, at the close of §2, seems to recognize that appeal to the meta-decree will not resolve all of the differences here. The reason is that the most pressing part of the dispute is left unresolved: what is the order or priority of decrees in the world which is actualized? Would God, that is, actualize a world in which he takes account of the free acts of creatures in establishing the economy of graces?

Leibniz gives only brief attention to the first of the three main questions presented by Burnet, namely the one that raises the issue of limited atonement. In light of Leibniz's comments, it is clear that he frames the question as follows: Does God intend that the atoning work of Christ save all of humankind, or merely the elect? His solution is to employ another favored device of his, the distinction between antecedent and consequent wills. Although Leibniz uses this terminology in *De praedestinatione*, his clearest and most concise description of the distinction is found in the following passage from the *Theodicy*:

But before that one must explain the nature of will, which has its own degrees. Taking it in the general sense, one may say that *will* consists in the inclination to do something in proportion to the goods it contains. This is called *antecedent will* when it is detached, and considers each good separately in the capacity of a good. In this sense it may be said that God tends to all good as good. . . . Success entire and infallible belongs only to the *consequent will*, as it is called. This it is which is complete; and in regard to it this rule obtains, that one never fails to do what one wills, when one has the power. Now this consequent will, final and decisive, results from the conflict of all antecedent wills, of those which tend toward good, even as of those which repel evil; and from the concurrence of all these particular wills comes the total will. (Huggard §22; G.vi.63–64)

Thus, for Leibniz, various goods are considered by the agent and the agent subsequently inclines toward each good in degrees proportionate to their perceived goodness. These individual inclinations toward all things perceived as good constitutes the *antecedent will* of the agent. However, certain goods considered by the agent are such that their attainment precludes the attainment of other goods. For example, I may perceive it to be good to be warm and dry, whereas I also perceive it to be good to jump into the icy river to save someone drowning. No doubt these goods are incompatible. As a result, the agent selects a compossible set of attainable goods which represents the set perceived as consisting of the greatest number of the highest goods. This resultant inclination constitutes the *consequent will*.

With this distinction in hand, Leibniz argues that the dispute over limited atonement is merely verbal: the Arminian view is right when we consider the antecedent will of God, and the Reformed view is right when we consider the consequent will. There are, however, good reasons to think that the Calvinists would find Leibniz's solution less than satisfying. First, it seems to represent a complete victory for the Remonstrants. Because the Remonstrants did not hold that the atoning work of Christ was in fact effective for all, the view that Leibniz sets out here does not require that they make any concessions. Second, Calvinists might be inclined to think that Leibniz has done nothing in the way of addressing the argument that made the Reformed view compelling to them in the first place. After all, the argument was that if God intended that all would be saved through the atoning work of Christ, all would be, unless something caused the intention of God to be rendered ineffective. But because the effectiveness of God's intention is not conditioned on anything else, nothing can render the

intention of God ineffective. Thus, since all are not saved, God must not have intended the salvation of all in the first place.

Those in the Reformed camp took this argument to be of central importance since it seemed to follow directly from the fact that God does not give consideration to the acts of creatures in the decree of election. As creaturely cooperation is irrelevant to the success of God's intentions concerning creaturely salvation, what else could prevent those intentions from being effective? It is this sort of reasoning that led Reformed theologians to consistently reject Arminian solutions to this problem based on a distinction between antecedent and consequent wills.¹⁵ The influential late seventeenth-century Reformed theologian Francis Turretin makes the objection plain: "But our men constantly reject [the distinction between antecedent and consequent willings] in the sense of the Scholastics and the Neopelagians who understand by antecedent will the purpose of God concerning the saving of all men universally, but by consequent will the decree concerning the salvation of believers and the damnation of unbelievers. . . . God in this way would be subjected to man since the consequent will is said to depend on the determination of human will so that no one is elected by God who does not first choose God by his faith and repentance."¹⁶

Notice, however, that Leibniz's solution here carefully avoids endorsing a specifically Remonstrant approach to the issue of limited atonement. No doubt, if something does not preclude God's antecedent will from becoming effective, then the object of that antecedent will becomes the object of the consequent will as well. But one might hold that what renders the antecedent willing ineffective in this case is not the failure of creaturely cooperation (as the Remonstrants had it), but simply the existence of other divine antecedent willings, willings the objects of which are non-compossible with the salvation of all creatures. Thus, Leibniz says that the antecedent intention that all be saved is "tempered by the concurrence of *other considerations* considered by the divine wisdom—considerations in part manifest and in part hidden" (§3a; emphasis added).

It is worth noting that, later in the commentary, Leibniz tries to employ a similar solution (although not aimed directly at the topic of limited atonement) using terminology that would be more agreeable to Calvinists. One of the few divisions of the divine will that Reformed theologians viewed favorably was the distinction between God's *voluntas signi* and his *voluntas beneplaciti*. Reformed thinkers employed these terms to mark off distinctions between that which God desired and that which God ultimately decreed. They used such terminology in distinguishing, for example, between God's will that creatures do what he commands (sometimes

called his “preceptive” will) and what God actually effects in the world (i.e., the existence of creatures who fail to act in accord with the preceptive will), this latter sometimes being referred to as his “decretive” will. Although they did not take this to be equivalent to the distinction between antecedent and consequent wills as employed by Leibniz, Leibniz attempts to point out just how closely the distinctions parallel one another in §31a.

On the second main question, concerning the doctrine of irresistible grace, Leibniz’s views are largely Arminian, though he does not foreclose on the possibility that grace is sometimes a sufficient condition for salvation. Recall that the Reformed view was distinctive in holding that divine grace was not only a sufficient condition for salvation, but a necessary one as well. Leibniz makes it clear, however, that if saving grace is irresistible, or, in his own terminology, “victorious *per se*,” then, in such a case, God brings it about that the individual’s conversion does not involve his or her freely choosing it. On this Leibniz says, “I prefer to call those aids that move the will with certainty *infallibly* efficacious rather than *irresistibly* efficacious, so that freedom of man is unimpaired, and necessity is held not to be imposed on us” (§4a).

Thus, Leibniz admits, in most cases the Arminians have it right. God can infallibly know (via middle knowledge) that grace of a certain sort would be sufficient for bringing someone to freely accept salvation in Christ, and thus can infallibly bring about that person’s faith by providing it. Thus, although it is possible that such grace fail to bring about its intended result (because the agent, being free, could fail to accept salvation in Christ), divine access to middle knowledge insures that such an outcome will not be realized. As a result, Leibniz wants to make clear, the Arminian can embrace the notion that the grace God provides is, when efficacious, infallibly so. Allowing such language at least eases the prospects for bringing Calvinists and Arminians together verbally if not otherwise.

It should be clear, however, that such a solution would again find little sympathy with those who take the Reformed stance. What is critical to the Reformed position is not whether or not God can guarantee that he can get the outcome he wants. As Leibniz shows, Arminians and Calvinists both insist on this.¹⁷ The difference is that, for the Calvinist, whether or not divine grace succeeds in securing a certain outcome is independent of facts about the creature’s will.¹⁸ And this is the position Leibniz seeks to distance himself from by employing “infallible” grace.

Leibniz’s take on the third main question, the one treating the Reformed doctrine of the perseverance of the saints, is clear and uncharacteristically uncompromising. Leibniz says of the Reformed view that it “invents hy-

potheses which are lacking any basis, contrary to experience, rejected from antiquity by the greatest part of the church, and not wholly lacking in danger” (§38b).

But while Leibniz thinks that the scriptural, philosophical, and practical arguments against the Reformed view are persuasive, he is clearly reluctant to leave the matter there, making no concessions to the Reformed side whatsoever. As a result, Leibniz sides with the Calvinists and against many Arminians, favoring a related doctrine sometimes known as the certainty (or assurance) of faith.

As we saw earlier, Arminians rejected the doctrine of perseverance—the claim that once one comes to faith and is thereby justified by God, one can never relapse into the reprobate state. But many also adopted the view that one cannot know with assurance that one has true faith, and thereby partakes of justification, at any given time. This doctrine was explicitly affirmed by Roman Catholics at the Council of Trent, and by many Arminians.¹⁹ Leibniz, however, denies this doctrine as a way of preserving the Reformed insistence on the assurance of salvation without going so far as to maintain perseverance.

One of the key issues lying behind the Reformed insistence on perseverance was that it allowed Christian believers to have assurance of their salvation, which the Reformed argued was explicitly affirmed in scripture. Perseverance was a way of maintaining one’s confidence in salvation, even if one continued to sin, because it guarantees that if one is once among the redeemed, one will always remain so. Leibniz denied this doctrine as we have seen. But he salvaged the doctrine of assurance by arguing that, even though humans can lose their salvation, one can be infallibly aware of whether or not one is saved at any given time: “And so taking a middle course (against the Papists and indeed not few others), we hold the more correct view that we can be certain concerning our faith, conversion, and justification, especially by weighing the present internal acts of which we are conscious; and we hold (against some of the Reformed) that we cannot be certain concerning our final perseverance or election without a singular revelation, but that the related fear is superfluous” (§38b). Again, Leibniz offers a fairly small concession to the Calvinists, while siding with the Remonstrants on the central points of dispute.

There is something at once surprising and expected about Leibniz’s views on the issues discussed above. When we look at the positions he takes on the disputed questions between Calvinists and Arminians, Leibniz makes significant concessions to the Arminian side, and minimal ones to the Calvinist side. This is expected because Leibniz represents himself and the elector of Brunswick, both of whom were Lutheran by confes-

sion, and because Lutheranism from the time of Melanchthon had shown far greater sympathies with Arminianism than with Calvinism.

Still, as noted at the end of section 2.B, theological commitments on the points of dispute between Arminians and Calvinists usually were adopted as packaged clusters. And contained in these clusters were commitments to related philosophical and theological positions that were understandably quite uniform. In particular, one's views on the points in dispute above were taken largely to fix one's views on human freedom and on the problem of evil. What is surprising about Leibniz's Arminianism, then, is its awkward fit with his views on freedom and the problem of evil, views which, most would argue, are firmly in sympathy with Calvinism. In the final section I will take a closer look at the relationship between Leibniz's Arminian theological sympathies and their connections with other philosophical positions he endorses.

B. Leibniz's Views on Freedom, Evil, and Related Philosophical Matters in *De praedestinatione*

If one were acquainted only with Leibniz's views on the Canons of Dort addressed in section 2.C above, one would expect that Leibniz would endorse a libertarian view of freedom and a free-will-style theodicy. What is interesting, however, is that Leibniz consistently rejects the former and makes sparing use of the latter in setting out his own views. Such was Leibniz's eclecticism. Still, if Leibniz rejects these views, endorsed with near uniformity by Arminians, what are his views? Does he throw any philosophical bones to the Arminians? Further, if Leibniz's sympathies on the related philosophical questions favor the Calvinists, do his overall commitments hang together coherently? Asking (and answering) questions like these will help us better appreciate Leibniz's eclecticism in philosophy and theology and his own understanding of these controversial philosophical questions. It is worth remarking up front, however, that we should be surprised if we find Leibniz siding with the Reformed position on philosophical matters wholeheartedly if for no other reason than that his Remonstrant theological sympathies would seem to be deeply in tension with such philosophical views.

It is impossible to give a reasonably complete accounting of the relationships that exist between the theological doctrines under discussion above and the various positions one might take on the nature of human freedom and on the problem that evil raises for the theist. It is impossible even to give a tolerably complete accounting of Leibniz's own views on these matters here. As a result, I will offer only a brief summary of the

views that Leibniz sets out in *De praedestinatione* and provide a short commentary on them.

Anyone acquainted with Leibniz's remarks on the nature of freedom in the *Theodicy* will find nothing surprising in *De praedestinatione*. In §42h, Leibniz sets out three ways in which parties in this dispute use the word "freedom." First, it is used to designate the willing of a course of action established by practical deliberation. Second, it is used to designate choosing among alternatives while maintaining complete (prior) indifference with respect to those alternatives. Finally, it is used to designate an ability to exercise control over the influence of one's passions on choice. While Leibniz has something to say about all three of these phenomena, he conceives of human freedom in the first sense described above.

In §43a he provides a definition of freedom that is roughly the same as the one found in later the *Theodicy*: "*spontaneous* action with *deliberation*, apart from *necessity*" (emphasis added). To understand the view one would, of course, like to have the notions of spontaneity and necessity unpacked. Unfortunately, no detailed unpacking is on offer in *De praedestinatione*. Leibniz does, however, deal with the characteristics in detail elsewhere.

In a number of texts, Leibniz argues that spontaneity is a necessary condition for acting freely, and that spontaneity is secured for all substances because there is no intersubstantial causation. Because no substance causes the states of any other substance, each substance must act with complete spontaneity.²⁰ Thus in the two detailed treatments of the spontaneity condition in the *Theodicy* he writes: "The soul has within it the principle of all its actions, and even of all its passions, and . . . the same is true in all the simple substances scattered throughout Nature, although there be freedom only in those that are intelligent" (Huggard §65; G.vi.138), and "for the establishment of [the preestablished harmony] demonstrates beyond doubt that in the course of nature each substance is the sole cause of all its actions, and that it is free of physical influence from every other substance, save the customary cooperation of God. And this system shows that our spontaneity is real and not merely apparent" (Huggard §300; G.vi.295–96).

Leibniz echoes these sentiments in *De praedestinatione* when he asserts that "There is contingency and some spontaneity in *all substances*, and freedom in intelligent substances alone" (§11e). But if this is all Leibniz has to say in defense of spontaneity, his defense is just too thin. The notion of spontaneity was introduced as a key component of accounts of freedom simply because it guarantees there is some sense in which the *terminus* of explanation for free acts must be found in the agent. In one sense, Leibniz's cheap and easy way of securing spontaneity will give him

that. But spontaneity is the very condition that is supposed to prevent, for example, acts that are coerced from counting as free and morally significant. Thus, if Leibniz wants to grant himself spontaneity by way of his general metaphysical commitments, he will lose the ability (or at least have to find some other way) of explaining why responsibility for coerced acts should not be imputed. What he needs then, is a version of spontaneity that will allow him to distinguish cases in which the (at least apparent) terminus of explanation for an act lies beyond the agent.²¹

Sometimes, Leibniz does employ such a conception of spontaneity, one seemingly more relevant to his purposes in the context of discussions of freedom. And in these contexts, Leibniz seems to understand spontaneity as the absence of any external, determining, proximate, phenomenal cause. There are a number of passages where Leibniz makes this clear, some in the context of divine freedom, some in the context of human freedom. Here is one that focuses primarily on divine freedom: “For why God chooses the best no reason can be given other than because He wishes or because this is the first divine desire, to choose the best. That is, this does not follow from things themselves, but purely from what God wills. And, at any rate, He wills freely, because outside His will no reason can be given other than another willing; it does not follow that something is given without a reason—but this reason is intrinsic to His will and in this consists the true nature of spontaneity, that it be its own source, not something external. Therefore, in every mind there is some liberty, and God concurs in the action of the mind, otherwise the mind would not act, but He alone” (Grua 301).²² Here, on the other hand, is a text that focuses on spontaneity in human freedom: “When we act freely we are not being forced, as would happen if we were pushed onto a precipice and thrown from top to bottom; and when we are not prevented from having a free mind when we deliberate, as would happen if we were given a potion to deprive us of discernment” (Huggard §34; G.vi.122).

Graeme Hunter has noted the importance of this more restricted use of spontaneity in Leibniz’s metaphysics. He argues that one of the fundamental distinctions between the Scholastics and most moderns is that for the former some causal chains are initiated from within a substance by means of intrinsic causal powers it possesses by virtue of its form. For the moderns, however, who routinely eschew Aristotelian forms, substances lose this ability to initiate causal chains in nature and thus become subject only to “the simple laws governing the collisions of elementary physical bodies.”²³ But on such a view freedom might well be thought to suffer a serious setback because human bodies, like any other, become subject to the laws which govern them. As a result, freedom comes to mean one of

four things: being unimpeded, as with Hobbes; acting according to nature, as with Spinoza; acting as we will, as with Locke; or the manifestation of a mysterious power relegated to the unextended realm, as with the Cartesian soul. Leibniz rejects all of these in turn. Instead, he understands that these are the alternatives only as long as one fails to acknowledge a true principle of spontaneity, which allows creatures to be initiators of causal activities rather than passively “moved” bodies. As a result, he reestablishes the Scholastic metaphysical doctrine of substantial forms and with this, a robust doctrine of spontaneity.

When it comes to the topic of necessity, matters are vastly more complex. The literature on Leibniz’s views on the nature of modality is extensive, and I do not intend to add to it here. The texts that treat contingency of choice in *De praedestinatione* repeat Leibniz’s enigmatic phrase that we remain free because reasons merely incline but do not necessitate. It is for this reason, Leibniz contends, that we retain the “ability to do otherwise” and thus choose contingently. The point is made clearly in the following two texts: “We are never in such a state that it is impossible (i.e., absolutely) for us to act otherwise, even if, when all the circumstances are taken together at the same time, both internal and external to us, it is certain to an omniscient and infallible knower, that we would not act otherwise than we will in fact act. . . . And so those things which are said concerning fate, inevitability and irresistibility are true or false depending on how they are received: They are true insofar as they concern infallibility, certainty, and determinateness but false insofar as they concern necessity, or that from which the opposite is impossible. We are always *inclined*, never *necessitated* when we act freely” (§43a). And: “So that indeed man has in himself a principle for all of his actions, through an inclining but not necessitating connection. And thus man has not only a principle of such in himself, but also *dominion*, which is not destroyed but completed by the choice of that which we judge best” (§11e).

In order to understand what Leibniz is claiming here, we need to take a brief look at an often neglected facet of Leibniz’s philosophical treatments of freedom, namely, his faculty psychology. Like most of his colleagues in the period, Leibniz describes free choices as springing from the operations of two faculties of the soul, the intellect and the will. Much of the dispute that went on between Arminians and Calvinists (as well as between their Roman counterparts, the Jesuits and the Dominicans) centered around the psychology of freedom. In brief, both parties agreed that the complete free human act was a product of the operations of intellect and will. The function of the intellect is to consider the means to an intended end, and the role of the will is to choose one of these means. What was in

dispute was the extent to which the will had *control* over the final outcome. Arminians and Jesuits were inclined toward a libertarianism which held that the role of the intellect was to determine the various suitable means to the end, and the role of the will was to select from among these. The will, on this view, retains control over the ultimate outcome because the will chooses among the alternative means “indifferently,” where indifference here entails an absence of causal or metaphysical necessitation.

Calvinists and Dominicans, on the other hand, argued that the role of the will in choice was simply to will that means which the intellect judges to be best here and now. Thus, there is no indifference among alternatives of the sort proposed by Arminians and Jesuits. Still, Calvinists and Dominicans held that the will was free in choice, though they differed in their explanations of why such choices counted as free. Most commonly, one of two accounts of freedom was offered by those taking this position. Some held that the will remained free in choosing on this scheme because the will exercised indirect control over the process of deliberation which precedes choice. As the will can direct the intellect to attend to certain objects (or certain features of objects) over others, the will can exercise control over the process of deliberation and thus over choice that follows deliberation.²⁴ Alternatively, some held that something about the very nature of the will prevents it from being necessitated in its choices. The will, understood as an appetite for good, displays degrees of desire for objects in proportion to their degree of perceived goodness. But no object exhibits a measure of goodness great enough to compel or necessitate the choice of the will, save one, namely, God seen in His essence. But since none of the created goods we encounter in this life is perceived to have goodness of this maximal sort, they produce only goods that incline the will toward them without reaching the level of necessitation.²⁵

It is clear that Leibniz’s allegiance was with the Calvinists in this matter. Like them, he insisted that the will did not have the sort of indifference among alternatives that the libertarian Arminians proposed. Leibniz offers a number of arguments against the libertarian position, many of them lifted straight from stock criticisms offered by Calvinists and Dominicans of his day. Thus, for example, Leibniz argues in one text that if the will chooses in the way libertarians contend, it must be capable of engaging in a sort of deliberation of its own, thus investing the will with its own practical intellect: “*If the will is to judge*, or take cognizance of the reasons and inclinations which the understanding or the sense offer it, *it will need another understanding in itself*, to understand what is offered. The truth is that the soul, or the thinking substance, understands the reasons and feels the inclinations, and decides according to predominance of repre-

sentations modifying its active force, in order to shape the action" (*Observations on King*, Huggard, 421; G.vi.415, emphasis added).

Leibniz here appeals to the fact that when we make choices, we take ourselves to be in possession of reasons that, in some sense, explain why we chose as we did. But if this is right, and the reasons provided by the intellect in deliberation do not explain the choice, then the will must provide such reasons. Of course, this seems to invest the will with an ability to deliberate on its own, something all parties in the dispute reject.

Elsewhere, Leibniz argues that there is something impossible about the libertarian view. In one notably faulty argument, Leibniz explains that choosing under conditions of indifference as they are spelled out by the libertarians is impossible where the agent has more than two options available: “[Such] equipoise in all direction is impossible for if we were equally inclined toward the courses A, B, and C, we could not be equally inclined towards A and not-A” (Huggard §35; G.vi.127–28).

Of course, no libertarian version of indifference requires indifference of this sort. It need only be the case that one’s inclinations are not so strong that they causally (or metaphysically) necessitate choice. A similarly bad argument is raised by Leibniz in the context of a discussion of Buridan’s ass:

The case also of Buridan’s ass between two meadows, impelled equally toward both of them, is a fiction that cannot occur in the universe, in the order of nature. . . . For the universe cannot be halved by a plane drawn through the middle of the ass, which is cut vertically through its length, so that all is equal and alike on both sides. . . . Neither the parts of the universe nor the viscera of the animal are alike, nor are they evenly placed on both sides of this vertical plane. There will therefore always be many things inside the ass and outside the ass, although they be not apparent to us, which will determine him to go to one side or the other. And although man is free, and the ass is not, nevertheless for the same reason it must be true that in man likewise the case of a perfect equipoise between two courses is impossible, namely that agents are capable of regarding two or more objects of courses of action as utterly similar. (Huggard §49; G.vi.129–30)²⁶

Leibniz has either misunderstood the view or he is offering us a straw man. What is relevant is whether or not an agent can perceive two options as equal and nonetheless choose among them. The prospects for successfully bisecting the universe are simply irrelevant.²⁷ Further, even if the libertarian were to concede the claim that no agent can be equally disposed toward two or more courses of action at the same time, this too is irrele-

vant for their view. The libertarians do not need to argue that agents are ever *actually* in a position of regarding competing alternatives as equivalent. The libertarian is simply contending that the will can choose options that the agent regards as less good, or toward which the will has a lesser desire. Thus, even if it is impossible for two courses of action to be regarded as equally good, or to be equally desired, this is irrelevant to the libertarian position.

Leibniz at times seems to be aware of this more nuanced understanding of the libertarian position, and he employs it when making his most pervasive argument against the libertarian view, namely, that it runs afoul of the principle of sufficient reason. This, of course, was the very point that the Buridan's ass case is attempting to make plain. Like many in the Calvinist and Dominican camps, Leibniz holds that no event can occur without a reason that is sufficient for explaining why it occurs rather than some other event. As the libertarian view requires the absence of just such sufficient reasons, Leibniz rejects the view without exception. It is interesting to note that Leibniz's way of casting this criticism sounds quite similar to the criticisms of libertarian views raised by earlier Dominicans. Here are two representative examples: "By this false idea of an indifference of equipoise the Molinists were much embarrassed. They were asked . . . how it is possible that [a choice] should finally result there from a determination for which there is no source: to say with Molina that it is the privilege of the free cause is to say nothing, but simply to grant that cause the privilege of being chimerical" (Huggard §48; G.vi.129), and "To claim that a determination comes from a complete indifference absolutely indeterminate is to claim that it comes naturally from nothing. That would not only be the emergence of something from nothing, but its emergence thence *of itself*" (Huggard §320; G.vi.306).

Thus, on Leibniz's view, there must be a sufficient reason for the will choosing as it does, and the sufficient reason amounts to the fact that a certain course of action is judged to be best here and now.²⁸ To this end we see Leibniz in *De praedestinatione* defending the view that "Good, when it is sufficiently perceived, determines the soul infallibly, especially if the perceived good is the maximum good. . . . Certainly the supreme intelligence is infallibly determined through the consideration of what is best: and the more one is free, so much more is he determined [in this way]. Freedom is conjoined with a certain indifference but not with 'the indifference of equilibrium,' where, namely, there is no reason for inclining more to one alternative, which state of indifference is chimerical, and (as in Buridan's ass) can be imagined (by those who do not carefully enough inspect the ground of things) but cannot exist" (§34c).

What is important here is that Leibniz thinks that freedom from necessity is grounded in facts about the way reasons affect the will and the fact that though the outcome of deliberation fixes the choice of the will, it does not necessitate that choice: “God himself, even if he is maximally determined to choose the good, is nonetheless free, not so much from coercion but from necessity. Reasons incline the wise man but they do not necessitate him. It is possible that he will act otherwise but it is certain that he will not do so” (§35b).

It is clear then, that Leibniz does not want to endorse libertarianism. But it is equally clear that he thinks freedom to be incompatible with necessity. The important question, of course, is just what sort of necessity Leibniz takes to be incompatible with freedom. Leibniz consistently rejects the claim that freedom is compatible with metaphysical or logical necessity, though many have argued that Leibniz is committed to such necessitation nonetheless.

Is freedom consistent with physical or causal necessity? No doubt, Leibniz thinks that freedom is compatible with a complete determinism at the level of corporeal bodies or, more precisely, that the behavior of bodies is fully predictable in terms of fully specified natural laws. But what about causal necessitation in the sequence of mental events? Most have argued that Leibniz must be a compatibilist with respect to causal necessity even at the mental level, because, at the metaphysical ground floor, all causation is imminent causation and each state of a monad is an imminent causal consequence of its preceding state. Thus, however we partition the phenomena, the ontological foundation of deliberation and willing must consist of imminently causally related monadic states. Further, many have claimed, Leibniz plainly asserts that mental events are causally related to one another. Passages such as the following from *De praedestinatione* are often taken to make just such a claim: “However, as long as things proceed naturally, everything in the material realm happens by a concatenation of motions, but in such a way that they are accommodated by God from the beginning to minds, and preordained to moral ends, just as all things in the mind happen naturally by a concatenation of direct perceptions and appetitions directed by God to spiritual ends; and when they are distinct and come about by way of reasoning, they constitute the connection of means and ends” (§11e).

But notice that Leibniz does not claim here that the relations among mental events are causally necessary. What is interesting is that he consistently describes the relation merely as one of “inclination without necessitation.” In the years immediately following the writing of *De praedestinatione*, Leibniz adopts a distinctive terminology, describing the

relationship between the outcome of deliberation and willing as one of “moral necessity.” I have argued elsewhere that in adopting such a phrase Leibniz is connecting with a tradition in faculty psychology that was well-known in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries and that used “moral necessity” to identify a modality that was weaker than physical or causal necessity.²⁹

Since the concept of moral necessity does not appear in *De praedestinatione* (at least by name), we need not pursue that notion any further here. But when we turn to Leibniz’s treatment of the problem of evil in *De praedestinatione*, one can see that tensions arise if we take Leibniz to endorse what we might call “mental causal compatibilism.” As noted earlier, Calvinist and Arminian positions on freedom, evil, grace, and the questions raised by Burnet at the beginning of the commentary concerning the Canons of Dort form natural clusters. To see how the tensions become manifest within Leibniz’s own view, we need to see a bit more about how Leibniz addresses the topic of evil.

The problem of evil that is the focus of most contemporary discussions concerns the compossibility of God and evil, or, as it is often cast, whether or not an omniscient, omnipotent, and wholly good being would have been able to create a world that had less evil, without thereby compromising the other aims such a being might have proposed for creation. In other words, the contemporary critic asks, wouldn’t a divine being have done better than this? We might call this facet of the problem of evil the “underachiever problem.”

This problem was not, according to most medieval and early modern thinkers, the main difficulty that evil presents. For them, the real problem was how it could be the case that God, the creator of all that is, makes a world and causally contributes to every event that occurs in it, without having his character tainted by the evil that the world contains. Because God, as creator and sustainer of the world, is so intimately, causally intermingled with the world’s existence and operation, how is it that God can avoid the stain that marks the character of those creatures who are (also?) knowingly and causally involved in sin. The question here concerns the compatibility of divine holiness with God’s *causal* involvement with evil. I will refer to this facet of the problem of evil as the “holiness problem.” It is this problem that the medieval thinkers are responding to when they spin their philosophical yarns about the metaphysical nature of evil. The outline of the most common response to the holiness problem goes like this: because evil is a privation, it is a lack of being rather than an additional sort of being. But since this is the case, evil is something which *per se* needs no cause. Thus, because the stain that was to have marked God’s

character was supposed to have resulted from God's *causal* involvement in evil, and because there can be no (per se) causal involvement in the origin of evil, God's character is free from its stain. No doubt there are a number of questions that immediately spring to mind when one considers this response to the holiness problem: why can't God act in such a way as to "make up" the privation of being in which the evil consists, and why aren't humans similarly off the hook for evil because, presumably, we cannot contribute to causing privations any more than God can. These questions all get their due from these medieval figures, but must be set aside here.

Not surprisingly, Leibniz is concerned with the underachiever problem and with the holiness problem, and remarks made in *De praedestinatione* bear on both of these issues. Leibniz's response to the underachiever problem is simply to deny that there is a problem at all. Owing to the fact that this world is the best possible world, Leibniz argues, there is no under-achieving (§§39g, f, 40f, 41e). One might question Leibniz's confidence in the claim that this is the best of all possible worlds. And, in fact, it does seem that his confidence in this claim is often grounded in his prior confidence that there exists an all-powerful, all-knowing, and morally perfect being.

But even Leibniz knew that a theodicy of this sort was not going to suffice. Even with such an account, a further story would have to be told about the specific nature of the relationship between God's act of will concerning the existence of the world he creates and the evil that arises in it. The reason for this further need is simple. All Christian theodicists were acutely aware of the fact that the Bible precluded the permissibility of "doing evil that good may come" (Romans 3:8). Thus, even if it is the case that God chooses to create a world containing evil, and that the evil contained in it is a necessary condition for securing certain goods not securable in any better way, it cannot be the case that God *wills* to bring about those evils in order that the goods that result from them may be secured. Thus, God's will can only be related to them permissively. And this, in fact, is just the line that Leibniz takes: "God foreknew the lapse of Adam after he chose as the best that possible series in which the evil is contained. However he *willed* the good in the series and he *permitted* the bringing forth of evil" (§40f; see also §7e, 39b, f, h, i, 41a, b, f, i, 44b, c, 45a, 72b).

Leibniz's most explicit discussion of permission is found in his earliest sustained treatment of the topic of evil, the *Confessio philosophi* of 1672–73. There he sets out an account of permission which can be summarized as follows:

P permits E iff:

- (1) P fails to will that E
- (2) P fails to will that not-E
- (3) P brings it about that state of affairs S obtains by willing that S obtains
- (4) If S obtains then E obtains
- (5) P knows that (4)
- (6) P believes that the good entailed by S's obtaining outweighs the evil entailed by E's obtaining.³⁰

This account of permission does for Leibniz what he wants it to do, providing the sort of moral buffer between God and evil that blocks the holiness problem. But a closer look at Leibniz's account of permission makes it clear why it makes for an awkward fit with mental causal compatibilism. One of the issues in dispute between Arminians and Calvinists (as well as their Roman counterparts, the Jesuits and Dominicans) concerned the ground or truthmaker for counterfactuals of freedom (or, in the language of the day, "conditional future contingents"). In brief, the question regards whether the truth value of such propositions is determined by the divine will or not. It was nearly universally agreed that propositions that are necessary have their truth independent of any facts about divine volitions or decrees. But philosophically important disagreements arose about the truth value of contingent propositions. Undoubtedly, many contingent propositions have their truth value determined by way of divine decrees. The fact that this world is the actual world serves as a representative example. More contentious was whether or not propositions of the form "If Peter were in circumstances C, Peter would freely f" were dependent upon divine decrees for their truth or falsity. We might call propositions whose truth value is fixed independently of divine decrees "prevolitional truths," and the remainder "postvolitional truths."

Calvinists and Dominicans held that all such conditional future contingents bore their truth value postvolitionally. Consider now a token instance of sin: Peter's denial of Christ. Given Leibniz's account of permission,

- (7) It is not the case that God wills that Peter deny [from (1)].

In light of what was said above, if Leibniz endorses mental causal compatibilism, Leibniz should likewise endorse the "postvolitional" claim,

- (8) God wills that "if Peter is in C, then Peter denies."

In addition, it seems that Leibniz is committed to the claims that:

- (9) God wills that Peter exist
- (10) God wills that C obtain
- (11) God wills that Peter exist in C

It is hard to see, however, how Leibniz can coherently hold (8), (11), and (7) since it is reasonable to assume (8) and (11) entail the denial of (7).³¹ But what is it that Leibniz should surrender here? If he surrenders (7), then he must also surrender his account of permission. Surrendering (11) appears to carry a price too high to pay since (11) seems to be required by any orthodox account of divine creation.³² If Leibniz surrenders (8), then he will have to give up postvolitionalism.

I think a good case can be made for the claim that Leibniz comes to see this difficulty with postvolitionalism in the mid-1680s and from that point forward maintains the prevolitionalist position.³³ It is only after this time that we find Leibniz using the prevolitionalist language, found here in *De praedestinatione*, which describes God as “discovering”³⁴ how it is that creatures will freely choose in this or that world.³⁵

The prevolitional view also has a natural affinity for Leibniz’s doctrine of the “original limitation,” another position endorsed here by Leibniz and, again, only after the mid-1680s. The idea of an original limitation is introduced by Leibniz as a way of explaining that there are certain prevolitional contingent facts about an agent which preclude creating that agent without sin (and which thereby explain why there is no world with created, free beings, that also lacks sin).³⁶ The result is that while God wills that a certain world (the best one) be actual, he merely permits those contingent states of affairs that follow from but are not directly willed by him. Thus, concerning the original limitation, Leibniz says: “For how can I be said to choose something freely if in choosing I depend on God and my mind is inclined toward one option by God himself. That is, if the series of things established by God brings it about that false but plausible reasons are observed by my deliberating mind, impelling me to choice . . . the cause of sin must not [however] be ascribed to the will of God since he always tends toward the most perfect . . . But the cause of evil should be laid to the account of non-being or privation, i.e., the natural limitation or weakness of things, or, what is the same, to the original imperfection anterior [even] to the original sin.”³⁷

Thus, in the period after the mid-1680s Leibniz’s views on the problem of evil seem to make for an uncomfortable fit with the mental causal compatibilism that is often ascribed to him. In addition, as alluded to earlier, Leibniz’s generally Arminian theological sympathies also make for an uncomfortable fit with compatibilism more aligned with Calvinism.³⁸

4. Conclusion

Maybe one should expect that an irenical doctrine of the sort we have in *De praedestinatione* would at best live with some uneasy tensions as the cost of attempting reconciliation between parties that themselves saw no way to reconcile for decades. Still, the commitments that Leibniz evidences here seem to be legitimate and consistent with the positions he stakes out throughout his career. But the philosophical implications for such views are both significant and vexing. Leibniz does not go a long way toward resolving those philosophical tensions in the current work. But given the nature of the document, we should not expect that he would. What this document does give us is some insight into the theological heart of Leibniz, insight that creates and at the same time illuminates some of the more puzzling features of what we sometimes regard as Leibniz's secular philosophical commitments.

Among other things, the tensions generated here should prompt scholars interested in Leibniz's philosophy to take a closer look at his theological views as a way of rounding out the intellectual profile we have of him. Above I have tried to make clear that the connections between the theological and philosophical positions run deep and in two directions. But until the texts treating the theological opinions are examined with more care, it is unlikely that we will understand completely the philosophical positions Leibniz stakes out. It is my hope that providing this translation will be a step in that direction.³⁹

Dissertation on Predestination and Grace

Article XVII of and Burnet's Commentary on *The Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England*

Article XVII

Of Predestination and Election

Predestination to life is the everlasting purpose of God, whereby (before the foundations of the World were laid) he hath constantly decreed by his Counsel, secret to us, to deliver from curse and damnation, those whom he hath chosen in Christ unto everlasting Salvation as vessels made to honor. Wherefore they which be endued with so excellent a benefit of God, be called according to God's purpose, by his Spirit working in due season. They through grace obey the calling, they be justified freely, they be made Sons of God by Adoption, they be made like the Image of this only begotten Son Jesus Christ: They walk religiously in good works, and at length by God's mercy they attain to everlasting felicity.

As the godly consideration of Predestination and our Election in Christ is full of sweet, pleasant, and unspeakable comfort to godly persons, and such as feel in themselves the working of the Spirit of Christ, mortifying the works of the Flesh, and their earthly members and drawing up their mind to high and heavenly things, as well because it doth greatly establish and confirm their Faith of eternal Salvation to be enjoyed through Christ, to have continually before their Eyes the sentence of God's Predestination, is a most dangerous downfall, whereby the Devil doth thrust them either into desperation, or into wretchedness of most unclean living, no less perilous than desperation.

Furthermore, We must receive God's promises in such wise, as they be generally set forth to us in holy Scripture: And in our doings, that Will of God is to be followed, which we have expressly declared unto to us in the Word of God.

§1 There are many things in several of the other Articles which depend upon this; and therefore I will explain it more fully: for as this had given occasion to one of the longest, the subtlest, and indeed the most intricate, of all the questions in divinity; so that it will be necessary to open and examine it as fully as the importance and difficulties of it do require.^a In treating of it, I shall,

First, State the question, together with the consequences that arise out of it.

Secondly, Give an account of the differences that have arisen upon it.

Thirdly, I shall set out the strength of the opinions of the contending parties, with all possible impartiality and exactness.

Fourthly, I shall shew how far they agree, and how far they differ; and shall shew what reason there is for bearing with one another's opinions in these matters; and in the

Fifth and last place, I shall consider how far we of this church are determined by this Article, and how far we are at liberty to follow any of those different opinions.

§2 The whole controversy may be reduced to this single point as its head and source: upon what news did God turn his purposes and decrees concerning mankind? Whether^a he did it merely upon a design of advancing his own glory, and for manifesting his own attributes, in order to which he settled the great and universal scheme of his whole creation and providence? Or whether^a he considered all the free motions of those rational agents that he did intend to create, and according to what he foresaw they would choose and do, in all the various circumstances in which he might put them, formed his decrees? Here the controversy begins: and when this is settled,^b the three main questions that arise out of it will be soon determined.

§3 The first^a is, whether both God and Christ intended that Christ should only die for that particular number whom God intended to save? Or whether it was intended that he should die for all, so that every man that would, might have the benefit of his death, and that no man was excluded from it, but because he willingly rejected it?

§4 The second is, Whether those assistances, that God gives to men to enable them to obey him, are of their own nature so efficacious and irresistible,^a that they never fail of producing the effect for which they are given? Or whether they are only sufficient to enable a man to obey God; so that their efficacy comes from the freedom of the will, that either may co-operate with them, or may not, as it pleases?

§5 The third is, Whether such persons do and must certainly persevere to whom such grace is given? Or, whether they may not fall away both entirely and finally from that state?^a

§6 There are also other questions concerning the true notion of liberty, concerning the feebleness of our powers in this lapsed state, with several lesser ones; all which do necessarily take their determination from the decision of the first and main question;^a about which there are four opinions.

§7 The first is of those commonly called Supralapsarians, who think that God does only consider his own glory in all that he does:^a and that whatever is done arises, as from its first cause, from the decree of God:^b that in this decree God, considering only the manifestation of his own glory, intended to make the world, to put a race of men in it, to constitute them under Adam as their fountain and head: that he decreed Adam's sin,^c the lapse of his posterity, and Christ's death, together with the salvation or damnation^c of such men as should be most for his own glory: that to those who were to be saved he decreed to give such efficacious assistances,^d as should certainly put them in the way of salvation; and to those whom he rejected he decreed to give such assistances and means^e only as should render them inexcusable: that all men do continue in a state of grace, or of sin,^f and shall be saved or damned, according to that first decree: so that God views himself only,^g and in that view he designs all things singly for his own glory, and for the manifesting of his own attributes.

§8 The second opinion^a is of those called the Sublapsarians, who say, that Adam having sinned freely, and his sin being imputed to all his posterity,^b God did consider mankind, thus lost, with an eye of pity; and having designed to rescue a great number out of this lost state,^c he decreed to send his Son to die for them, to accept of his death on their account, and to give them such assistances as should be effectual both to convert them to him, and to make them persevere to the end: but for the rest, he framed no positive act about them,^d only he left them in that lapsed state, without intending^e that they should have the benefit of Christ's death, or of efficacious and persevering assistances.

§9 The third opinion is of those who^a are called Remonstrants, Arminians, or Universalists, who think^b that God intended to create all men free, and to deal with them according to the use that they should make of their liberty:^c that therefore, foreseeing^d how every one would use it, did, upon that, decree all things that concerned them in this life, together with their salvation and damnation in the next: that Christ died for all men;^e that sufficient assistances are given to every man, but that all men may choose^f whether they will use them, and persevere in them, or not.

§10 The fourth opinion is of the Socinians,^a who deny the certain pre-science of future contingencies; and therefore they think the decrees of God from all eternity were only general; that such as believe and obey the gospel shall be saved, and that such as live and die in sin shall be damned: but that there were no special decrees made concerning particular persons, these being only made in time, according to the state in which they are:

they do also think that man is by nature so free and so entire, that he needs no inward grace; so they deny a special predestination from all eternity, and do also deny inward assistances.

§11 This is a controversy that arises out of natural religion^a for if it is believed that God governs the world, and that the wills of men are free; then it is natural to inquire which of these is subject to the other, or how they can be both maintained? whether God determines the will? or if his Providence follows the motions of the will?^b Therefore all those that believed a Providence have been aware of this difficulty. The Stoics put all things under a fate;^c even the gods themselves: if this fate was a necessary series of things,^d a chain of matter and motion^e that was fixed and unalterable,^(f) then it was plain and downright atheism. The Epicureans set all things at liberty, and either thought that there was no God, or at least that there was no Providence. The philosophers knew not how to avoid this difficulty, by which we see Tully and others were so differently moved, that it is plain they despaired of getting out of it. The Jews had the same question among them; for they could not believe their law, without acknowledging a Providence: and yet the Sadducees among them asserted liberty in so entire a manner, that they set it free from all restraints: on the other hand, the Essens put all things under an absolute fate: and the Pharisees took a middle way; they asserted the freedom of the will, but thought that all things were governed by a Providence.^g There are also subtle disputes concerning this matter among the Mahometans, one sect asserting liberty, and another fate,^h which generally prevails among them.

§12 In the first ages of Christianity, the Gnostics fancied that the souls of men were of different ranks,^a and that they sprang from different principles, or gods, who made them. Some were carnal, that were devoted to perdition; others were spiritual, and were certainly to be saved; others were animal of a middle order, capable either of happiness or misery. It seems that the Marcionites and Manichees thought that some souls were made by the bad god, as others were made by the good. In opposition to all these, Origen asserted, that all souls were by nature equally capable of being either good or bad;^b and that the difference among men arose merely from the freedom of the will, and the various use of that freedom: that God left men to this liberty, and rewarded and punished them according to the use of it;^c yet he asserted a Providence: but as he brought in the Platonical doctrine of preexistence into the government of the world; and as he explained God's loving Jacob, and his hating of Esau, before they were born, and had done either good or evil, by this of a regard to what they had done formerly; so he asserted the fall of man in Adam, and his being re-

covered by grace; but he still maintained an unrestrained liberty in the will. His doctrine, though much hated in Egypt, was generally followed over all the east, particularly in Palestine and at Antioch. St. Gregory Nazianzen and St. Basil drew a system of divinity out of his works, in which that which relates to the liberty of the will is very fully set forth: that book was much studied in the east. Chrysostom, Isidore of Damiete, and Theodoret, with all their followers, taught it so copiously, that it became the received doctrine of the eastern church. Jerome was so much in love with Origen, that he translated some parts of him, and set himself on translating the rest. But as he had a sharp quarrel with the bishops of Palestine, so that perhaps disposed him to change his thoughts of Origen: for ever after that, he set himself much to disgrace his doctrine; and he was very severe on Ruffin for translating him: though Ruffin confesses, that, in translating his works, he took great liberties in altering several passages that he disliked. One of Origen's disciples was Pelagius, a Scottish monk, in great esteem at Rome, both for his learning and the great strictness of his life. He carried these doctrines further than the Greek church had done; so that he was reckoned to have fallen into great errors both by Chrysostom and Isidore (as it is represented by Jansenius, though that is denied by others, who think they meant another of the same name). He denied that we had suffered any harm by the fall of Adam, or that there was any need of inward assistances; and he asserted an entire liberty in the will. St. Austin, though in his disputes with the Manichees he had said many things on the side of liberty, yet he hated Pelagius's doctrines which he thought asserted a sacrilegious liberty, and he set himself to beat down his tenets, which had been but feebly attacked by Jerome. Cassian, a disciple of St. Chrysostom's, came to Marseilles about this time, having left Constantinople perhaps when his master was banished out of it. He taught a middle doctrine, asserting an inward grace, but subject^d to the freedom of the will; and that all things were both decreed and done, according to the pre-science of God, in which all future contingents were foreseen: he also taught, that the first conversion of the soul to God was merely an effect of its free choice; so that all preventing grace was denied by him; which came to be the peculiar distinction of those who were afterward called the Semi-pelagians. Prosper and Hilary gave an account of this system to St. Austin, upon which he writ against it, and his opinions were defended by Prosper, Fulgentius, Orosius, and others, as Cassian's were defended by Faustus, Vincentius, and Gennadius. In conclusion, St. Austin's opinions did generally prevail in the west; only Pelagius, it seems, retiring to his own country, he had many followers among the Britains: but German and Lupus, being sent over once and again from France, are said to have conquered

them so entirely, that they were all freed from these errors: whatever they did by their arguments, the writers of their legends took care to adorn their mission with many very wonderful miracles, of which the gathering of all the pieces of a calf, some of which had been dressed, and the putting them together in its skin, and restoring it again to life, is none of the least. The ruin of the Roman empire, and the disorders that the western provinces fell under by their new and barbarous masters, occasioned in those ages a great decay of learning: so that few writers of fame coming after that time, St. Austin's great labors and piety, and the many vast volumes that he had left behind him, gave him so great a name, that few durst contest what had been so zealously and so copiously defended by him:^e and though it is highly probable, that Celestine was not satisfied with his doctrine; yet both he and the other bishops of Rome, together with many provincial synods, have so often declared his doctrine in those points to be the doctrine of the church, that this is very hardly got over by those of that communion.

§13 The chief, and indeed the only material, difference that is between St. Austin's doctrine and that of the Sublapsarians^a is, that he, holding that with the sacrament of baptism there was joined an inward regeneration, made a difference between the *regenerate* and the *predestinate*, which these do not: he thought persons thus regenerate might have all grace, besides that of *perseverance*; but he thought that they, not being predestinated, were certainly to fall from that state, and from the grace of regeneration. The other differences are but forced strains to represent him and the Calvinists as of different principles: he thought, that overcoming delectation, in which he put the efficacy of grace, was as irresistible, though he used not so strong a word for it as the Calvinists do; and he thought that the decree was as absolute, and made without any regard to what the free will would choose, as any of these do. So in the main points, the absoluteness of the decree, the extent of Christ's death,^b the efficacy of grace, and the certainty of perseverance, their opinions are the same, though their ways of expressing themselves do often differ. But if St. Austin's name and the credit of his books went far, yet no book was more read in the following ages than Cassian's Collations. There was in them a clear thread of good sense, and a very high strain of piety that run through them; and they were thought the best institutions for a monk to form his mind, by reading them attentively: so they still carried down, among those who read them, deep impressions of the doctrine of the Greek church.

§14 This broke out in the ninth century, in which Godescalcus,^a a monk was severely used by Hincmar, and by the church of Rhemes for asserting some of St. Austin's doctrines against which Scotus Erigena wrote; as

Bertram, or Ratramne, wrote for them. Remigius, bishop of Lyons, with his church, did zealously assert St. Austin's doctrine, not without great sharpness against Scotus. After this, the matter slept, till the school-divinity came to be in great credit: and Thomas Aquinas being accounted the chief glory of the Dominican order, he not only asserted all St. Austin's doctrine, but added this to it; that whereas formerly it was in general held, that the providence of God did extend itself to all things whatsoever, he thought^b this was done by God's concurring immediately to the production of every thought, action, motion, or mode; so that God was the first and immediate cause every thing that was done: and in order to the explaining the joint production of every thing by God as the first and by the creature as the second cause, he thought, at least as his followers have understood him, that by a physical influence the will was predetermined by God to all things, whether good or bad;^c so that the will could not be said to be free in that particular instance *in sensu composito*,^d although it was in general still free in all its action *in senso diviso*: a distinction so sacred, and so much used among them, that I choose to give it in their own terms, rather than translate them. To avoid the consequence of making God the author of sin, a distinction was made between the positive act of sin, which was said not to be evil, and the want of its conformity to the law of God, which being a negation was no positive being;^e so that it was not produced. And thus, though the action was produced jointly by God as the first cause, and by the creature as the second, yet God was not guilty of the sin, but only the creature. This doctrine passed down among the Dominicans, and continues to do so to this day. Scotus, who was a Franciscan, denied this predetermination, and asserted the freedom of the will. Durandus denied this immediate concourse, in which he has not had many followers, except Adola^f and some few more.

§15 When Luther began to form his opinions into a body, he clearly saw that nothing did so plainly destroy the doctrine of merit and justification by works, as St. Austin's opinions: he also found in his works very express authorities against most of the corruptions of the Roman church: and being of an order that carried his name, and by consequence was accustomed to read and reverence his works, it was no wonder if he, without a strict examining of the matter, espoused all his opinions. Most of those of the church of Rome who wrote against him, being of other persuasions,^a any one reading the books of that age would have thought that St. Austin's doctrine was abandoned by the church of Rome: so that when Michael Baius, and some others at Louvain, began to revive it, that became a matter of scandal, and they were condemned at Rome: yet at the council of

Trent the Dominicans had so much credit,^b that great care was taken, in the penning their decrees, to avoid all reflections upon that doctrine. It was at first received by the whole Jesuit order,^c so that Bellarmine formed himself upon it, and still adhered to it: but soon after, that order changed their mind, and left their whole body to a full liberty in those points, and went all quickly over to the other hypothesis, that differed from the Semipelagians only in this, that they allowed a preventing grace, but such as was subject to the freedom of the will.

§16 Molina and Fonseca invented a new way of explaining God's foreseeing future contingents, which they called a *middle*, or *mean science*; by which they taught, that as God sees all things as possible in his knowledge of *simple apprehension*, and all things that are certainly future, as present in his knowledge of vision; so by this knowledge^a he also sees the chain of all conditionate futurities, and all the connections of them, that is, whatsoever would follow upon such or such conditions. Great jealousies arising upon the progress that the order of the Jesuits was making, these opinions were laid hold on to mortify them; so they were complained of at Rome for departing from St. Austin's doctrine, which in these points was generally received as the doctrine of the Latin church: and many conferences were held before pope Clement the Eighth, and the cardinals; where the point in debate was chiefly, What was the doctrine and tradition of the church? The advantages that St. Austin's followers had were such that before fair judges they must have triumphed over the other: pope Clement had so resolved; but he dying, though pope Paul the Fifth had the same intentions, yet he happened then to be engaged in a quarrel with the Venetians about the ecclesiastical immunities, and having put that republic under an *interdict*, the Jesuits who were there chose to be banished, rather than to break the *interdict*: and their adhering so firmly to the papal authority, when most of the other orders forsook it, was thought so meritorious at Rome, that it saved them the censure: so, instead of a decision, all sides were commanded to be silent, and to quarrel no more upon those heads.^b

§17 About forty years after that, Jansenius, a doctor of Louvain, being a zealous disciple of St. Austin's, and seeing the progress that the contrary doctrines were making, did, with great industry, and an equal fidelity, publish a voluminous system of St. Austin's doctrine in all the several branches of the controversy:^a and he set forth the Pelagians and the Semipelagians in that work under very black characters; and, not content with that, he compared the doctrines of the modern innovators with theirs. This book was received by the whole party with great applause, as a work that

had decided the controversy. But the author having writ with an extraordinary force against the French pretensions on Flanders,^b which recommended him so much to the Spanish court, that he was made a bishop upon it: all those in France who followed St. Austin's doctrine, and applauded this book, were represented by their enemies as being in the same interests with him, and by consequence as enemies to the French greatness; so that the court of France prosecuted the whole party. This book was at first only prohibited at Rome, as a violation of that silence that the pope had enjoined; afterward articles were picked out of it, and condemned, and all the clergy of France were required to the condemnation of them. These articles were certainly in his book,^c and were manifest consequences of St. Austin's doctrine, which was chiefly driven at; though it was still declared at Rome, that nothing was intended to be done in prejudice of St. Austin's doctrine.^d Upon this pretense his party have said, that those articles being, capable of two senses, the one of which was strained, and was heretical, the other of which was clear, and according to St. Austin's doctrine, it must be presumed it was not in that second but in the other sense, that they were condemned^e at Rome, and so they signed the condemnation of them: but then they said, that they were not in Jansenius's book in the sense in which they condemned them.

§18 Upon that followed a most extravagant question concerning the pope's infallibility in matters of fact: it being said on the one side, that the pope having condemned them as Jansenius's opinions, the belief of his infallibility obliged them to conclude that they must be in his book: whereas the others with great truth affirmed, that it had never been thought that in matters of fact either popes or councils were infallible. At last a new cessation of hostilities upon these points was resolved on;^a yet the hatred continues and the war goes on,^b though more covertly and more indirectly than before.

§19 Nor are the reformed more of a piece than the church of Rome upon these points. Luther went on long, as he at first set out, with so little disguise, that whereas all parties had always pretended that they asserted the *freedom of the will*, he plainly spoke out, and said the will was not *free*, but *enslaved*: yet before he died, he is reported to have changed his mind; for though he never owned that, yet Melanthon, who had been of the same opinion, did freely retract it; for which he was never blamed by Luther. Since that time all the Lutherans have gone into the Semipelagian opinions so entirely and so eagerly, that they will neither tolerate nor hold communion with any of the other persuasion.^a Calvin not only taught St. Austin's doctrine, but seemed to go on to the Supralapsarian way; which

was more openly taught by Beza, and was generally followed by the reformed; only the difference between the Supralapsarians and the Sublapsarians was never brought to a decision; divines being in all the Calvinists' churches left to their freedom as to that point.^b

§20 In England the first reformers were generally in the Sublapsarian hypothesis: but Perkins and others having asserted the Supralapsarian way, Arminius, a professor in Leyden, writ against him: upon this Gomarus and he had many disputes; and these opinions bred a great distraction over all the United Provinces. At the same time another political matter occasioning a division of opinion, whether the war should be carried on with Spain, or if propositions for a peace or truce should be entertained? it happened that Arminius's followers were all for a peace, and the others were generally for carrying on the war; which being promoted by the prince of Orange, he joined to them: and the Arminians were represented as men, whose opinions and affections leaned to popery: so that this, from being a doctrinal point, became the distinction of a party, and by that means the differences were inflamed. A great synod met at Dort; to which the divines were sent from hence, as well as from other churches. The Arminian tenets were condemned,^a but the difference between the Supralapsarians and Sublapsarians was not meddled with. The divines of this church, though very moderate in the way of proposing their opinions, yet upon the main adhered to St. Austin's doctrine. So the breach was formed in Holland: but when the point of state was no more mixed with it, these questions were handled with less heat.

§21 Those disputes quickly crossed the seas, and divided us: the abbots adhered to St. Austin's doctrine; while bishop Overal, but chiefly archbishop Laud, espoused the Arminian tenets.^a All divines were by proclamation required not to preach upon those heads: but those that favored the new opinions were encouraged, and the others were depressed. And unhappy disputes falling in at that time concerning the extent of the royal prerogative beyond law, the Arminians having declared themselves highly for that, they were as much favored at court, as they were censured in the parliament: which brought that doctrine under a very hard character over all the nation.

§22 Twisse carried it high to the Supralapsarian hypothesis, which grew to be generally followed by those of that side: but that sounded harshly; and Hobbes^a grafting afterward a fate and absolute necessity upon it, the other opinions were again revived; and no political interests falling in with them, as all prejudices against them went off, so they were more calmly debated, and became more generally acceptable than they were before. Men are now left to their liberty in them, and all anger upon those heads

is now so happily extinguished, that diversity of opinions about them begets no alienation nor animosity.

§23 So far have I prosecuted a short view of the history of this controversy. I come now to open the chief grounds of the different parties and first, for the Supralapsarians.

§24 They lay this down for a foundation, that God is essentially perfect and independent in all his acts: so that he can consider nothing but himself and his own glory;^a that therefore he designed everything in and for himself: that to make him stay his decrees till he sees what free creatures will do, is to make him decree dependently upon them;^b which seems to fall short of infinite perfection: that he himself can be the only end of his counsels; and that therefore he could only consider the manifestation of his own attributes and perfection; that infinite wisdom must begin its designs at that which is to come last in the execution of them;^c and since the conclusion of all things at the last day will be^d the manifestation of the wisdom, goodness, and justice of God, we ought to suppose, that God, in the order of things designed that first, though in the order of time there is no first nor second in God, this being supposed to be from all eternity. After this great design was laid, all the means in order to the end were next to be designed. Creatures in the sight of God are as nothing, and, by a strong figure, are said to be less than nothing, and vanity.^e Now if we in our designs do not consider ants or insects, not to say straws, or grains of sand and dust,^f then what lofty thoughts soever our pride may suggest to us must be confessed to be very poor and inconsiderable creatures before God;^g therefore he himself and his own glory can only be his own end in all that he desires or does.^h

§25 This is the chief basis^a of their doctrine and so ought to be well considered. They add to this, that there can be no certain prescience of future contingents. They say it involves a contradiction, that things which are not certainly to be, should be certainly foreseen;^b for if they are certainly foreseen they must certainly be: so while they are supposed to be contingent, they are yet affirmed to be certain, by saying that they are certainly foreseen. When God decrees that any thing shall be, it has from that a certain futurition,^c and as such it is certainly foreseen by him: all uncertain foresight is an act of its nature imperfect, because it may be a mistake, and so is inconsistent with the divine perfection. And it seems to imply a contradiction to say that a thing happens freely, that is, may be, or may not be,^d and yet that it is certainly foreseen by God. God cannot force things, but as he decrees them, and so gives them a futurition, and, therefore, this prescience antecedent to his decree must be rejected as a thing impossible.^e

§26 They say further, that conditionate decrees are imperfect in their nature,^a and that they subject the will and acts of God to a creature;^b that a conditionate decree is an act in suspense, whether it shall be or not; which is inconsistent with infinite perfection. A general will, or rather a willing that all men should be saved, has also plain characters of imperfection in it:^c as if God wished somewhat that he could not accomplish, so that his goodness should seem to be more extended than his power.^d Infinite perfection can wish nothing^e but what it can execute; and if it is fit to wish it,^f it is fit also to execute it. Therefore all that style, that ascribes passions or affections to God, must be understood in a figure;^g so that when his providence exerts itself in such acts as among us men would be the effects of those passions, then the passions themselves are in the phrase of the scripture ascribed to God. They say we ought not to measure the punishments of sin by our notions of justice:^h God afflicts many good men very severely, and for many years in this life, and this only for the manifestation of his own glory, for making their faith and patience to shine;ⁱ and yet none think that this is unjust. It is a method in which God will be glorified in them: some sins are punished with other sins, and likewise with a course of severe miseries: if we transfer this from time to eternity, the whole will be then more conceivable; for if God may do for a little time that which is inconsistent with our notions, and with our rules of justice^k he may do it for a longer duration; since it is as impossible that he can be unjust for a day, as for all eternity.

§27 As God does every thing for himself and his own glory, so the scriptures teach us everywhere to offer up all praise and glory to God; to acknowledge that all is of him, and to humble ourselves as being nothing before him.^a Now if we were elected not by a free act of his;^b but by what he foresaw that we would be, so that his grace is not efficacious by its own force, but by the good use that we make of it, then the glory and praise of all the good we do, and of God's purposes to us, were due to ourselves:^c he designs, according to the other doctrine, equally well to all men; and all the difference among them will arise neither from God's intentions to them, nor from his assistances, but from the good use that he foresaw they would make of these favors that he was to give in common to all mankind:^d man should have whereof to glory, and he might say, that he himself made himself to differ from others. The whole strain of the scriptures in ascribing all good things to God, and in charging us to offer up the honor of all to him, seems very expressly to favor this doctrine; since if all our good is from God, and is particularly owing to his grace;^e then good men have somewhat from God that bad men have not; for which they

ought to praise him.^f The style of all the prayers that are used or directed to be used in the scripture, is for a grace that opens our eyes, that turns our hearts, that makes us to go, that leads us not into temptation, but delivers us from evil. All these phrases do plainly import that we desire more than a power or capacity to act, such as is given to all men, and such as, after we have received it, may be still ineffectual to us.^g For to pray for such assistances as are always given to all men, and are such that the whole good of them shall wholly depend upon ourselves,^h would sound very oddly; whereas we pray for somewhat that is special, and that we hope shall be effectual. We do not and cannot pray earnestly for that, which we know all men as well as we ourselves have at all times.

§28 Humility and earnestness in prayer seem to be among the chief means of working in us the image of Christ, and of deriving to us all the blessings of heaven. That doctrine which blasts both, which swells us up with an opinion that all come from ourselves,^a and that we receive nothing from God but what is given in common with us to all the world, is certainly contrary both to the spirit and to the design of the gospel.

§29 To this they add observations from Providence. The world was for many ages delivered up to idolatry; and since the Christian religion has appeared, we see vast tracts of countries which have continued ever since in idolatry: others are fallen under Mohametism; and the state of Christendom is in the eastern parts of it under so much ignorance, and the greatest part of the west is under so much corruption, that we must confess the far greatest part of mankind has been all ages left destitute of the means of grace, so that the promulgating the gospel to some nations, and the denying it to others, must be ascribed to the unsearchable ways of God, that are past finding out. If he thus leaves whole nations in such darkness and corruption, and freely chooses others to communicate the knowledge of himself to them, then we need not wonder if he should hold the same method with individuals, that he does with whole bodies: for the rejecting of whole nations by the lump for so many ages, is much more unaccountable than the selecting of a few, and the leaving others in that state of ignorance and brutality. And whatever may be said of his extending mercy to some few of those who have made a good use of that dim light which they had; yet it cannot be denied but their condition is much more deplorable, and the condition of the others is much more hopeful; so that great numbers of men are born in such circumstances, that it is morally impossible that they should not perish in them; whereas others are more happily situated and enlightened.^a

§30 This argument, taken from common observation becomes much stronger, when we consider what the apostle says, particularly in the Epistles to the Romans and the Ephesians, even according to the exposition of those of the other side: for if God *loved* Jacob, so as to choose his posterity to be his people, and rejected or *hated* Esau and his posterity, and if that was according to the *purpose* and design of his election; if by the same purpose the Gentiles were to be grafted upon that stock, from which the Jews were then to be cut off; and if the counsel or purpose of God had appeared in particular to those of Ephesus, though the most corrupted both in magic, idolatry, and immorality, of any in the east; then it is plain, that the applying the means of grace, arises merely from a great design that was long hid in God, which did then break out.^(a) It is reasonable to believe, that there is a proportion between the application of the means, and the decree itself concerning the end. The one is resolved into the unsearchable riches of God's grace, and declared to be free and absolute.^b God's choosing the nation of the Jews in such a distinction beyond all other nations, is by Moses and the prophets frequently said not to be on their own account, or on the account of any thing that God saw in them, but merely from the goodness of God to them.^c From all this it seems, say they, as reasonable to believe that the other is likewise free,^d according to those words of our Saviour's, "I thank thee, O Father. Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes": the reason of which is given in the following words, "Even so, Father, for it seemed good in thy sight."^e What goes before, of Tyre and Sidon, and the land of Sodom, that would have made a better use of his preaching, than the towns of Galilee had done, among whom he lived, confirms this, that the means of grace are not bestowed on those of whom it was foreseen that they would have made a good use of them; or denied^f to those who, as was foreseen, would have made an ill use of them; the contrary of this being plainly asserted in those words of our Saviour's. It is further observable, that he seems not to be speaking here of different nations, but of the different sorts of men of the same nation: the learned of the Jews, the wise and prudent, rejected him, while the simpler, but better sort,^g *the babes*, received him: so that the difference between individual persons seems here to be resolved into the *good pleasure of God*.^h

§31 It is further urged, that since those of the other side confess, that God by his prescience foresaw what circumstances might be happy, and what assistances might prove efficacious, to bad men; then his not putting them in those circumstances, but giving them such assistances only, which, how

effectual soever they might be to others, he saw would have no efficacy on them, and his putting them in circumstances, and giving them assistances, which he foresaw they would abuse, if it may seem to clear the justice of God, yet it cannot clear his infinite holiness and goodness; which must ever carry him, according to our notions of these perfections, to do all that may be done, and that in the most effectual way, to rescue others from misery, to make them truly good, and to put them in a way to be happy. Since therefore this is not always done, according to the other opinion, it is plain that there is an unsearchable depth in the ways of God, which we are not able to fathom.^a Therefore it must be concluded, that since all are not actually good, and so put in a way to be saved, that God did not intend that it should be so; for “who hath resisted his will?”^b The counsel of the Lord standeth fast, and the thoughts of his heart to all generations.” It is true, his laws are his will in one respect: he requires all to obey them: he approves them, and obliges all men to keep them. All the expressions of his desires that all men should be saved, are to be explained of the will of revelation, commonly called *the sign of his will*.^c When it is said, *What more could have been done?* that is to be understood of outward means and blessings:^d but still God has a secret will of his *good pleasure*, in which he designs all things; and this can never be frustrated.

§32 From this they do also conclude, that though Christ’s death was to be offered to all Christians, yet that intentionally and actually he only died for those whom the Father had chosen and given to him to be saved by him. They cannot think that Christ could have *died in vain*, which St. Paul speaks of as a vast absurdity.^a Now since, if he had died for all, he should have died in vain, with relation to the far greater part of mankind, who are not to be saved by him; they from thence conclude, that all those for whom he died are certainly saved by him.^b Perhaps with relation to some subaltern blessings, which are through him communicated, if not to all mankind, yet to all Christians, he may be said to have died for all: but as to eternal salvation, they believe his design went no further than the secret purpose and election of God, and this they think is implied in these words, “all that are given me of my Father: thine they were, and thou gavest them me.” He also limits his intercession to those only; “I pray not for the world, but for those that thou hast given me; for they are thine: and all thine are mine, and mine are thine.”^c They believe that he also limited to them the extent of his death, and of that sacrifice which he offered in it.

§33 It is true, the Christian religion being to be distinguished from the Jewish in this main point, that whereas the Jewish was restrained to Abraham’s posterity, and confined within one race and nation, the Christian

was to be preached to *every creature*; universal words are used concerning the death of Christ: but as the words, “preaching to every creature,” and to “all the world,” are not to be understood in the utmost extent, for then they have never been verified;^a since the gospel has never yet, for aught that appears to us, been preached to every nation under heaven; but are only to be explained generally of a commission not limited to one or more nations; none being excluded from it: the apostles were to execute it in going from city to city, as they should be inwardly moved to it by the Holy Ghost: so they think that those large words, that are applied to the death of Christ, are to lie understood in the same qualified manner; that no nation or sort of men are excluded from it, and that some of all kinds and sorts shall be saved by him.^b And this is to be carried no further, without an imputation on the justice of God: for if he has received a sufficient oblation and satisfaction^c for the sins of the whole world it is not reconcilable to justice, that all should not be saved by it, or should not at least have the offer and promulgation of it made them; that so a trial may be made whether they will accept of it or not.^d

§34 The *grace of God* is set forth in scripture by such figures and expressions as do plainly intimate its efficacy; and that it does not depend upon it to use it,^a or not to use it, at pleasure. It is said to be a creation; “we are created unto good works, and we become new creatures”: it is called a regeneration, or a *new birth*; it is called a quickening and a resurrection; as our former state is compared to a feebleness, a blindness, and a death. God is said “to work in us both to will and to do: His people shall be willing in the day of his power: He will write his laws in their hearts, and make them to walk in them.” Mankind is compared to a mass of clay in the hand of the *potter*, who of the same lump makes at his pleasure “vessels of honour or of dishonour.” These passages, this last in particular^b do insinuate an absolute and a conquering power in grace; and that the love of God constrains us,^c as St. Paul speaks expressly.

§35 All outward coaction is contrary to the nature of liberty, and all those inward impressions that drove on the prophets, so that they had not the free use of their faculties, but felt themselves carried they knew not how, are inconsistent with it; yet when a man feels that his faculties go in their method, and that he assents or chooses from a thread of inward conviction and ratiocination, he still acts freely, that is, by an internal principle of reason and thought. A man acts as much according to his faculties, when he assents to a truth, as when he chooses what he is to do: and if his mind were so enlightened, that he saw as clearly the good of moral things, as he perceives speculative truths, so that he felt himself as little able to resist

the one as the other, he would be no less a free and a rational creature,^a than if he were left to a more unlimited range; nay the more evidently that he saw the true good of things, and the more that he were determined by it, he should then act more suitably to his faculties, and to the excellence of his nature. For though the saints in heaven being made perfect in glory are no more capable of further rewards, yet it cannot be denied but they act with a more accomplished liberty, because they see all things in a true light, according to that, “in thy light we shall see light”: and therefore they conclude that such an overcoming degree of grace, by which a man is made willing through the illumination of his understanding, and not by any blind or violent impulse, is no way contrary to the true notion of liberty.^b

§36 After all, they think, that if a debate falls to be between the sovereignty of God, his acts and his purposes, and the freedom of man’s will, it is modest and decent rather to make the abatement on man’s part, than on God’s;^a but they think there is no need for this. They infer, that besides the outward enlightening of a man by knowledge, there is an inward enlightening of the mind, and a secret forcible conviction stamped on it; otherwise what can be meant by the prayer of St. Paul for the Ephesians, who had already heard the gospel preached, and were instructed in it; “that the eyes of their understanding being enlightened, they might know what was the hope of his calling, and what the riches of the glory of his inheritance in the saints, and what was the exceeding greatness of his power towards them that believed.” This seems to be somewhat that is both internal and efficacious.^b Christ compares the union and influence that he communicates to believers, to that union of a head with the members, and of a root with the branches, which imports an internal, a vital, and an efficacious influence. And though the outward means that are offered may be, and always are rejected, when not accompanied with this overcoming grace;^c yet this never returns empty; these outward means coming from God, the resisting of them is said to be the “resisting God, the grieving or quenching his Spirit”;^d and so in that sense we resist the grace or favour of God; but we can never withstand him when he intends to overcome us.^e

§37 As for perseverance, it is a necessary consequence of absolute decrees, and of efficacious grace;^a for since all depends upon God, and that as “of his own will he begat us,” so with him “there is neither variableness nor shadow of turning: whom he loves he loves to the end”; and he has promised, that “he will never leave nor forsake those to whom he becomes a God”: we must from thence conclude, that “the purpose and calling of God is without repentance.”^b And therefore though good men may fall

into grievous sins, to keep them from which there are dreadful things said in scripture, against their falling away or apostasy;^c yet God does so uphold them, that, though he suffers them often to feel the weight of their natures, yet of all that are given by the Father to the Son to be saved by him, none are lost.^d

§38 Upon the whole matter, they believe that God did in himself and for his own glory *foreknow* such a determinate number, whom he pitched upon, to be the persons in whom he would be both sanctified and glorified: that, having thus foreknown them, he predestined them to be holy;^a conformable to the image of his Son: that these were to be *called* not by a general calling in the sense of these words, “many are called, but few are chosen”; but to be “called according to his purpose”;^b and those he *justified* upon their obeying that calling; and he will in conclusion *glorify* them. Nor are these words only to be limited to the sufferings of good men; they are to be extended to all the effects of the love of God, according to that which follows, that “nothing can separate us^c from the love of God in Christ.” The whole reasoning in the 9th of the Romans does so plainly resolve all the acts of God’s mercy and justice, his *hardenings*, as well as his pardoning, into an absolute freedom, and an unsearchable depth,^d that more express words to that effect can hardly be imagined.

§39 It is in general said, that “the children being yet unborn, neither having done good or evil; that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth; Jacob was loved and Esau hated”; that God “raised up Pharaoh, that he might shew his power in him”; and when an objection is suggested against all this, instead of answering it, it is silenced with this, “Who art thou, O man, that repliest against God?”^a And all is illustrated with the figure of the potter; and concluded with this solemn question, “What if God, willing to shew his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction?” This carries the reader to consider what is so often repeated in the book of Exodus, concerning God’s “hardening the heart of Pharaoh, so that he would not let his people go.” It is said, that God “has made the wicked man for the day of evil”;^b as it is written on the other hand, that “as many believed the gospel, as were appointed to eternal life.”^c Some are said to be “written in the book of life, of the Lamb slain before the foundation of the world, or according to God’s purpose before the world began.” Ungodly men are said to be “of old ordained to condemnation, and to be given up by God unto vile affections, and to be given over by him to a reprobate mind.” Therefore they think that reprobation is an absolute and free act of God, as well as elec-

tion,^d to manifest his holiness and justice in them who are under it, as well as his love and mercy is manifested in the elect.^e Nor can they think with the Sublapsarians, that reprobation is only God's passing by those whom he does not elect; this is an act unworthy of God, as if he forgot them,^f which does clearly imply imperfection. And as for that which is said concerning their being fallen in Adam, they argue, that either Adam's sin, and the connection of all mankind to him as their head and representative, was absolutely decreed, or it was not: if it was, then all is absolute; Adam's sin^g and the fall of mankind were decreed, and by consequence all from the beginning to the end are under a continued chain of absolute decrees;^h and then the Supralapsarian and the Sublapsarian hypothesis will be one and the same, only variously expressed. But if Adam's sin was only foreseen and permitted, then a conditionate decree founded upon prescience is once admitted, so that all that follows turns upon it; and then all the arguments either against the perfection of such acts, or the certainty of such a prescience, turn against this;ⁱ for if they are admitted in any one instance, then they may be admitted in others as well as in that.

§40 The Sublapsarians do always avoid to answer this;^a and it seems they do rather incline to think that Adam was under an absolute decree; and if so, then though their doctrine may seem to those, who do not examine things nicely, to look more plausible; yet really it amounts to the same thing with the other. For it is all one to say, that God decreed that Adam should sin,^b and that all mankind should fall in him, and that then God should choose out of mankind, thus fallen by his decree, such as he would save, and leave the rest in that lapsed state to perish in it; as it is to say, that God intending to save some, and to damn others, did, in order to the carrying this on in a method of justice, decree Adam's fall, and the fall of mankind in him, in order to the saving of his elect, and the damning of the rest. All that the Sublapsarians say in this particular for themselves is, that the scripture has not declared any thing concerning the fall of Adam, in such formal terms, that they can affirm any thing concerning it.^c A liberty of another kind seems to have been then in man, when he was made after the image of God, and before he was corrupted by sin. And therefore though it is not easy to clear all difficulties in so intricate a matter, yet it seems reasonable to think, that man in a state of innocence was a purer and a freer creature to good,^d than now he is. But after all, this seems to be only a fleeing from the difficulty, to a less offensive way of talking of it;^e for if the prescience of future contingents cannot be certain, unless they are decreed, then God could not certainly foreknow Adam's sin, without he had made an absolute decree^f about it; and that, as was just now said, is the

same thing with the Supralapsarian hypothesis; of which I shall say no more, having now laid together in a small compass the full strength of this argument. I go next to set out with the same fidelity and exactness the Remonstrants' arguments.

§41 They begin with this, that God is just, holy, and merciful: that, in speaking of himself in the scripture with relation to those attributes, he is pleased to make appeals to men, to call them to reason with him: thus his prophets did often bespeak the Jewish nation; the meaning of which is, that God acts so, that men, according, to the notions that they have of those attributes, may examine them, and will be forced to justify and approve them.^a Nay, in these God proposes himself to us, as our pattern; Eve ought to imitate him in them, and by consequence Eve may frame just notions of them. We are required to be holy and merciful as he is merciful. What then can we think of a justice that shall condemn us for a fact that we never committed, and that was done many years before we were born?^b as also that designs first of all to be glorified by our being eternally miserable, any that decrees that we shall commit sins,^c to justify the previous decree of our reprobation? If those decrees are thus originally designed by God, and are certainly effectuated, then it is inconceivable how there should be a justice in punishing that which God himself appointed by an antecedent and irreversible decree should be done: so this seems to lie hard upon justice. It is no less hard upon infinite holiness, to imagine that a Being of "purer eyes than that it can behold iniquity," should by an antecedent decree fix our committing so many sins, in such a manner that it is not possible for us to avoid them:^d this is to make us to be born indeed under a necessity of sin; and yet this necessity is said to flow from the act and decrees of God: God represents himself always in the scriptures as "gracious,^e merciful, slow to anger, and abundant in goodness and truth." It is often said, that "he desires that no man should perish, but that all should come to the knowledge of the truth": and this is said sometimes with the solemnity of an oath; "As I Live, saith the Lord, I take no pleasure in the death of sinners." They ask, what sense can such words bear, if we can believe that God did by an absolute decree reprobate so many of them? If all things that happen do arise out of the decree of God as its first cause,^f then we must believe that God takes pleasure both in his own decrees and in the execution of them;^g and, by consequence, that he takes pleasure in the death of sinners, and that in contradiction to the most express and most solemn words of scripture. Besides, what can we think of the truth of God, and of the sincerity of those offers of grace and mercy, with the obtestations, the exhortations, and expostulations upon them, that occur so often

in scripture, if we can think that by antecedent acts of God he determined that all these should be ineffectual;^h so that they are only so many solemn words that do indeed signify nothing, if God intended that all things should fall out as they do;ⁱ and if they do so fall out only because he intended it? The chief foundation of this opinion lies in this argument as its basis, that nothing can be believed that contradicts the justice, holiness, the truth, and purity, of God;^k that these attributes are in God according to our notions concerning them;^l only they are in him infinitely more perfect; since we are required to imitate them. Whereas the doctrine of absolute decrees does manifestly contradict the clearest ideas that we can form of justice, holiness, truth, and goodness.^m

§42 From the nature of God they go to the nature of man; and they think that such an inward freedom by which a man is the master of his own actions, and can do or not do what he pleases, is so necessary to the morality of our actions, that without it our actions are neither good nor evil,^a neither capable of rewards or punishment. Mad men, or men asleep,^b are not to be charged with the good or evil of what they do; therefore at least some degrees of liberty must be left with us,^c otherwise why are we praised or blamed for any thing that we do? If a man thinks that he is under an inevitable^d decree, as he will leave little remorse for all the evil he does, while he imputes it to that inevitable force that constrains him, so he will naturally conclude that it is to no purpose for him to struggle with impossibilities:^e and men being inclined both to throw all blame off from themselves, and to indulge themselves in laziness and sloth, these practices are too natural to mankind to be encouraged by opinions that favour them. All virtue and religion, all discipline and industry, must arise from this as their first principle; that there is a power in us to govern our own thoughts and actions, and to raise and improve our faculties.^f If this is denied, all endeavours, all education, all pains either on ourselves or others, are vain and fruitless things.^g Nor is it possible to make a man believe other than this for he does so plainly perceive that he is a free agent;^h he feels himself balance matters in his thoughts, and deliberate about them so evidently, that he certainly knows he is a free being.

§43 This is the image of God that is stamped upon his nature; and though he feels himself often hurried on so impetuously, that he may seem to have lost his freedom in some turns, and upon some occasions: yet he feels that he might have^a restrained that heat in its first beginnings; he feels he can divert his thoughts, and master himself in most things, when he sets himself to it: he finds that knowledge and reflection, that good company, and good exercises, do tame and soften him, and that bad ones make him wild,

loose, and irregular. From all this they conclude that man is free, and not under inevitable fate, or irresistible motions either to good or evil. All this they confirm from the whole current of the scripture, that is full of persuasions, exhortations, reproofs, expostulations, encouragements, and terrors; which are all vain and theatrical things, if there are no free powers in us to which they are addressed:^b to what purpose is it to speak to dead men, to persuade the blind to see, or the lame to run? If we are under an impotence till the irresistible grace comes, and if, when it comes, nothing can withstand it, then what occasion is there for all those solemn discourses, if they can have no effect on us? They cannot render us inexcusable,^c unless it were in our power to be bettered by them; and to imagine that God gives light and blessings to those whom he before intended to damn, only to make them inexcusable when they could do them no good, and they will serve only to aggravate their condemnation,^d gives so strange an idea of that infinite goodness, that it is not fit to express it by those terms which do naturally arise upon it.

§44 It is as hard to suppose two contrary wills^a in God, the one commanding us our duty, and requiring us with the most solemn obtestations to do it, and the other putting a certain bar in our way, by decreeing that we shall do the contrary.^b This makes God look as if he had a *will* and a *will*; though a heart and a heart import no good quality when applied to men: the one *will* requires us to do our duty, and the other makes it impossible for us not to sin: the *will* for the good is ineffectual, while the will that makes us sin is infallible.^c These things seem very hard to be apprehended; and whereas the root of true religion is the having right and high ideas of God and of his attributes, here such ideas arise as naturally give us strange thoughts of God; and if they are received by us as originals, upon which we are to form our own natures, such notions may make us grow to be spiteful, imperious, and without bowels, but do not seem proper to inspire us with love, mercy, and compassion; though God is always proposed to us in that view.^d All preaching and instruction does also suppose this: for to what purpose are men called upon, taught, and endeavoured to be persuaded, if they are not free agents, and have not a power over their own thoughts, and if they are not to be convinced and turned by reason? The offers of peace and pardon that are made to all men are delusory things, if they are by an antecedent act of God restrained only to a few, and all others are barred from them.

§45 It is further to be considered, say they, that God having made men free creatures, his governing them accordingly, and making his own administration of the world suitable to it, is no diminution of his own au-

thority: it is only the carrying on of his own creation according to the several natures that he has put in that variety of beings of which this world is composed, and with which it is diversified: therefore if some of the acts of God,^a with relation to man, are not so free as his other acts are, and as we may suppose necessary to the ultimate perfection of an independent being, this arises not from any defect in the acts of God, but because the nature of the creature that he intended to make free is inconsistent with such acts.^b

§46 The Divine Omnipotence^a is not lessened when we observe some of his works to be more beautiful and useful than others are; and the irregular productions of nature do not derogate from the order in which all things appear lovely to the Divine Mind.^b So if that liberty, with which he intended to endue thinking beings, is incompatible with such positive acts, and so positive a providence as governs natural things and this material world,^c then this is no way derogatory to the sovereignty of his mind. This does also give such an account of the evil that is in the world, as does no way accuse or lessen the purity and holiness of God; since he only suffers his creatures to go on in the free use of those powers that he has given them; about which he exercises a special providence, making some men's sins to be the immediate punishments of their own or of other men's sins, and restraining them often in a great deal of that evil that they do design, and bringing out of it a great deal of good that they did not design; but all is done in a way suitable to their natures, without any violence to them.

§47 It is true, it is not easy to shew how those future contingencies, which depend upon the free choice of the will should be certain and infallible. But we are on other accounts certain that it is so; for we see through the whole scriptures a thread of very positive prophecies, the accomplishment of which depended on the free will of man; and these predictions, as they were made very precisely, so they were no less punctually accomplished.^a Not to mention any other prophecies, all those that related to the death and sufferings of Christ were fulfilled by the free acts of the priests and people of the Jews: they sinned in doing it, which proves that they acted in it with their natural liberty. By these and all the other prophecies that are in both Testaments, it must be confessed, that these things were certainly foreknown; but where to found that certainty,^b cannot be easily resolved; the infinite perfection of the Divine Mind ought here to silence all objections. A clear idea, by which we apprehend a thing to be plainly contrary to the attributes of God, is indeed a just ground of rejecting it; and therefore they think that they are in the right to deny all such to be in God, as they plainly apprehend to be contrary to justice, truth, and goodness: but

if the objection against any thing supposed to be in God lies only against the manner and the unconceivableness of it, there the infinite perfection of God answers all.

§48 It is further to be considered, that this prescience does not make the effects certain, because they are foreseen; but they are foreseen because they are to be; so that the certainty of the prescience is not antecedent or causal, but subsequent and eventual. Whatsoever happens, was future before it happened; and since it happened it was certainly future from all eternity; not by a certainty of fate,^a but by a certainty that arises out of its being once, from which this truth, that it was future, was eternally certain: therefore the Divine Prescience being only the knowing all things that were to come, that does not infer a necessity^b or causality.

§49 The scripture plainly shews on some occasions a conditionate prescience:^a God answered David, that Saul was come to Keilah, and that the men of Keilah were to deliver him up; and yet both the one and the other was upon the condition of his staying there; and he going from thence, neither the one nor the other ever happened: here was a conditionate prescience. Such was Christ's saying, that those of Tyre and Sidon, Sodom and Gomorrah, would have turned to him, if they had seen the miracles that he wrought in some of the towns of Galilee. Since then this prescience may be so certain, that it can never be mistaken, nor misguide the designs or providence of God; and since by this both the attributes of God are indicated, and the due freedom of the will of man is asserted, all difficulties seem to be easily cleared this way.

§50 As for the giving to some nations and persons the means of salvation and the denying these to others, the scriptures do indeed ascribe that wholly to the riches and freedom of God's grace;^a but still they think, that he gives to all men that which is necessary to the state in which they are, to answer the obligations they are under in it; and that this light and common grace is sufficient^b to carry them so far, that God will either accept of it, or give them further degrees of illumination;^c from which it must be inferred, that all men are inexcusable in his sight; and that "God is always just and clear as when he judges"; since every man had that which was sufficient, if not to save him, yet at least to bring him to a state of salvation. But besides what is thus simply necessary, and is of itself sufficient, there are innumerable favours, like largesses of God's grace and goodness; these God gives freely as he pleases.

§51 And thus the great designs of Providence go on according to the goodness and mercy of God. None can complain, though some have more

cause to rejoice and glory in God than others. What happens to nations in a body may also happen to individuals; some may have higher privileges, be put in happier circumstances, and have such assistances given them as God foresees will become *effectual*, and not only those, which though they lie in their nature *sufficient*, yet in the event will be *ineffectual*:^a every man ought to complain of himself for not using that which was sufficient, as he might have done; and all good men will have matter of rejoicing in God, for giving them what he foresaw would prove effectual. After all, they acknowledge there is a depth in this, of God's not giving all nations an equal measure of light, nor putting all men into equally happy circumstances, which they cannot unriddle: but still justice, goodness, and truth, are saved; though we may imagine a goodness that may do to all men what is absolutely the best for them;^(b) and there they confess there is a difficulty, but not equal to those of the other side.

§52 From hence it is that they expound all those passages in the New Testament, concerning the *purpose*, the *election*, the *foreknowledge*, and the *predestination* of God, so often mentioned. All those, they say, relate to God's design of calling the Gentile world to the knowledge of the Messias: this was kept secret, though hints of it are given in several of the Prophets; so it was a mystery; but it was then revealed, when, according to Christ's commission to his apostles, to go and teach all nations, they went preaching the gospel to the Gentiles. This was a stumbling-block to the Jews, and it was the chief subject of controversy betwixt them and the apostles at the time when the Epistles were writ: so it was necessary for them to clear this very fully, and to come often over it. But there was no need of amusing people in the beginnings of Christianity, and in that first infancy of it, with high and unsearchable speculations concerning the decrees of God: therefore they observe, that the apostles shew how that Abraham at first, Isaac and Jacob afterwards, were chosen by a discriminating favour, that they and their posterity should be in covenant with God: and upon that occasion the apostle goes on to shew, that God had always designed to call in the Gentiles, though that was not executed but by their ministry.

§53 With this key one will find a plain coherent sense in all St. Paul's discourses on this subject, without asserting antecedent and special decrees as to particular persons.^a Things that happen under a permissive and directing Providence, may be also in a largeness of expression ascribed to the will and counsel of God; for a permissive and directing will is really a will, though it be not antecedent nor causal. The *hardening Pharaoh's heart* may be ascribed to God, though it is said that his *heart hardened itself*, because he took occasion, from the stops God put in those plagues

that he sent upon him and his people, to encourage himself, when he saw there was a new respite granted him: and he who was a cruel and bloody prince, deeply engaged in idolatry and magic, had deserved such judgments for his other sins; so that he may be well considered as actually under his final condemnation, only under a reprieve, not swallowed up in the first plagues, but preserved in them, and raised up out of them, to be a lasting monument of the justice of God against such hardened impenitency. “Whom he will he hardeneth,”^b must be still: restrained to such persons as that tyrant was.

§54 It is endless to enter into the discussion of all the passages cited from the scripture to this purpose; this key serving, as they think it does, to open most of them. It is plain these words of our Saviour concerning those “whom the Father had given him,” are only to be meant of a dispensation of Providence, and not of a decree; since he adds, “And I have lost none of them, except the son of perdition”: for it cannot be said, that he was in the decree, and yet was lost. And in the same period in which God is said “to work in us both to will and to do,” we are required to “work out our own salvation with fear and trembling.” The word rendered, “ordained to eternal life,” does also signify, fitted or predisposed to eternal life. That question, “Who made thee to differ?” seems^a to refer to these gifts which in different degrees and measures were poured out on the first Christians: in which men were only passive, and discriminated from one another by the freedom of those gifts, without any thing, previous in them to dispose them to them.

§55 Christ is said to be the “propitiation for the sins of the whole world”; and the wicked are said to “deny the Lord that bought them”; and his death, as to its extent to all men, is set in opposition to the sin of Adam: so that “as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation; so only the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men to justification of life.” The *all* of the one side must be of the same extent with the *all* of the other: so since *all* are concerned in Adam’s sin, *all* must be likewise concerned in the death of Christ. This they urge further, with this argument, that all men are obliged to believe in the death of Christ, but no man can be obliged to believe a lie; therefore it follows that he must have died for *all*. Nor can it be thought that grace is so efficacious of itself, as to determine us; otherwise why are we required “not to grieve God’s Spirit”? Why is it said, “Ye do always resist the holy Ghost: as your fathers did, so do ye. How often would I have gathered you under my wings, but ye would not? What more could I have done in my vineyard, that has not been done in it?” These seem to be plain intimations of

a power in us, by which we not only can,^a but often do, resist the motions of grace.

§56 If the determining efficacy of grace is not acknowledged, it will be yet much harder to believe that we are efficaciously determined to *sin*. This seems to be not only contrary to the purity and holiness of God, but is so manifestly contrary to the whole strain of the scriptures, that charges sin upon men, that in so copious a subject it is not necessary to bring proofs. “O Israel, thou hast destroyed thyself; but in me is thy help”: and “Ye will not come unto me, that ye may have life: why will you die, O house of Israel?” And as for that nicety of saying, that the evil of sin consists in a negation, which is not a positive being so that though God should determine men to the action that is sinful, yet he is not concerned in the sin of it:^a they think it is too metaphysical to put the honour of God and his attributes upon such a subtlety: for in sins against moral laws, there seems to be an antecedent immorality in the action itself, which is inseparable from it. But suppose that sin consisted in a negative,^b yet that privation does immediately and necessarily result out of the action, without any other thing whatsoever intervening; so that if God does infallibly determine^c a sinner to commit the action to which that guilt belongs, though that should be a sin only by reason of a privation that is dependent upon it, then it does not appear but that he is really the author of sin;^d since if he is the author of the sinful action, on which the sin depends as a shadow upon its substance, he must be esteemed, say they, the author of sin.

§57 And though it may be said, that sin being a violation of God’s law, he himself, who is not bound by his law, cannot be guilty of sin; yet an action that is immoral is so essentially opposite to infinite perfection, that God cannot be capable of it, as being a contradiction to his own stature. Nor is it to be supposed that he can damn men for that, which is the necessary result of an action to which he himself determined them.^a

§58 As for perseverance, the many promises made in the scriptures to them that overcome, that continue *steadfast and faithful to the death*, seem to insinuate, that a man may fall from a good state. Those famous words in the 6th of the Hebrews do plainly intimate, that such men may so fall away, that it may be impossible to renew them again by repentance. And in that Epistle where it is said “The just shall live by faith”; it is added, “but if he draw back (*any man* is not in the original), my soul shall have no pleasure in him.” And it is positively said by the prophet, “When the righteous turneth away from his righteousness, and committeth iniquity, all his righteousness that he hath done shall not be mentioned; in his sin that he

hath sinned shall he die." These suppositions, with a great many more of the same strain that may be brought out of other places, do give us all possible reason to believe that a good man may fall from a good state, as well as that a wicked man may turn from a bad one.^a In conclusion, the end of all things, the final judgment at the last day, which shall be pronounced according to what men have done, whether good or evil, and their being to be rewarded and punished according to it, seems so effectually to assert a freedom in our wills, that they think this alone might serve to prove the whole cause.

§59 So far I have set forth the force of the argument on the side of the Remonstrants. As for the Socinians, they make their plea out of what is said by the one and by the other side. They agree with the Remonstrants in all that they say against absolute decrees, and in urging all those consequences that do arise out of them: and they do also agree with the Calvinists in all that they urge against the possibility of a certain prescience of future contingents:^a so that it will not be necessary to set forth their plea more specially, nor needs more be said in opposition to it, than what was already said as part of the Remonstrants' plea. Therefore, without dwelling any longer on that, I come now to make some reflections on the whole matter.

§60 It is at first view apparent, that there is a great deal of weight in what has been said of both sides:^a so much, that it is no wonder if education, the constant attending more to the difficulties of the one side than of the other, and a temper some way proportioned to it, does fix men very steadily to either the one or the other persuasion.^b Both sides have their difficulties, so it will be natural to choose that side where the difficulties are least felt: but it is plain there is no reason for either of them to despise the other, since the arguments of both are far from being contemptible.^c

§61 It is further to be observed, that both sides seem to be chiefly concerned to assert the honour of God, and of his attributes. Both agree in this, that whatever is fixed as the primary idea of God, all other things must be explained so as to be consistent with that. Contradictions are never to be admitted; but things may be justly believed, against which objections may be formed that cannot be easily answered.^a

§62 The one side think, that we must begin with the idea of infinite perfection, of independency, and absolute sovereignty:^a and if in the sequel difficulties occur which cannot be cleared,^b that ought not to shake us from this primary idea of God.

§63 Others think, that we cannot frame such clear notions of independency, sovereignty, and infinite perfection, as we can do of justice, truth, holiness, goodness, and mercy:^a and since the scripture proposes God to us most frequently under those ideas, they think that we ought to fix on these as the primary ideas of God, and then reduce all other things to them.

§64 Thus both sides seem zealous for God and his glory; both lay down general maxims^a that can hardly be disputed; and both argue justly from their first principles.^b These are great grounds for mutual charity and forbearance in these matters.

§65 It is certain, that one who has long interwoven his thoughts of infinite perfection with the notions of absolute and unchangeable decrees, of carrying on every thing by a positive will, of doing every thing for his own glory, cannot apprehend decrees depending on a foreseen free will, a grace subject to it, a merit of Christ's death that is lost, and a man's being at one time loved, and yet finally hated, of God, without horror.^a These things seem to carry in them an appearance of feebleness, of dependence, and of changeableness.

§66 On the other hand, a man that has accustomed himself to think often on the infinite goodness and mercy, the long-suffering, patience, and slowness to anger, that appears in God; he cannot let the thought of absolute reprobation, or of determining men to sin, or of not giving them the grace necessary to keep them from sin and damnation,^a enter into his mind, without the same horror that another feels in the reverse of all this.

§67 So that the source of both opinions being the different ideas that they have of God,^a and both these ideas being true; men only mistaking in the extent of them,^b and in the consequences drawn from them; here are the clearest grounds imaginable for a mutual forbearance, for not judging men imperiously, nor censuring them severely upon either side.^c And those who have at different times of their lives been of both opinions, and who upon the evidence of reason, as it has appeared to them, have changed their persuasions, can speak more affirmatively here; for they know, that in great sincerity of heart they have thought both ways.

§68 Each opinion has some practical advantages of its side. A Calvinist is taught, by his opinions, to think meanly of himself, and to ascribe the honour of all to God: which lays in him a deep foundation for humility: he is also much inclined to secret prayer, and to a fixed dependence on God^a which naturally both brings his mind to a good state, and fixes it in it: and so though perhaps he cannot give a coherent account of the grounds of his

watchfulness and care of himself;^b yet that temper arises out of his humility, and his earnestness in prayer. A Remonstrant, on the other hand, is engaged to awaken and improve his faculties, to fill his mind with good notions, to raise them in himself by frequent reflection, and by a constant attention to his own actions: he sees cause to reproach himself for his sins,^c and to set about his duty to purpose: being assured that it is through his own fault if he miscarries: he has no dreadful terrors upon his mind; nor is he tempted to an undue security, or to swell up in (perhaps) an imaginary conceit of his being unalterably in the favour of God.^d

§69 Both sides have their peculiar temptations as well as their advantages:^a the Calvinist is tempted to a false security, and sloth: and the Arminian may be tempted to trust too much to himself, and too little to God: so equally may a man of a calm temper, and of moderate thoughts, balance this matter between both the sides, and so unreasonable it is to give way to a positive and dictating temper in this point. If the Arminian is zealous to assert liberty, it is because he cannot see how there can be good or evil in the world without it: he thinks it is the work of God, that he has made for great ends; and therefore he can allow of nothing that he thinks destroys it. If on the other hand a Calvinist seems to break in upon liberty,^b it is because he cannot reconcile it with the sovereignty of God, and the freedom of his grace: and he grows to think that it is an act of devotion to offer up the one to save the other.

§70 The common fault of both sides is to charge one another with the consequences of their opinions, as if they were truly their tenets. Whereas they are apprehensive enough of these consequences, they have no mind to them, and they fancy that by a few distinctions they can avoid them. But each side thinks the consequences of the other are both worse, and more certainly fastened to that doctrine, than the consequences that are urged against himself are. And so they think they must choose that opinion that is the least perplexed and difficult: not but that ingenuous and learned men of all sides confess, that they feel themselves very often pinched in these matters.^a

§71 Another very indecent way of managing these points is, that both sides do too often speak very boldly of God. Some petulant wits, in order to the representing the contrary opinion as absurd and ridiculous, have brought in God, representing him, with indecent expressions, as acting, or decreeing, according to their hypothesis, in a manner that is not only unbecoming, but that borders upon blasphemy. From which, though they think to escape by saying that they are only shewing what must follow if the other opinion were believed; yet there is a solemnity and gravity of

style, that ought to be most religiously observed, when we poor mortals take upon us to speak of the glory or attributes, the decrees or operations, of the great God of heaven and earth: and every thing relating to this, that is put in a burlesque air, is intolerable. It is a sign of a very daring presumption, to pretend to assign the order of all the acts of God, the ends proposed in them, and the methods by which they are executed. We, who do not know how our thoughts carry our bodies to obey and second our minds, should not imagine that we can conceive how God may clove or bend our wills. The hard thing to digest in this whole matter, is reprobation: they who think it necessary to assert the freedom of election, would fain avoid it: they seek soft words for it, such as the passing by or leaving men to perish:^a they study to put that on Adam's sin,^b and they take all the methods they can to soften an opinion that seems harsh, and that sounds ill. But howsoever they will bear all the consequences of it,^c rather than let the point of absolute election go.

§72 On the other side, those who do once persuade themselves that the doctrine of reprobation is false, do not see how they can deny it, and yet ascribe a free election to God. They are once persuaded that there can be no reprobation but what is conditionate, and founded on what is foreseen concerning men's sins: and from this they are forced to say the same thing of election.^a And both sides study to begin the controversy with that which they think they can the most easily prove; the one at the establishing of election, and the other at the overthrowing of reprobation. Some have studied to seek out middle ways: for they observing that the scriptures are writ in a great diversity of style, in treating of the good or evil that happens to us, ascribing the one to God, and imputing the other to ourselves, teaching us to ascribe the honour of all that is good to God, and to cast the blame of all that is evil upon ourselves, have from thence concluded, that God must have a different influence and causality in the one, from what he has in the other:^b but when they go to make this out, they meet with great difficulties; yet they choose to bear these rather than to involve themselves in those equally great, if not greater difficulties, that are in either of the other opinions. They wrap up all in two general assertions, that are great practical truths, *Let us arrogate no good to ourselves, and impede no evil to God*, and so let the whole matter rest.^{bb} This may be thought by some the lazier, as well as the safer way:^c which avoids difficulties, rather than answers them; whereas they say of both the contending sides, that they are better at the starting of difficulties than at the resolving of them.

§73 Thus far I have gone upon the general, in making such reflections as will appear but too well grounded to those who have with any attention

read the chief disputants of both sides. In these great points all agree: that mercy is freely offered to the world in Christ Jesus: that God did freely offer his Son to be our propitiation, and has freely accepted the sacrifice of his death in our stead, whereas he might have condemned every man to have perished for his own sins: that God does, in the dispensation of his gospel, and the promulgation of it to the several nations;^a act according to the freedoms of his grace, upon reasons that are to us mysterious and past finding out: that every man is inexcusable in the sight of God: that all men are so far free as to be praiseworthy or blameworthy for the good or evil that they do: that every man ought to employ his faculties all he can, and to pray and depend earnestly upon God for his protection and assistance: that no man in practice ought to think that there is a fate or decree hanging over him^b and so become slothful in his duty, but that every man ought to do the best he can, as if there were no such decree, since, whether there is or is not, it is not possible for him to know what it is: that every man ought to be deeply humbled for his sins in the sight of God, without excusing himself by pretending a decree was upon him, or a want of power in him: that all men are bound to obey the rules set them in the gospel, and are to expect neither mercy nor favour from God^c but as they set themselves diligently about that: and finally, that at the last day all men shall be judged, not according to secret decrees, but according to their own works. In these great truths, of which the greater part are practical, all men agree. If they would agree as honestly in the practice of them, as they do in confessing them to be true, they would do that which is much more important and necessary, than to speculate and dispute about niceties; by which the world would quickly put on a new face, and then those few, that might delight in curious searches and arguments, would manage them with more modesty and less heat, and be both less positive and less supercilious.

§74 I have hitherto insisted on such general reflections as seemed proper to these questions. I come now in the last place to examine how far our church hath determined the matter, either in this Article or elsewhere: how far she hath restrained her sons, and how far she hath left them at liberty. For those different opinions being so intricate in themselves, and so apt to raise hot disputes, and to kindle lasting quarrels, it will not be suitable to that moderation which our church hath observed in all other things, to stretch her words on these heads beyond their strict sense. The natural equity or reason of things ought rather to carry us, on the other hand, to as great a comprehensiveness of all sides, as may well consist with the words in which our church hath expressed herself on those heads.

§75 It is not to be denied, but that the Article seems to be framed according to St. Austin's doctrine: it supposes men to be under a *curse and damnation*, antecedently to *predestination*, from which they are delivered by it; so it is directly against the Supralapsarian doctrine: nor does the Article make any mention of reprobation, no, not in a hint; no definition is made concerning it.^a The Article does also seem to assert the efficacy of grace:^b that in which the knot of the whole difficulty lies, is not defined; that is, whether God's eternal purpose or decree was made according to what he foresaw his creatures would do, or purely upon an absolute will, in order to his own glory.^c It is very probable, that those who penned it meant that the decree was absolute; but yet since they have not said it, those who subscribe the Articles do not seem to be bound to any thing that is not expressed in them: and therefore since the Remonstrants do not deny but that God having foreseen what all mankind would, according to all the different circumstances in which they should be put, do or not do, he upon that did, by a firm and eternal decree, lay that whole design in all its branches, which he executes in time; they may subscribe this Article without renouncing their opinion as to this matter. On the other hand, the Calvinists have less occasion for scruple; since the Article does seem more plainly to favour them. The three cautions, that are added to it, do likewise intimate that St. Austin's doctrine was designed to be settled by the Article: for *the danger of men's having the sentence of God's predestination always before their eyes, which may occasion either desperation on the one hand, or the wretchedness of most unclean living on the other*, belongs only to that side; since these mischiefs do not arise out of the other hypothesis. The other two, of taking *the promises of God in the sense in which they are set forth to us in holy scriptures*, and *of following that will of God that is expressly declared to us in the word of God*, relate very visibly to the same opinion:^d though others do infer from these cautions, that the doctrine laid down in the Article must be so understood as to agree with these cautions; and therefore they argue, that since absolute predestination cannot consist with them, that therefore the Article is to be otherwise explained. They say the natural consequence of an absolute decree is either presumption or despair: since a man upon that bottom reckons, that which way soever the decree is made, it must certainly be accomplished.^e They also argue, that because we must receive the promises of God as conditional, we must also believe the decree to be conditional; for absolute decrees exclude conditional promises. An offer cannot be supposed to be made in earnest by him that has excluded the greatest number of men from it by an antecedent act of his own. And if we must only follow the revealed will of God, we ought not to suppose that there is an antecedent and pos-

itive will of God, that has decreed our doing the contrary to what he has commanded.^f

§76 Thus the one side argues, that the Article as it lies,^a in the plain meaning of those who conceived it, does very expressly establish their doctrine: and the other argues, from those cautions that are added to it, that it ought to be understood so as that it may agree with these cautions: and both sides find in the Article itself such grounds, that they reckon they do not renounce their opinions by subscribing it. The Remonstrant side have this further to add, that the universal extent of the death of Christ seems to be very plainly affirmed in the most solemn part of all the offices of the church: for in the office of Communion, and in the Prayer of Consecration, we own that Christ, by *the one oblation of himself once offered, made there a full, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice, oblation, and satisfaction, for the sins of the whole world*. Though the others say, that by *full, perfect, and sufficient*, is not to be understood that Christ's death was intended to be a complete sacrifice and satisfaction for *the whole world*, but that in its own value it was capable of being such. This is thought too great a stretch put upon the words. And there are yet more express words in our Church Catechism to this purpose; which is to be considered as the most solemn declaration of the sense of the church, since that is the doctrine in which she instructs all her children: and in that part of it which seems to be most important, as being the short summary of the Apostles' Creed, it is said, *God the Son who hast redeemed me and all mankind*: where *all* must stand in the same extent of universality, as in the precedent and in the following words; *The Father who made me and all the world; the Holy Ghost who sanctifieth me and all the elect people of God*; which being to be understood severely, and without exception, this must also be taken in the same strictness. There is another argument brought from the office of Baptism, to prove that men may fall from a state of grace and regeneration; for in the whole office, more particularly in the Thanksgiving after the Baptism, it is affirmed, that the person baptized is *regenerated by God's holy Spirit*, and is *received for his own child by adoption*; now since it is certain that many who are baptized fall from that state of grace, this seems to import, that some of the regenerate may fall away:^b which though it agrees well with St. Austin's doctrine, yet it does not agree with the Calvinists' opinions.^c

§77 Thus I have examined this matter in as short a compass as was possible; and yet I do not know that I have forgot any important part of the whole controversy, though it is large, and has many branches. I have kept, as far as I can perceive, that indifference which I proposed to myself in the

prosecuting of this matter; and have not on this occasion declared my own opinion, though I have not avoided the doing it upon other occasions.^a Since the church has not been peremptory, but that a latitude has been left to different opinions, I thought it became me to make this explanation of the Article such: and therefore I have not endeavoured to possess the reader with that which is my own sense in this matter, but have laid the force of the arguments, as well as the weight of the difficulties, of both sides, before him, with all the advantages that I had found in the books either of the one or of the other persuasion.^b And I leave the choice as free to my reader as the church has done.

Praefatio annotatoris

Antiquissima in genere humano controversia de Libertate et Fato magnam apud Christianos de Gratia et Praedestinatione accessionem accepit. Res male intellecta etiam vitae praxin turbavit, quasi fatalia aut praedestinata absolutae certitudinis essent, ut eventura constaret, quicquid facias aut omittas. Unde aut torpor ignavus, aut effrenis licentia futurum expectantis cuius nihil penes nos esset; quod ineptum est, eventa enim a suis causis certitudinem accipiunt, quarum pars magna nos ipsi sumus. Quaestiones Christianorum circa hoc argumentum olim fere innocuae fuere, sed decimo sexto demum Christianitatis seculo inter Protestantes acrius erupere: et licet non fecerint schisma, tamen nunc quoque potissimum alunt. Evidem fatendum est, lite licet de persona Christi ad veteris Ecclesiae formulas composita, nonnihil adhuc controversiam Eucharisticam multos moraturam, quo minus Evangelicorum et Reformatorum redintegrari facile communionem posse credant. Sed cessabit ea difficultas, si constet veritatem perceptae rei coelestis, quam Calvinus ipse cum publicis reformatorum symbolis plerisque tuerit, non tantum nunc quoque probari, sed et ingenue sufficienterque exponi, nec nuda animi per fidem repraesentatione, sed ipsa veri corporis substantia constare; ita tantum exul esset crassa praesentia ac dimesionibus circumscripta, quam nec nostri admittunt; solaque non digna tanto motu circa eucharistiam de indignis quaestio facile (non minus ac lites philosophicae) seponi posset.

Una ergo potissimum superforet Praedestinationis controversia, ubi ad Reformatorum dogmata plurimi nostrorum maxime horrent, tamquam divinae perfectiones, justitia imprimis bonitas, sanctitas, labefactarentur, pietasque et virtus laborarent. Multos etiam plurimum movet annata quaestio de baptismi, Eucharistiae, poenitentiae, caeterorumque Christianorum actuum efficacia; si enim nullam justificationis verae atque abolutionis certitudinem habere possemus sine certitudine electionis, verentur ne quid inde praxi salutari noxiun consequatur. Cum vero in Ecclesia An-

Leibniz's Commentary on Burnet

Annotation's Preface

The most ancient controversy in the human race, concerning liberty and fate, received a significant complication from Christians in the issues of grace and predestination. When poorly understood this matter has stirred up trouble even in practical affairs of life, as if fated or predestined events were absolutely certain, with the result that the occurrence of an event is fixed, whatever you might do or fail to do. From this conclusion results either ignorant inactivity or unrestrained licentiousness, since none of those things we might hope for in the future lies within our power; this is foolish, for events undoubtedly arise from their causes of which we are ourselves a great part. Christian inquires concerning this argument once were fairly innocuous, but in the sixteenth century they have erupted quite fiercely among the Protestants; and though they did not yield a schism, they are now as intense as ever. Granted, even though the dispute concerning the person of Christ has been settled by recourse to the formulae of the ancient church, it must be admitted that controversy over the Eucharist is still such an obstacle that many doubt that fellowship between the Evangelicals and the Reformed can be restored. But this difficulty will come to an end if the truth is established concerning this heavenly matter, which as Calvin himself holds, along with many of the public symbols of the Reformed, has now been not merely proved, but sufficiently and frankly explained, namely, that [the presence of Christ in the Eucharist] consists not in a mere representation in the soul through faith, but in the substance of the True Body itself. It was thus free from crass [material] presence and determinate dimensions, which even our own [Lutheran] theologians do not hold. If only there were not so much unworthy activity from unworthy motives, the question concerning the Eucharist could easily be laid aside (and the philosophical strife no less so).

Therefore one controversy chiefly remains, namely concerning predestination, where many within our confession bristle at Reformed doctrine, as if the divine perfections—principally justice, goodness, and sanctity—were subverted, and piety and virtue suffered. The related question concerning the efficacy of baptism, the Eucharist, penance, and the rest of the Christian rites, disturbs many even more; for they fear that if we cannot have certainty about our justification or absolution without certainty of election, something dangerous would follow concerning the practices tied to salvation. Since freedom of thinking on this issue remained in the

glicana circa hunc locum libertas sentiendi manserit, nec Dordracena de-
reta in legem iverint, eius potissimum Ecclesiae opera tolli controversiam
inter Protestantes posse spes est. Et hic imprimis nuper enituit studium
Reverendissimi et Illustrissimi Sarisberiensium Episcopi, qui decimum
septimum eiusdem Ecclesiae articulum inter caeteros explicans, utriusque
partis fundamenta graphice expressit; eo consilio, ut gravitate difficultatis
intellecta alter de altero clementius judicaret. Id caput cum Reformatus in
Germania Theologus, doctrina et moderatione praestans, ex Anglico ser-
mone in Latinum elegenter et lucide transtulisset, cogitationem mihi in-
jecit, neque nervosius opus huius argumenti temere reperiri posse, neque
cui conciliatoriae annotationes utilius adderentur. Mihi enim videbatur
non tantum speciosissima argumenta utrinque stare quod Reverendissimus
Autor abunde ostendit; sed etiam in potissimum ab utraque parte esse ver-
itatem diversa tantum facie spectatam; atque adeo passim non momentum
tamen dissensus, sed et ipsum dissensum, vel tolli, vel certe valde imminui
posse. Rmo Scripto nihil prorsus opponimus, sed illis, quorum sententias
et argumenta suspenso proprio judicio sese exhibere profitetur; a quibus
magis dissentimus, cum adversarios oppugnant, quam ubi sua defendunt.
Denique has qualescunque annotationes insignium utriusque partis The-
ologorum suasu, et spe excitandae aliorum curae felicioris, in lucem exire
passi sumus.

Church of England, and the decrees of Dordt did not pass into law, there is hope that the works of that church in particular can eliminate the controversy among the Protestants. And here especially, in recent days, the zeal of the most Reverend and Illustrious Bishop of Salisbury stood out, who, explaining the seventeenth article, among others, of that same church, expressed the underpinnings of each part with great skill; in order that, by way of this scheme, each party could, having understood the gravity of the difficulty, judge the other side more charitably. When a Reformed theologian in Germany, excelling in doctrine and moderation, elegantly and lucidly translated this chapter from English into Latin, it inspired in me the thought that one cannot easily find a more vigorous work on this subject nor one to which conciliatory annotations could be more usefully added. For it seemed to me not so much that most plausible arguments from both sides work, which the Most Reverend author brilliantly shows, but that in the most powerful arguments on each side there is truth, considered from diverse points of view; and so, along the way, the momentous nature of the disagreement, as well as the disagreement itself, can either be destroyed, or at least greatly diminished. We are not at all arguing against the Most Reverend writer himself, but against those whose opinions and arguments he puts forward while professing to suspend his own judgment; and we dissent from them more when they contend against their adversaries than when they defend their own views. Finally we allow these various annotations to come to light to persuade the most eminent theologians of each side, and in the hope of encouraging more careful attention to the issue.

DE PRAEDESTINATIONE ET GRATIA DISSERTATIO
autore reverendissimo et celebrrimo Viro GILBERTO BURNETO
SS. Theologiae D. Episcopo Saresbur
ex eiusdam EXPOSITIONE XXXIX ARTICULORUM Ecclesiae
Anglicanae

excerpta, qua utriusque partis momenta exhibentur,
ad promovendam piam in articulo Animorum moderationem
latine versa. Hac secunda editione accedere

ANNOTATIONES

alterius, quibus fundamenta utriusque partis conciliantur, et
pravae consequentiae clarrisimis rerum expositionibus eliduntur.

§1 (a) Notae Subjectae non Rmo Autori opponuntur, sed ad opiniones, ab eo cum suis rationibus et coloribus ingeniosissime et nervosissime reprezentatas unice referuntur.

§2 (a) Cum in hoc capite totius controversiae cardo collocetur, bene de ea sperandum apparet. Nam, siquid judico, quae hic proponuntur capitales sententiae, etsi discrimen partium passim faciant, adeo sibi invicem oppositae non sunt, ut cohaereant potius et amice conspirent; deprehendaturque sensu rebus convenientissimo ambos simul veras esse. Ut enim Architectus insignis, propositam sibi habens gloriam constructi praeclarri aedificii, omnia, quae ingredi structuram debent, sapienter considerat; ita maxime curam omnium habet Supremus Universi Conditor, cuius perspicatiam nihil effugit; neque aliter profecto summae Sapientiae decus tueretur. Sic igitur hic conciliari possunt pugnantes, retentis ipsis Rmi Autoris verbis: Deum decreta sua, hominem (aliasque res) spectantia ab aeterno condidisse, unico hoc proposito, ut (communicatione Boni secundum summas perfectiones suas operando) Gloriam suam attributaque (gloria dignissima) manifestaret; formato eum in finem magno et universali Creationis et Providentiae Schemate; sed consideratis (antequam in actum traduci debere decerneretur) omnibus Agentium creandorum motibus, tum irrationalium caecis et mechanismo materiae connexis, tum rationalium voluntariis, finisque alicuius et mediorum vinculo ligatis; juxta id, quod in

A DISSERTATION CONCERNING PREDESTINATION
AND GRACE

by the most Reverend and celebrated Gilbert Burnet
Most holy Doctor of Theology and Bishop of Salisbury
excerpted from his EXPOSITION OF THE 39 ARTICLES of the
Church of England
which sets forth the positions of both parties,
for the purpose of promoting pious moderation of the intellect in
discourse and translated into Latin.

This second edition contains annotations by another author,
in which the fundamental arguments of each side are reconciled
and the erroneous consequences are firmly refuted by means of the
clearest elucidations of the matters at hand.

§1 (a) The following remarks do not express opposition to the most Reverend author himself but refer solely to the opinions so cleverly and vigorously presented by him, together with the reasons and embellishments he gives.

§2 (a) Once the central issue of this whole controversy is set out in this section, it is clear that one ought to be hopeful about it. For if I am any judge, even though people everywhere draw distinctions among these positions, the central claims presented here are not only not opposed to each other, but rather favorably cohere and agree. And one further discovers that both views are true at the same time in a way that is most agreeable. For just as an eminent architect, having proposed to himself the ambition of constructing a distinguished edifice, wisely considers all those things that must enter into the structure, similarly, the supreme Founder of the universe has the highest concern for all things, of which nothing escapes His notice. And indeed, the glory of his supreme Wisdom is upheld in no other way. In this way, then, the opposing views can be reconciled while retaining the very words of the Rev. author: God instituted His decrees, viewing men (and other things) from eternity, with this sole purpose: that (by working through the communication of His goodness in accordance with His highest perfections) He would make manifest His glory and attributes (which are most worthy of glory), having formed the great and universal scheme of creation and providence, but only after having considered all the actions of agents to be created (though prior to decreeing that they should be brought into actuality), both those of irrational things, which are blind and connected by the mechanism of matter, and the voluntary motions of rational things, which are bound together in a chain of ends and means. Next, when it was asked which among this series of

illa possibilium serie, de qua ad existentiam decernenda quaerebatur, electura et factura haec Agentia proponebantur, in circumstantiis omnifariis, in quibus ea erant collocanda: ut scilicet constaret, utrum haec series possibilium inter alias innumeratas non minus possibilis esset, eligenda ac decernenda. Nam si unica tantummodo rerum series esset possibilis, decretum non liberum sed necessarium foret. Hinc etiam certo sensu dici potest, omnia decreta Dei simultanea esse, in signo rationis quoque, seu ordine naturae; et ita inter se connexa; ut nullum sit ab aliorum consideratione absolutum: et tali sensu cessat lis de ordine decretorum, ubi scilicet de tota serie decernitur. Cum hac Quaestione cognata est, non tamen prorsus connexa haec: Utrum Electio Salvandorum (vel quod eodem reddit, destinatio salutis ducentiumve ad salutem circumstantiarum internarum externarumque atque adeo gratiae victricis Coronantis) sit respectiva, an potius absoluta a respectibus bonarum vel minus malarum hominis naturalium qualitatum. Et hic fateor aliqua realis inter partes controversia est, etsi bene intellecta nil faciat ad proxim. Vera solutio conciliatioque est DEUM omnia aptissime ordinantem, has etiam Qualitates in primis respicere; sed iis non alligari, et quantam cuiusque rationem habeat, nobis non omnino constare; cum rationes, quibus omnino movetur, involvant harmoniam totius universi. Add. §9b, c, d.

§2 (b) Bono ergo omne optimisque auspiciis rem aggressi videbimur, quando in illo fundamentali capite compositio evidentissime (ni fallor) successit.

§3 (a) Hanc quaestionem ab explicatione vocabuli pendere puto, adeoque esse mere verbalem, prout alibi latius ostensum est, et non nihil etiam ex dicendis patebit. Sunt diversi in volendo gradus, et autores quidem non nulli non nisi summum voluntatis nomine dignantur, praesertim, cum de Dei voluntate agitur, quo parum dignos arbitrantur gradus inferiores. Summum autem (decreti scilicet puri, quod non fit sub conditione nec sub modo) adeoque pleni conatus, qui in Deo nunquam successu caret solum admittunt. Sed revera, quot sunt gradus bonitatis in objecto, tot sunt in sapiente gradus seriae voluntatis seu inclinationis ad objectum; adeoque inferiores gradus nullam imperfectionem involvunt. Et cum caeteris

possibles should be decreed to exist, these various agents were being put forth choosing and acting in innumerable circumstances in which they could be arrayed; so that it might become clear whether this series of possibles, among innumerable others which were no less possible, should be chosen and decreed. For if only one series of things were possible, the decree would not be free but rather *necessary*. For this reason it can be said in a certain sense that all decrees of God are simultaneous, even *in signo rationis*, that is, by the order of nature, and they are all so interconnected that none is detached from consideration of the others. And in this sense there is an *end to the dispute concerning the order of decrees* since there is a decree concerning the whole series. There is a question which is related to this one though it is not directly connected to it, namely: whether the election of those who are to be saved (or, what reduces to the same thing, the determination of salvation or the determination of the circumstances, internal and external, leading to salvation and thus crowning victorious grace) is relative or, instead, quite independent of considerations of the good or less vicious natural qualities of a man. And on this score I acknowledge that there is some real controversy among the parties, even if understanding this rightly makes no practical difference. Its true solution and conciliation is that God, having ordained all things most suitably in the first place, is mindful of these qualities. But we are not required to account for these matters and indeed the greatness of the reason which he has is not entirely clear to us, since the reasons by which he is moved involve the harmony of the whole universe. See §9b, c, d.

§2 (b) Thus, we seem to have approached the matter at hand under a good omen and the best auspices, since the solution has clearly worked out well concerning the most fundamental matter [i.e., the one treated in 2a] (if I am not mistaken).

§3 (a) I believe that this question depends on the explication of words and hence is merely verbal, as was shown more extensively elsewhere; and even now some of this will be made clear from what is to be said. There are diverse grades of willing, and some authors do not think worthy of the name anything except the highest form, especially when it concerns the will of God, concerning which inferior grades are believed too little worthy. However, they only admit the highest (namely pure decrees which are not made under a condition nor a limitation), which are thus full efforts, and which in God never lack success. But actually there are as many grades of goodness in an object as there are grades among the series of types of *will* or of inclinations toward the object in a rational being. Inferior grades therefore involve no imperfection. And since, other things

paribus melius sit quam plurimos Christi beneficiis gaudere, dubitari non potest, esse aliquam ad hoc pro omnibus obtainendum seriam et ad objectum nitentem Dei voluntatem; etsi actionis gradus et successus concursu aliarum considerationum sapientiae divinae obversantium partim manifestarum partim occultarum temperetur. Ut enim in naturalibus eodem mobili diversas habente tendentias, motus prodit ex omnibus tendentias compositus; tam mirabili artificio, ut quaevis totum effectum suum habere censeri possit, tanquam se mobile in singulas ex aequo divisisset, posteaque in centrum nisus omnium reuniretur, (Add. infra §32a) ita in eo, qui summa ratione agit, ad omnem bonitatis gradum condigna est inclinatio, eaque nullo prorsus modo frustranea; quod facit, ut ipso concursu effectus compositus totalis optimus formetur. Voluntas partialis quibusdam dicitur antecedens; totalis vero ex omnibus partialibus resultans, non male ab iisdem consequens appellatur, inde usque a Damasceno, quem tamen invenisse hanc distinctionem non appareat. Iam enim Chrysost. Homil. 1 in Ep. ad Epses. c. 1 (etsi fortasse sensu non per omnia eodem) voluntatem primam esse dixit, ut non pereant, qui peccarunt: secundam, ut, qui facti sunt mali, pereant. Quod habet etiam Theophylactus in eundem ad Ephesios locum. Add. §32b, c. Omnes igitur voluntates divinae sunt quodammodo efficaces. Interim absolute loquendo efficaces, vel si mavis effectrices, dicuntur totales illae, quae sine exceptione aut temperamento effectum sortiuntur, et a quibusdam vocantur victrices. Add. §26a, c, §32a, §40a.

§4 (a) Auxilia gratiae sunt vel Efficacia (id est Effectricia) vel Sufficiencia tantum. Effectricia utique infallibiliter talia sunt, sed distincta est consideratio efficaciae et infallibiliatis. Efficaciam aliquando habent auxilia per se et sua natura, et vel plenam, ut contrariis circumstantiis elidi non possint (qualia fuisse videntur in miraculosa Pauli conversione) vel sub modo, quia scilicet contrariis circumstantiis non impediuntur. At per accidens (ut sic dicam) efficaciam habent Auxilia, si eam a circumstantiis adjuvantibus mutuentur. Infallibilitatem per se habent ea tantum, quae Efficaciam per se plenam habent, caetera infallibilitatem a circumstantiis vel non impedientibus vel omnino adjuvantibus adeoque (non dei sed rei respectu) per accidens (ut sic dicam) accipiunt. Quaedam denique non ef-

being equal, it is a substantial good for anyone to enjoy the benefits of Christ, it cannot be doubted that there is some series which has the goal of securing this outcome for everyone, and there is furthermore a volition of God that aims at this outcome, even if the level of action and of success is tempered by the intermingling of other considerations which are apparent to the divine wisdom—considerations in part manifest and in part hidden to us. For just as in natural things motion arises out of the composite of all of its tendencies—the same movable object having tendencies in diverse directions, as though, by a wondrous artifice, the movable object divided itself into individual elements on equal terms, and afterward is reunited in the center of all of the efforts (see below §32a)—just so, in Him who acts by the highest reason, there is an appropriate inclination toward every grade of goodness which is in no way frustrated since, through the conjunction of inclinations, the best total composite effect is formed. This partial will is called *antecedent* by some, while the total decree actually resulting from all the partial ones is called (by these same individuals) not incorrectly, *consequent*, as, for example, St. John Damascene¹ (although he does not appear to have invented this distinction). For already Chrysostom in his *Homily on the Epistle to the Ephesians*, c. 1,² (even if perhaps not exactly in the same sense) said that the initial will exists that those who sinned would not perish; the second will exists that those who have become evil will perish. This is what Theophylactus holds regarding the same place in Ephesians.³ See §32b, c. Therefore all divine volitions are in a way efficacious. Nevertheless, absolutely speaking, those composites are called efficacious or, if you prefer effective which, without exception or moderation, determine the outcome and which are called victorious by some. See §26a, c, §32a, §40a.

§4 (a) Aids of grace are either efficacious (i.e., effective absolutely) or merely sufficient. Effective aids are such absolutely infallibly, but the considerations of efficacy and infallibility are distinct. Sometimes aids have efficacy *per se* and in virtue of their own nature. And aids have efficacy that is either *complete*, so that they cannot be thwarted by contrary circumstances (as they appear to have been in the miraculous conversion of Paul), or *sub modo*, because they are not in fact impeded by contrary circumstances. By contrast aids have efficacy *per accidens* (as I would put it), if they derive it from assisting circumstances. Only those that have complete *per se* efficaciousness have *per se* infallibility. Other derive their infallibility from the circumstances, which either do not impede, or, in general, assist and thus are *per accidens* (as I would put it) (not with respect to God, but with respect to the thing). And finally, certain ones are

ficacia sunt sed sufficientia tantum, nempe volenti, effectu vero carentia, ubi voluntas deest; hoc enim sensu gratiam sufficientem accipi commodissimum est. Malo etiam ea, quae voluntates certo movent, infallibiliter quam irresistibiliter efficacia appellare; ut integra sit libertas hominis, nec necessitas nobis imposita putetur: neque aliter fortasse rem intelligunt, qui aliter loquuntur. Caeterum aliud sunt Auxilia Gratiae sanctificantis, aliud ipsa Sanctificatio seu inhabitans regenerato Gratia habitualis gratis data, tandemque introducta ope auxiliorum, quae utique irresistibiliter datur uti omne quod datur. Ultimo enim actui omnibus rite dispositis quid amplius resistat? Haec etiam in homine utique victorioso operatur, dum is in hoc regenerationis statu est; etsi plus minusve resistant reliquiae corruptionis. Sed confirmatior est, cum ad delectationem pervenit. Omni regenerationi inesse delectationem vincentem vereor, ut experientia approbet. Pulchra habet Augustinus, sed interdum ex diversis ejus locis moderanda et explicanda. Add. §16a, item §9d, §34a.

SCHEMA

I. Auxilia

A) Efficacia in voluntatem

i. infallibiliter seu cum successu sive victricia

1> sua natura vel sola

2> ex concursu circumstantiarum

a. per se ob defectum scil circumstantiarum impeditium

b. per accidens ob circumstantias adiuvantes.

ii. fallibiliter seu sine successu, licet alioqui efficacia

1> per se, nisi a circumstantiis contrariis eliderentur.

2> per accidens, nisi a circumstantiis adjuvantibus destituerentur.

B) Sufficientia si accedat voluntas

Cum auxilia ad effectum sunt victricia, decretum effectus est purum; cum successus abest, et auxilia tamen, quantum in ipsis, efficacia sunt, decretum est non nisi sub modo; si tantum per accidens efficacia, esse potuis- sent, decretum non nisi sub conditione factum dici potest. Caeterum decretum purum esse potest, et gratia victrix, etsi sua natura aut per se victrix non sit. Haec secunda Quaestio, etsi magis realis sit quam prima, in mera tamen contemplatione subsistit.

not efficacious, but merely sufficient, for concerning the one who wills, an outcome is lacking where the will fails. *Sufficient grace* understood in this sense is perfectly agreeable. I prefer to call those aids that move the will with certainty *infallibly* efficacious rather than *irresistibly* efficacious, so that the freedom of man is whole, and necessity is not thought to be imposed on us. And perhaps those who speak differently do not understand the matter differently. But while aids of sanctifying grace are one thing, *sanctification* itself is something entirely different, that is, the *habitual grace, freely given*, which indwells the regenerate but nonetheless is introduced by means of aids—this at any rate is given “irresistibly,” just like everything which is given. For, all things having been arranged properly for the act, what resistance remains any longer? At any rate, this works in man victoriously, while he is in a state of regeneration, even if the remnants of his corruption more or less resist it. But this [victorious working] is more certain, when it reaches *enjoyment*. I am afraid, however, that experience shows that a *conquering enjoyment* is not found in every regeneration. Augustine has noble opinions, but here and there they must be moderated and explicated by reference to other places in his works. See §16a, and also §9d, §34a.

Schema

I. Aids

A) Efficacious with respect to the will

I. Infallibly, that is, successfully or victoriously

- a. through its own nature, that is, alone
- b. from the concurrence of circumstances
 - i) per se, because of a defect of impeding circumstances
 - ii) per accidens, because of aiding circumstances

II. Fallibly, i.e., without success though otherwise efficacious

- a. per se, that is, if they are not thwarted by contrary circumstances
- b. per accidens, that is, if they are not deprived of support from helping circumstances

B) Sufficient if the will assents

When aids aiming at a particular result are victorious, the *decree* concerning that result is *pure*. When success is lacking and, nevertheless, the aids taken in themselves are efficacious, the decree is only *sub modo*. If, on the other hand, the aids can be efficacious *per accidens*, the decrees made can only be called efficacious *sub conditione*. Otherwise, the pure decree can also be counted as victorious grace, even if by its nature or per se it is not victorious. The second question, even if it is more substantive than the first, nevertheless arises only in thought.

§5 (a) Tertia Quaestio eoredit, utrum Electi soli et semper in statu gratiae sint. Nempe quidam ita loquuntur, ac si Electus, postquam semel conversus est, nullis peccatis quamvis gravibus gratia excidat. Idemque Electorum discretionem a non Electis contra omnem antiquae Ecclesiae ipsiusque Augustini doctrinam eo usque extendunt, ut neminem nisi Electum et perseveraturum converti vere et fidem sinceram habere posse arbitrentur. In qua novitate docenda neque Scripturam habent faventem, et experientiam naturamque humanam inveniunt reclamantem. Itaque ex horum sententia nulla erit vera fides conversioque temporiorum, nec quisquam scire poterit, se in statu gratiae esse, nisi simul sciat, se in eo perseveraturum. Haec quaestio aliquem in fluxum in praxin habere potest. Add. §13, §58a, §76c. Itaque non despero, benigna interpretatione temperari posse, quae a non paucis durius dicta videri possint.

§6 (a) Primaria illa et fundamentalis quaestio §2 tribus quaestionibus derivatis praemissa in eo consistebat, utrum Deus tantum gloriam suam, an etiam Creaturarum Rationalium Voluntates in decernendo respiceret. Nos dicendum monuimus, alterum in altero involvi. Interim ex hac Quaestione quatuor sequentes sententias natas notat Rmus Autor: in quibus siquid peccatum est, inde ortum deprehendetur, quod divinae gloriae, vel quod eodemredit, divinarum perfectionum ratio satis habita non est.

§7 (a) vel quod idem est perfectionem operandi. Hoc nihil verius.

§7 (b) Sed Deus non decernit nisi ex inspectis rerum naturis. Decretum igitur Dei rerum causa est, etsi sui ipsius ratio non sit, sed proficiuntur pro parte ex ideis rerum in divino intellectu spectatis. Et hoc sensu Augustinus (lib. 15 de Trin. c. 13) non quia sunt, ideo res novit Deus; sed ideo sunt, quia novit. Sed hoc intelligendum interposita voluntate, quam movet intellectus. Itaque idem lib. 6 de Trin. c. 10 Dei Scientiam cum voluntate conjunctam esse causam rerum ait.

§7 (c) Decretum lapsus et omnis mali moralis intelligendum est permisivum: malum per se non inclinat voluntatem divinam, malumque etiam non producitur positiva Dei operatione, sed sola operationis divinae lim-

§5 (a) The third question reduces to this: whether the Elect alone are in a state of grace and whether they are always in a state of grace. To be sure, some speak in this manner, as if the Elect, after being converted at a given time, are not deprived of grace by any sins, however serious. And these same individuals open a wide gap between the Elect and the non-Elect, in opposition to the entire doctrine of the ancient church fathers and Augustine himself, such that they hold that no one can truly be converted and have sincere faith unless they are Elect. In this novel teaching they do not have the support of Scripture and they find it to be at odds with natural and human experience. Therefore, according to their opinions, there will be no true faith and no conversion of limited duration, and no one will be able to know that he is in a state of grace unless he knows at the same time that he will persevere in this state. *This question* can have some significance in practice. See §13, §58a, §76c. Therefore, I do not despair that what can appear as harsh sayings by many can be moderated through a benign interpretation.

§6 (a) This first and fundamental question of the three questions derived in §2 consisted in this: whether God regarded only His own glory, or also the wills of rational creatures in making decrees. We pointed out that it must be said that one is involved in the other. However, the most Reverend author notes the four views that follow most naturally from this question. Among those four, if there is some error, it is seen to have arisen from the fact that reason has not considered the divine glory sufficiently, or (what amounts to the same thing) the divine perfections.

§7 (a) Or, what is the same, the perfection of acting. Nothing is more true than this.

§7 (b) But God does not decree except on the basis of having inspected the natures of things. Therefore, the decree of God is the cause of things, even if it is not its own reason, in that it arises in part from ideas of things seen in the divine intellect. And in this sense, Augustine (in c. 13, bk. 15 of *On the Trinity*)⁴ held that God does not know things because they are, but rather, they are because he knows them. And this is to be understood by means of the interposition of the divine will, which the intellect moves. One should similarly understand c. 10, bk. 6, *On the Trinity*, where he said that God's knowledge conjoined with His will is the cause of things.

§7 (c) The decree of the fall and of all *moral evil* must be understood to be permissive. Evil per se does not incline the divine will, and indeed, it is not produced by a positive operation of God, but only by a limitation of

itatione, orta ex natura creaturarum limitata: hinc ipsius mali causa Deo tribuenda non est. Mala autem poenae etsi punitis mala et in se non expetenda, in universum tamen bona (subsidiaria licet) et justitiae ac sapientiae conformia sunt; sed non decernuntur, nisi suppositis malis culpae.

§7 (d) interna pariter et externa.

§7 (e) Verum est damnandos inexcusabiles esse. Et concilium Arelatense III illi anathema dixit, a quo statueretur, eum qui perit, non accipere, unde salvus esse posset; scilicet, si vellet, ut par est, uti oblatis. Sed Deum id tantum querere suo auxilio, ut homo aliquis inexcusabilis fiat; hoc dictu nimium est, et autoribus quibusdam incogitanter elapsum videtur. Potest dare et dat Deus auxilia per saepe hominibus malis multo plura, quam necesse sit ad inexcusabilitatem; et mensuram illis complendo bonitatem ostendit. Non omnibus tamen ea dat auxilia, nec dare obstrictus est, per quae voluntas ipsa perseveranter flectatur. Praeterea inexcusabilitas damnatorum non pro fine Deo proposita est, sed conditio est sine qua non damnat, (add. §43d) fluens ex oeconomia divinae operationis, quam justitia comitatur. Sane cavendum est, ne Deus gloriam per justitiam manifestare querens, curasse dicatur, ut haberet, quos jure damnaret; Ego ab his sensibus abhorruisse ipsos Supralapsarios puto, etsi aliquando verbis incommodis uti deprehendantur.

§7 (f) Hoc quoque prioribus non necessario cohaeret, ut salvandi semper sint in statu gratiae, damnandi semper in statu peccati.

§7 (g) In hoc est defectus oppositionis iam notatus. Deus non potest se ipsum intueri, et omnia ad perfectionum suarum manifestationem referre, quin simul intueatur rerum naturas, quas in suis ideis eminenter habet, et in quibus producendis attributa sua manifestat. Itaque dicendum non est, Deum se ipsum solum modo hic intueri.

§8 (a) Haec doctrina secundae sententiae summatim et sano sensu tota verissima est, cum non dicatur, Deum positive velle peccatum aut aliter, quam ex praevisis vel praesuppositis peccato imponentientiaque velle

the divine operation, arising from the limited nature of creatures. For this reason, the cause of this evil is not to be attributed to God. *Evils of punishment*, however, although bad for those punished and not to be sought for their own sake, are nonetheless generally good (although only in a subsidiary way) and conform both to justice and wisdom. But they are not decreed unless evils of wrongdoing are presupposed.

§7 (d) internal as much as external

§7 (e) It is true that those who are damned are not excusable. And the Third Council of Arles pronounced an anathema on anyone who holds that he who is lost does not receive those things by which he could be saved; that is, if he wished (as is right) to use what has been offered. But the claim that God seeks through his aid only that a man become inexcusable is an excessively strong remark, though one that seems to have been asserted by some authors thoughtlessly and incautiously. God can, and very often does, give aids to evil men, much more than is necessary to bring it about that they are inexcusable. And he has shown that his goodness will be given to them in abundance. Nevertheless, he does not give, nor is He obliged to give to everyone, those aids through which the will itself is turned so as to persevere. Moreover, the inexcusability of the damned is not set up by God as an end; rather it is a condition without which he does not damn (see §43d), flowing from the economy of divine grace, which is the companion of justice. To be sure, we must take care lest it is said that God, seeking to manifest His glory through His justice, saw to it that he had available some whom He damns justly. I believe that the supralapsarians themselves detest these views, even if sometimes they are caught using such disagreeable words.

§7 (f) This too is not necessarily connected with what was said before, namely that those to be saved are always in a state of grace, and those to be damned are always in a state of sinning.

§7 (g) In this matter, there is an absence of opposition already noted. God cannot consider Himself, and relate all things to the manifestation of His perfections, without at the same time considering the natures of things, which He possesses eminently in His own ideas, and in whose production He manifests His own attributes. Therefore it must not be said here that God considers *only* Himself *alone*.

§8 (a) This doctrine of the second view, generally and reasonably understood, is absolutely true, since it does not say that God willed sin positively, or in any way other than that he willed damnation on the basis of

damnationem. Hanc etiam doctrinam professi sunt Theologi Brandenbur-
gici et Hassiaci in colloquio Lipsiensi 1630. eique magis favent synodus
Dordracena et confessiones publicae Reformatorum.

§8 (b) (quanquam non est simplex imputatio sed et realis corruptio mas-
sae)

§8 (c) non omnes fateor eruere constituit, decreto pleno seu voluntate vic-
trice: aliquo tamen serio et per operationes quasdam se exserente volun-
tatis gradu voluisse merito dicitur et erui omnes et Christum pro omnibus
mori; neque appareat, quomodo id Sublapsariorum, quos vocant, hypoth-
esi officiat.

§8 (d) recte, si actus positivus, qui scilicet aliquid innovat, opponetur ipsi
negativo actus, quo res relinquitur in statu priore.

§8 (e) Sine ulla intentione plena idem decreti puri seu semper successum
habentis, si sic interpretere, nihil hic reprehendas. Qui nullam admitit nisi
plenam intentionem fere de nominibus litigat

§9 (a) Hic poterat distingui inter Universalistas triplices, nempe Refor-
matos, Evangelicos, et Remonstrantes, de quo aliquid in praefatione Ex-
imii interpretis. Sed nunc potius visum est ire per summa rerum. Caeterum
decretum absolutum compatible est etiam cum Universalismo non modo
hypothetico sed et puro, de quo hic sermo est.

§9 (b) Haec quoque doctrina tertiae sententiae summatim et sano sensu
tota vera est. Sunt in hac parte, qui simpliciter dicunt: Eligere Deum, quos
praevidit finaliter credituros, idque defendi etiam potest modo considere-
tur ipsam rursus fidem Dei donum esse; nec tolli hoc modo sed differri tan-
tum difficultatem. Quaeritur enim rursus, cur uni p[ro]ae alio Deus decreverit
dare aut dederit auxilia fidei in illis circumstantiis, in quibus effectum
salutarem secuturum praevidebat. Sive enim auxilia divina communia om-
nibus, sive specialia praeterea crediturus statuas, negari certe non potest,

presupposed or foreseen sin and lack of self-restraint. The theologians of Brandenburg and Hesse professed this same doctrine at the Leipzig Colloquium of 1630. And the Synod of Dort and the general confessions of the Reformers favored it greatly.

§8 (b) (Although this is not a simple imputation, but also a real corruption of the mass [of humanity].)

§8 (c) I agree that He brought it about that not all are rescued with a full decree or victorious will. Nevertheless it is rightly said that, through a certain series and by a certain degree of exertion of will, God, exerting himself through certain operations, has desired that all men be saved and that Christ die for all. It is not apparent how this is detrimental to the hypothesis of those whom they call the Sublapsarians.

§8 (d) Right, if a positive act, namely, one which alters something, is opposed to the negative aspect of the act, by which something is left in its prior state.

§8 (e) Without any full intention either of a pure decree or of one always having success. If it is interpreted in this way, there is nothing objectionable. Whoever admits nothing other than a full intention merely squabbles about words.

§9 (a) Here one could distinguish threefold among Universalists: namely, Reformed, Evangelicals, and Remonstrants, concerning which there is some material by the distinguished translator in the preface. But now rather this seems to proceed by virtue of the foundation of things. However that may be, the absolute decree is compatible even with universalism, not only in a hypothetical way, but even in an absolute manner, concerning which there is some discussion here.

§9 (b) This doctrine of the third view generally, and reasonably understood, is also absolutely true. There are those in this party who say simply: God chooses those whom He foresaw would believe in the end; and this can also be defended provided that it is held that this very faith in turn is a gift of God. Still, the problem is not solved in this way, but merely postponed. For one is led to ask why God decreed to give, or gave aids to, faith in these circumstances to one rather than to another—circumstances in which he foresaw that the resultant salvation would follow. For it certainly cannot be denied that either general divine aids are given to all, or, in addition, that special aids are given to those for whom it has been determined that they would believe. Whether you think divine aids of grace are common to everyone or that there are further special aids in addition,

saltem homines circumstantiis distingui, quibus objiciuntur quae faciunt, ut eadem auxilia communia in alio succedant, in alio vero effectu careant. Ut si duorum adolescentum fratum alter in Turcicam servitutem ad ductus a fide deficiat, alter domi pie educatus in recta vivaque fide servetur. Hic ergo, in dispensatione mediorum salutis externorum saltem; fatentur et Evangelici recurrendum esse ad το βάθος, nec regulas generales Deo prae finibunt. Quis enim (exempli gratia) audeat dicere, omnes eos qui circumstantiis infelicibus objecti periire, etiam in favorabilioribus circumstantiis perituros fuisse? Cum Christus diserte dicat, Tyrios, Sidonios ipsumque Sodomae populum praedicationi magis obtemperaturos fuisse, quam incolas Galileos; aut quis affirmet, neminem Barbarorum, qui in America periree, inter nostros institutione quacunque ad salutem per venturum fuisse. add. §27d. Itaque etsi commodior doctrina videatur, quae Electionem ad salutem a fide praevisa suspendit, quia tamen ipsius fidei requisita et adjutoria tam interna quam externa rursus a Divino arbitrio pendent; saltemque externa in omnibus aequalia esse defendi non potest; non magis sufficiens ad fidem recurrendo ratio electionis redditur, quam si quis (contra) fidei dandae decretum effectorum suspendat a decreto electionis, dicatque cum Augustine, Electionem non invenire sed facere fidelem; Tanquam prior sit intentio salutem quam fidem dandi. Neque enim sufficiens ratio est, quae eget nova ratione. Itaque Formulae Concordiae Autores in declaratione solida art. 9 non male totum salutis negotium, salvationem scilicet cum requisitis salvationis, una Electione complexi sunt, quemadmodum notavit Joh. Musaens in Dist. de Decreto Electionis Thes. 276. Et diserte habet Formula Concordiae decretum dandi fidem, cum ait: decrevit (Deus) etiam se spiritu sancto suo . . . in nobis efficacem esse velle. Vel contra ad veram poenitentiam agendum inflectere, eaque vera fide illuminare. Itaque sub Electione comprehendit tam decretum dandi fidem quam decretum dandi salutem. Et non apparent, quid ad

it certainly cannot be denied that human beings at least are distinguished by circumstances—circumstances on which they base their objections, that is, that the same aids succeed in one person but have no effect in the other. At any rate, persons are distinguished by circumstances, by which what they do is occasioned, with the result that the same general aids succeed in one, and lack a result in another. Suppose, for example, that one of two young brothers, having been led away into Turkish slavery, loses his faith, while the other, having been dutifully educated in a proper and living faith at home, is saved. In this case, in the dispensation of the external means of salvation, even the Evangelicals will admit that one must not prescribe general rules to God, and they further admit that one must revert to “the depths of divine wisdom.”⁵ For who (for example) would dare to say that all those who perish when thrown into unfavorable circumstances would have perished in more favorable circumstances? Especially in light of the fact that Christ eloquently said that the Tyronians and the Sidonians and the people of Sodom would have complied with his prediction more than the residents of Galilee;⁶ Or who would among us affirm that none of the Barbarians who perish in America, would have reached salvation by some education among us. See also §27d. Hence, even if the doctrine that leaves election to salvation undecided with respect to faith foreseen seems more agreeable, nevertheless, the requisites and aids, internal and external, of this very faith depend on the divine choice, and one cannot defend the claim that the external ones are equal in all cases; the sufficient reason of election is no more settled by having recourse to faith than if one holds that (on the contrary) the decree of giving faith is left undecided by the decree to election, and one says, with Augustine, that election does not discover, but produces faith, insofar as the intention to give salvation is prior to the intention to give faith. For a reason is not sufficient that requires a new reason. Hence, the authors of the Formula of Concord,⁷ in a solid declaration (article 9) rightly included the whole matter of salvation, namely, salvation with all the requisites for salvation, in a single election, just as John Musaens observed in his *Dist. de Decreto Electionis* thes. 276.⁸ The Formula of Concord has eloquently expressed the decree of our confession, when it says:

God has also decreed that, through His Holy Spirit, He wants to be efficacious in us, or, stated differently, that He wants to turn us to true repentance and to illuminate us with that true faith.

Therefore, it includes under election the decree giving faith, as well as the decree giving salvation. And it is not apparent how it benefits our practice

proxim salutarem faciat disputare, utrum pruis intendat potiusque velit Deus; hominem esse salvum, an hominem esse fidelem. Nostri etiam non negant quibusdam, saltem extra ordinem, specialia auxilia gratiae fuisse data, allegantque conversionem Pauli aliaque id genus exempla. Hulsemannus, qui inter nostros in hoc argumento profundius, quam vulgo sit versatus est, in Brevario theologico, censuit fieri communiter, ut qui inferiorem gratiae gradum respiciat, ei superior non offeratur; et ita fieri, ut in effecti majorem gratiam accipiat, qui reapse convertitur. Hic enim (inquit c.15) ordo constitutus est a Deo, ut nolit iis, qui primam gratiam praefracte repudiant, majores gradus seu incrementa conferre, Matt. XVIII, 12, XXV, 29, Luc XIX, 25, quo sensu non male ab Augustino dicitur, esse peculiarem quandam gratiae speciem, quam Deus electis praeparavit, tanquam medium assequendae salutis, videlicet insensiorem gradum gratiae seu majus incrementum, quod Deus consequente seu vindicatrice voluntate juste negat iis, qui primam gratiam rejecerunt. Haec ille quae etsi saepe ita se habere concedi possit, nescio tamen, an regulae instar ordinariae constitui patiatur longanimitas Dei, a quo saepius pleriusque pulsatur ianua cordis, et fieri etiam potest, ut aliquando minor majorque gradus gratiae simul a Deo tribuantur. Postremo si distinguas, inter gratiam supernaturalem internam et auxilia naturalia atque externa, non video equidem, cur non defendi possit, priorem in omnibus regulariter aequalem esse, hominesque sua indole ac mediorum salutis externorum congrua dispensatione distingui. Sed vel hanc vel aliam regulam defendere quam asserere facilius est, praestatque rem totam pro infinita propemodum varietate rationum ac circumstantiarum, justissimae ac bonitatis plenissimae DEI voluntati integrum servari.

§9 (c) Certum puto, eum, qui libertate sua bene utitur, salvari; adeoque eum, qui damnatur, libertate sua non esse bene usum. Si tamen sensus esset, Deum non dare gratiam nisi proportione usus naturalis liberi arbitrii, nimium diceretur; tanquam Deus id solum respiciat. Ita enim inter alia sequeretur, eum, qui diu bene usus est libero arbitrio, semper salvari, cum tamen occulto Dei judicio fieri possit, ut, qui diu bene vixit, finaliter in apostasiam labatur.

§9 (d) Concedendum haud dubie est, Deum praevidere conditionata,

to dispute whether God first intends or rather wills that this man is saved, or that this man is faithful. Those of our party do not deny, at least in extraordinary cases, that special aids of grace were given, and adduce in support of this the conversion of Paul and other examples of that sort. Hulsemann, who among those of our party involved in this argument is more profound than the general run, in his *Brief Theology*,⁹ expressed the view that it generally happens that the one who looks to an inferior variety of grace would not be offered a superior variety; and so it comes about in the end, that he who is actually converted receives the greater grace. For (it is said in c. 15) the order of decrees is ordained by God in such a way that He wills against conferring greater grades or increments of grace upon those who obstinately refuse the initial grace (Mt. 18:12; 25:29; Lk. 19:25); in which sense Augustine said, not incorrectly, that there is a certain special type of grace, which God prepares for the Elect, as a means for achieving salvation, i.e., an insensible grade of grace or even a greater increment, which God consequently (or through vengeance) justly denies to those who rejected His first grace. Even if one can concede that grace frequently operates in this way, still I don't know whether the longsuffering of God can be cast in the likeness of a normal rule by which, more often and for the most part, the door of the heart is moved; and it can even happen that greater and lesser degrees of grace are given by God at the same time. Finally, if you distinguish between supernatural internal grace and natural and external aids, I do not for my part see why it cannot be defended that the former is, as a rule, equal in all cases, and that men are distinguished by their natural constitution and the suitable dispensation of the external means of salvation. But it is easier to defend either this or some other rule than to amend it, and this makes plain the whole issue taking into consideration the nearly infinite variety of causes and circumstances, so that the complete justice and perfect goodness of the will of God is preserved intact.

§9 (c) I am sure that he who makes good use of his own freedom is saved; and indeed, he who is damned does not make good use of his freedom. Nonetheless, if the sense were that God does not give grace except in proportion to the use of natural free choice, that would be saying too much, as if God were to consider only that. For it would follow, among other things, that he who makes good use of his free choice for a long time is always saved, while, on the contrary, it can come about by a secret judgment of God that someone who has lived well for a long time, in the end falls into apostasy.

§9 (d) Undoubtedly, it must be conceded that God foresees conditionally

quomodo scilicet quisque libero arbitrio usurus esset, si quaedam auxilia offerrentur; eaque cognitione, ut aliis omnibus, nixum, decernere de oeconomia generis humani ad salutem. Sed non ideo iis assentiri necesse est, qui putant, huic considerationi Deum unice alligari, quanquam ea saepe valere apud ipsum possit. Nam in summa scopus Dei est perfectio operandi, et fieri interdum potest, ut correctio pessimi sit optima; convenitque etiam, ut exemplum interdum statuatur, quo constet, dum durissima corda emollit Deus, ut Paulus de misericordia sibi facta notavit, nemini esse desperandum. Recte nostri et commode causam, cur homo gratiae effectu careat, ab ipsis resistentia petunt: sed non ideo necesse habent addere, minorem semper gratiae effectum esse, ubi major resistentia est. Interdum enim (sed rarius opinor) aucta malitia abundantior gratia affluit, donec resistentia supereretur. Deus igitur se praevisioni melioris, vel potius minus mali liberi arbitrii usus naturalis non adstringit, etsi ejus rationem habeat non parvam. Et tunc non ideo homini favet, quasi melior aut minus malus sit, sed quia ita postulat generalis oeconomia, rerumque melior nexus. Nam in universum omnes aequae pravi et ad bonum mortui sunt: quia tamen equalis licet pravitas saltem dissimilis est pro diversitate inclinationum; hinc alii in his alii in aliis circumstantiis minus resistunt; nec minima divinae gratiae pars est hominem in favorabilioribus circumstantis collocari. Caeterim oeconomia Decretorum divinorum circa salutem talis est, ut nullis regulis generalibus a nobis includi possit. Itaque nec auxilia divina semper sua naturae vi victoriosa sunt, imo nec semper per se efficacia, sed saepe per accidens tantum, si ita loqui licet, id est, per circumstantias effectum obtinent: nam alioqui dici diverso sensu potest, nihil respectu Dei id est divinae providentiae, per accidens evenire. Add. §34a. Sed nobis interdum commoda vocabula desunt. Deus autem, dum auxilia circumstantiis accommodat, minori molimine, et ut sic dicam, sumtu praestat destinata, facitque, quod sapiens solet; qui si eisdem ad plura uti possit, diversorumque concurrentium ope effectum consequi, hoc mavolet, quam unicuique operationi causas assignare propias per se efficaces, ut vel ex automatopoeorum artificiis patet. Interdum tamen convenit causas proprias per se efficaces adhiberi, irresistibiles raro, quae scilicet tantarum sint virium, ut nulla oppositione contraria elidi possunt.

how someone would use his free choice, were certain aids afforded; and relying on knowledge of that, along with knowledge of all others, He renders his decisions concerning the division of humanity with respect to salvation. But it is not therefore necessary to agree with those who hold that this consideration alone is binding on God, although it might often prevail with Him. For, in the end, the goal of God is perfection of operation, and it can sometimes happen that the correction of the worst is the best thing. And it is even agreed that sometimes an example is provided from which it is evident that God softens the hardest hearts, so that Paul knows from the mercy shown to him that we should despair for no one. And those who see it our way discover, rightly and without difficulty, that the reason men lack the effect of grace is their own resistance. But they have not seen it as necessary to add that the effect of grace is always less where the resistance is greater. For sometimes (I would suppose less often) more abundant grace abounds in increased malice, until resistance is overcome. Therefore, God does not bind Himself to the foreknowledge of the better, or rather less evil, use of our natural free choice, although he regards its ground with great significance. Thus He does not show favor to a man on the grounds that he is better, or less evil, but because the general division and better combination of things demands that it be this way. For generally, everyone is equally depraved and dead to the good. Yet, although they are equal in depravity, nevertheless, they are unlike with respect to diversity of inclinations, and, for this reason, some resist less in certain circumstances while others do so in other, different circumstances. Nor is it a small part of divine grace that a man is placed in favorable circumstances. Besides, the economy of divine decrees concerning salvation is such that it cannot be reduced to general rules by us. Hence divine aids are not always victorious by the force of their own nature; indeed, they are not always *per se* efficacious, but often only *per accidens*, if I may speak in this manner, that is, they obtain their effect in virtue of the circumstances. Though it can be said, in a different sense, that nothing comes about *per accidens* with respect to God, that is, with respect to divine providence. See §34a. But when God adapts helps to circumstances, he brings about the sought ends with less effort and cost, so to speak. He does what the wise man generally does who, if he can use the same things for diverse purposes and can obtain an effect by means of diverse or concurrent aids, prefers this rather than allotting to each single operation particular causes that are efficacious *per se*. This is clear from the case of builders of automata. Yet it sometimes pleases him to furnish particular causes that are efficacious *per se*, indeed, rarely, some that cannot be resisted at all, i.e., can be destroyed by no opposing force. But for the most part it is sufficient

Plerumque enim sufficit tantas adesse vires pro circumstantiis, ubi adhibentur, ut constet non fore elidendas.

§9 (e) sufficienter scilicet, licet non efficienter.

§9 (f) sed haec optio non unice penes hominem est. Nam et voluntas ad bonum spirituale indiget auxilio divino. Aliqua tamen in decernendo hoc auxilio naturalis arbitrii, ut aliarum circumstantiarum omnium ratio habetur, uti jam dictum est.

§10 (a) Haec doctrina defendi nullo modo potest. Tollit enim divinam omniscientiam, omni potentiam, independentiam, rerumque a Deo dependentiam. Imo nec sapientis laudem Deo relinquit, qui ad instar hominis negligentis in diem vivat, et ex eventibus tantum consilia capiat.

§11 (a) verissimum est, magnam partem huius controversiae pertinere ad Philosophiam, seu ad Theologiam naturalem.

§11 (b) Dicendum est, fieri utrumque: et mirum est, non satis solere considerari *περιχώρησιν* rerum. Deus operatione sua ad omnem realitatem bonitatemque concurrit, eandemque voluntate sua intendit. Itaque concurrit etiam ad determinationem voluntatis. Interim providentia ejus se praevisis voluntatis motibus, ut aliis omnibus rebus accommodat etiam inanimatis. Hoc non est subjici rebus, nisi quis sapiente aut potius potente indignum putet, aut pro servitutis genere habeat, rationes sequi.

§11 (c) Si fatum certitudinem significat, omnia continentur fato; si absolutam necessitatem, solae aeternae veritates sunt fatales. Etiam priore sensu voluntates non sunt subjectae fato proprie loquendo, sed comprehensae, et pro parte sua faciunt fatum, ut Deus pro toto. Fatum ergo hoc sensu est complexus divinorum fatorum seu decretorum, quae voluntatum creatarum decreta aliquando supponunt, saltem sub ratione possibilitatis spectata.

§11 (d) certa est, sed salva contingentia et libertate, non necessaria rerum series. Et talis catenae aureae autor est Deus. Itaque ea longe abest ab Atheismo. Add. §14c, d.

§11 (e) In omnibus substantiis est et contingentia et aliqua spontaneitas, in solis intelligentibus libertas. Interim quamdiu naturaliter proceditur, omnia in materia fiunt concatenatione motuum, sed a Deo mentibus ab

that such powers, when they are employed, operate through circumstances, so that circumstances are arranged in such a way that the result will not be thwarted.

§9 (e) Sufficiently though not efficiently.

§9 (f) But this option is not in the power of man alone. For the will to do a spiritual good also requires divine aid. Still, in a certain way, in decreeing this aid for natural choice, the foundation of all other circumstances are considered, as was already said.

§10 (a) This doctrine cannot be defended in any way since it destroys divine omniscience, omnipotence, independence, and the dependence of things on God. Certainly it does not result in praise of the wisdom in God, and instead makes God in the image of a negligent man who lives only for the day or adopts plans only in response to events.

§11 (a) It is quite true that this controversy pertains for the most part to philosophy or natural theology.

§11 (b) It should be said that both occur. It is amazing that people are not sufficiently accustomed to considering the mutual dependence of things. God concurs by his operation in all reality and goodness, and he intends these things by his will. Thus he concurs even in the determination of the will. Meanwhile, His providence accommodates itself to the foreseen motions of the will as also to all other things, even inanimate ones. But this is not to be subjected to things, unless one would hold it unworthy of a wise or powerful person to follow reasons, or to regard doing so as a kind of slavery.

§11 (c) If *fate* signifies certainty, then all things are contained in fate; if it signifies absolute necessity, eternal truths alone are subject to fate. And so in this prior sense wills are not subject to fate properly speaking, but are included in it, and they bring about fate for their part as God does for the whole. Thus, fate in this sense is a complex of the divine fates or decrees, which sometimes presuppose decrees concerning created wills, at least as seen *sub ratione possibilitatis*.

§11 (d) The series of things is certain but, since one must preserve contingency and freedom, not necessary. But God is the author of this splendid series and so this is far removed from atheism. See §14c, d.

§11 (e) There is contingency and some spontaneity in all substances, and freedom in intelligent substances alone. However, as long as things proceed naturally, everything in the material realm happens by a concatenation of motions, but in such a way that they are accommodated by God

initio accommodata, et ad fines etiam morales paeordinata; uti omnia in mentibus naturaliter fiunt concatenatione perceptionum et appetitionum a Deo ad fines etiam spirituales directarum; quae ubi distinctae sunt, et cum ratiocinatione fiunt, finium mediorumque connexionem constituunt. Materiae motus non turbant seriem perceptionum mentibus naturalem, legesve cogitandi, aut volendi libertatem; nec mentis cogitationes aut voluntates turbant leges motuum materiales a natura paescriptas. Unio autem animae et corporis sese ostendit in utriusque seriei consensu a Deo ab initio paeabilito, ut ex propriis legibus in tempore sese invicem accommodent sibi. Atque huc redit sistema, quod vocatur Harmoniae paeabilitae quo omnium maxime et divinae providentiae veritas, et humanae mentis invicta suique juris natura in clara luce collocatur. Non male scripsit Hilarius (lib. 9 de Trin.) Deum in primo nascentis animae statu omnes ejus futuras cogitationes legere: secutus opinor Origenem in Genes. cuius verba sunt apud Euseb. praep. Evang. Ita ut revera homo principium in se habeat omnium suarum actionum, nexus tamen inclinante non necessitante: Itaque non tantum principium earum in se, sed et dominum habet, quod non tollitur sed perficitur electione eorum quae optima judicamus.

§11 (f) Catena fixa est et immutabilis non absolute, sed ex hypothesi divinae paevisionis et paeordinationis. Posset quidem mutari, sed non mutabitur: quia Deus, antequam eam constitueret, omnes rationes, quae mutationem suadere aut dissuadere aliquando possent, jam paevidit. Nempe hic quoque omnia sunt paeabilita.

§11 (g) Hac in re ergo sapiebant Pharisaei. Iudeorum etiam posteriorum considerationes quaedam non malae, habentur in libro Cosri et alibi pas- sim.

§11 (h) Homines in non nullis quaestionibus pae caeteris ad Fatum Muhammedanum configere solent. Plerique si ipsis utcumque adhuc valentibus curam sanitatis commendes, respondent, suam cuique diem stare. In bello quoque, in matrimonio ineundo, in genere vitae eligendo aliique, perplexioribus negotiis sponte ab intentiore deliberatione abstinent non raro, et rem affectui aut casui committunt; facileque etiam ad superstitiones, et ominum captationes et divinatorias artes dilabuntur; Ignorantiaeque suae et negligentiae favent argumento illo, quod veteres jam

from the beginning to minds, and preordained to moral ends, just as all things in the mind happen naturally by a concatenation of direct perceptions and appetitions directed by God to spiritual ends; and when they are distinct and come about by way of reasoning, they constitute the connection of means and ends. The motions of matter do not disturb the natural series of perceptions in minds, nor the laws of thinking, nor the freedom of willing; nor do the thoughts or volitions of the mind disturb the material laws of motion prescribed by nature. However, the union of the body and the soul shows an agreement between each series, preestablished by God from the beginning, so that they mutually accommodate themselves to one another in time according to their own laws. And so this system is reduced to that which is called *preestablished harmony*, by which the truth of all things, both concerning divine providence and concerning the human mind, is set forth in a clear light through the unconquered nature of its own law. Hilary¹⁰ wrote correctly (in book 9 of *De Trinitate*) that God reads in the first state of the birth of the soul all of its future cogitations, following, I suppose the opinion of Origen¹¹ in his work on Genesis, whose words are also in Eusebius,¹² *Preap. Evang.* So that indeed man has in himself a principle for all of his actions, through an *inclining* but not *necessitating* connection. And thus man has not only a principle of such in himself, but also *dominion*, which is not destroyed but completed by the choice of those things which we judge best.

§11 (f) The series is fixed and immutable not absolutely but on the hypothesis of divine prevision and preordination. It could be changed, but it will not be changed because God, before he made it, already foresaw all of the reasons that in the end could argue for or against a change. So, in this way all things are certainly *preestablished*.

§11 (g) Thus, the Pharisees were wise with regard to this matter. Certain due considerations of the later Jews are contained in the *Liber Cosri*¹³ and in other places here and there.

§11 (h) Men are accustomed to having recourse to a Mohamedan Fate in some questions more than in others. If you recommend a concern for health to these men, even while they are still healthy, they respond that the day of their death is already established. In war also, and in entering into marriage, and in other choices in life generally, they frequently abstain of their own will from more strenuous deliberation in intricate matters, and they consign the matter to disposition and chance. And they will easily slip into superstition and seeking omens, and arts of divination; and their ignorance and negligence favor this *argument*, which the ancients called

ignavum dicebant. Verbi gratia: si mors mea tali die praevisa aut praedes-tinata est, moriar illa die, quicquid agam aut non agam. Responsio est: morieris utique statuta die, sed non quicquid agas aut non agas. Ages enim, quae te ad illam fati diem ducent. Si alia ages, etiam alia et forte longin-quior dies tibi praestituta fuit. Certe si valeret haec ratio ignava, nimium probaret; Nam nec praecipitum similiaque pericula evidentia cavere de-beremus aut possemus, si malum aequa statutum est, quicquid agas aut non agas. Tantum ergo sophisma inservit ad palliandam hominum negli-gentiam circa minora aut obscuriora, aut ea certe, ubi pugnandum est in af-fectus nostros: nemo enim sanus est, qui non magnum malum evidenter irruens praevalente aliis affectibus metu, declinet, si nullo negotio possit.

§12 (a) Verum est originariam quandam inter animas nostras esse differ-entiam, nec omnes invicem per se assimilari aut solis corporibus discrimen debere: generatim enim, quae substantiae numero differunt, eas necesse est habere in se differentias individuales. At gradu dignitatis atque origine differre dicendum non est.

§12 (b) Quicquid sit de Origene, cuius sententia forte altioris est indagi-nis; concesserim, ad beatitudinem supremam omnes animas per se aequa esse indeterminates/indifferentes, non sequitur, sic etiam se habere eas ad aliud genus boni vel mali. Itaque ad salutem determinatio a caeteris circumstantiis pendebit. Per se intelligo locum habere, quae pendent a notionibus specierum, non a notionibus propriis individuorum; vel quod idem est, quae pendent ab explicabilibus, non vero ab infinitis in rei sin-gularis notione comprehensis. Talia enim sunt, quae dicuntur competere per accidens, id est, a circumstantiis et infinito Aristotelico et materia; nec quicquam amplius incertum relinquunt. Add. §27d.

§12 (c) Certum est, proprie loquendo non nisi liberos actus puniri. Interim certum quoque est, non omnia bona vel mala, spiritualia vel temporalia, nobis attrahi per solum liberi arbitrii usum. Non est semper currentis aut volentis. Add. §50a.

§12 (d) Praestabat dicere accommodatam quam subjectam.

§12 (e) Augustini nomine et doctrina abusos quosdam, longiusque pro-

lazy. For example, if my death is foreseen or was predestined for a certain day, I will die that day whatever I may do or may not do. The response is: You will certainly die on the established day but not regardless of whatever you may do or may not do. For you will do those things that lead you to that fated day. If you will do other things, then it was another and, as it happened, more distant day preestablished for you. Certainly, if this lazy reasoning were correct, it would prove too much; for we neither would be required nor be able to beware of falling headlong or of similar evident dangers if evil were equally established, no matter what we did or did not do. This sophism serves only to mask the laziness of people concerning trivial or obscure matters or those instances where we should struggle against our emotions; for no sane person, rushing headlong into a great evil, would, as long as he could without great difficulty, fail to turn away out of a fear that swamps all one's other emotions.

§12 (a) It is true that there is a certain difference in origin among our souls, so that all of them should not be assimilated to one another *per se* nor distinguished by bodies alone: for generally, when substances differ numerically, it is necessary that they have individual differences in themselves. But it need not be said that they differ in degree of dignity and in origin.

§12 (b) Whatever one says concerning Origen, his view is perhaps aimed at a higher level of abstraction.¹⁴ Even if I were to concede that all souls *per se* are equally indifferent to the supreme good, it does not follow that they are indifferent toward other types of good and evil. And so, determination to salvation will depend on the rest of the circumstances. I understand *per se* to apply to that which depends on the notions of species and not on the proper notions of individuals. Or, what is the same, it applies to that which depends on what is explicable and not to that which depends on the infinite things comprehended in the notion of the singular thing. For such are the things which are said to come together *per accidens*, that is, from the circumstances and an Aristotelian infinity and [the pure potency of] matter; and there is nothing left over that remains uncertain. See §27d.

§12 (c) It is certain, properly speaking, that no act is punished unless it is free. However, it is also certain that not all things, good and evil, spiritual and temporal, are brought to us through the use of free choice alone. It is not always by running or willing.¹⁵ See §50a.

§12 (d) It will be better to say “accommodate” rather than “subject.”

§12 (e) We know from a certain Prosper of Aquitaine¹⁶ and others that

gressos Praedestinatianorum haeresin peperisse, ex Prospero quodam Historico aliisque discimus, quemadmodum non male videtur astruxisse Sirmondus vir eximius qui veterem scriptorem contra hunc haeresin sub titulo Praedestinati edidit. Et si sint quidam adversae partis, qui nullam hanc haeresin fuisse potent, sed Augustini doctrinam ab adversariis odiosis nominibus traductam ita usserius et jansenius iprensis et ipsi viri insignes. Ego vero non video, cur non esse potuerint, qui aliquid a Stoicis Manichaeisque trahentes, sustulerint libertatem, Deumque fecerint despota-ica potestate utentem, quae voluntatem habeat pro ratione; aut etiam mali autorem; cum et recentiores quidam incautius locuti deprehendantur. Illud ad Praedestinatianam Haeresin cuiquam improperandam non sufficit, quod forte sub Praedestinatione non solam Electionem, sed etiam Reprobationem comprehendit. Haec lis enim tantum de nomine fuerit, modo concedatur, Reprobationem non praecedere considerationem culpae. Et praedestinatione tanquam genere, cuius species sint Electio et Reprobatio, usi sunt non uno loco Augustinus, Prosper, Fulgentius, aliique ejus temporis partisque, et postea Ecclesia Lugdunensis qui Godescalco faverunt. Interim multis Theologis piis et prudentibus aptius formaeque sanorum verborum congruentius visum, praedestinationem tantum adhibere ad vitam, (uti etiam in Ecclesiae Anglicanae articulo hujus loci factum est) et non nisi Electos dicere praedestinatos, Reprobos autem vocare tantum praescitos. Nam praedestinatio ingerit animo aliquid anterius consideratione meriti vel demeriti in genere spiritualium, in eo qui praedestinatur. Ideo electis commodius applicatur, quorum ipsi boni actus, quibus ad salutem perducti sunt, divinae gratiae atque destinationi debentur. Reprobatio vero in hominis pravitate fundatur, ut Reprobos magis postdestinatus dici mereatur. Et ipse Augustinus non uno loco Praedestinationem de solis Electis accipit, veluti cum ait: Praedestinationis causa quaeritur, nec invenitur: Reprobationis vero causa quaeritur et invenitur. Quasi diceret, gratuitam esse Electionem sed promeritam Reprobationem. Sed circa vocabula faciles erimus, modo res sint salvae.

§13 (a) Neque tamen omnes Sublapsarios in ea re ab Augustino abire constat; et optandum erat, reliquos hic cum eo reconciliari, cum iste locus prae caeteris totius controversiae maxime aliquid in praxin possit quod bene vedit Augustinus. Add. §5.

certain men, abusing the name and teaching of Augustine and departing widely from it, defended the heresy of “Predestinarianism,”¹⁷ as Sirmondus, an exceptional man, well realized. He published an old author’s works in opposition to this heresy under the title “Praedestinati.” And yet there were certain people on the opposite side, who did not take this to be a heresy, but rather the doctrine of Augustine merely brought in under the names of troublesome adversaries, such as Ussher,¹⁸ Jansen (Bishop of Ypres),¹⁹ and other distinguished men. I do not see why there could not be those who, drawing something from the Stoics and Manichaeans, would deny freedom, and would portray God as using a despotic power, which would place the will before reason; or even which makes God the author of evil, since even some more recent ones have been known to speak incautiously on this subject. It is not sufficient for something to count as the heresy of Predestinationism that it include not only election but also reprobation under predestination. For this controversy would, for the most part, be only over a name, provided that it is conceded that Reprobation does not precede consideration of fault. Augustine, Prosper,²⁰ Fulgentius,²¹ and others of this time and party, and afterward the church of Lyon, which favored Gottschalk in a number of places, used predestination just as a genus whose species are election and reprobation. However, it seemed to many pious and prudent theologians more suitable in form and more congruent with sound words to apply predestination only to life (as is done in this passage of the article of the Anglican church) and to call only the elect “predestined” whereas the reprobate are called only “foreseen.” In him who is predestined, predestination implants something in the soul before consideration of merit and demerit in the genus of spiritual things. Thus, it is applied more appropriately to the elect whose very good acts themselves, by which they are led to salvation, are credited to divine grace and determination. But reprobation is based on the depravity of man, so that the Reprobate deserves more to be called *postdestined*. And in more than one place Augustine himself accepted predestination concerning only the elect as when he said: the cause of predestination is sought but it is not found, while truly the cause of reprobation is sought and is found. This is just as he said, that election is free but reprobation is earned. But we will be easy when it comes to words as long as the ideas are sound.

§13 (a) And still it is not agreed that all sublapsarians depart from Augustine in this matter; and one would have hoped that those remaining could be reconciled with him on this point since this could greatly affect conduct more than any other issue in the whole controversy, as Augustine rightly saw. See §5.

§13 (b) Sunt Augustini loca non pauca pro universalitate mortis Christi.

§14 (a) Nescio, annon Godescalcus non nihil excesserit, et ad haeresin, quam dixi, Praedestinationorum inclinavit, eaque ratione Episcopos quosdam in se armavit; et quidem primum omnium Rabanum sive Maurum Archeepiscopum Moguntinum, cuius et contra ipsum scripta extant. Res hodie obscurior est; pro Godescalco stetit Usserius, contra Sirmondus; ambo excellentes viri: illi succenturiatus Mauguinus, huic Cellotius, justis operibus. Nec mirum dubitari nostris temporibus, cum et viventi Godescalco faverint Episcopi in regno Lotharii, dum adversi erant, qui sub fratum Ludovici et Caroli ditione degebant. Imperatori autem Lothario cum fratribus non bene conveniebat. Scilicet facilius concordia in Ecclesia retinetur, cum in republica pax est. Itaque voluit providentia, ut dogmata Christiana Conciliis Oecumenicis stabilirentur, antequam Romanorum imperium a Barbaris dilaceraretur.

§14 (b) Aliorum Scholasticorum exemplo. Nam haec doctrina Thoma antiquor est, eamque tota, ni fallor, schola defendit, excepto Durando aliquisque paucis, quamquam et Durandus generalem saltem concursum ad singulos actus admississe videatur. Th. Bradwardinus, qui seculo jam decimo quarto Praedeterminatoribus physicis maxime praelusit; refert, a Stephano Parisiensi Episcopo damnatas fuisse has propositiones: causa secunda habet actionem, quam non accipit a prima; cessante prima (a cooperazione) non cessat secunda ab operatione.

§14 (c) Hoc ita capiendum est, ut intelligamus, quicquid perfectionis seu realitatis absolutae est in bonis vel malis, profluere a Deo; resque ita connexas esse, ut ex praeteritis futura non necessario quidem sed tamen certo nascantur.

§14 (d) Eodem res redit cum distinguitur inter necessitatem hypotheticam, ex posita semel atque praestabilita serie, et absolutam; quae posteriori libertas semper salva est. Connexio quoque causarum in mentibus deliberantibus, finium scilicet et mediorum consideratione constans, non est necessitans sed inclinans. In utroque igitur capite merito dissentimus a Bradwardino, cuius velut Ismaelis manum contra omnes fuisse (inducta non obscura necessitate) scribit Grotius, credo, quia Anselmum, Lombardum, Thomam et alios scholae proceres impugnare non dubitavit. Ejus

§13 (b) These are a number of places in Augustine which favor the universality of Christ's death.

§14 (a) I am not sure whether or not Gottschalk has exaggerated something and inclined, as I said, toward the heresy of predestinations, and for this reason armed certain bishops against him. And indeed the first among these was Archbishop Rabanus Maurus²² of Mainz whose writings against him still exist. Today the matter is more obscure; Ussher stands firm in favor of Gottschalk while Sirmond²³ was against; both men are excellent: Mauguin²⁴ is substituted for the former, Cellotius²⁵ for the latter, in impartial treatments. Nor is it surprising that the matter remains unsettled in our times since the bishops in Lothar's realm favored Gottschalk while he was alive, while there were adversaries who were living under the wealth of his brothers, Louis and Charles.²⁶ However, Emperor Lothar was not on good terms with his brothers. No doubt it is easier to retain harmony in the church when the republic is at peace. And so, Providence decreed that the Christian dogmas be established by the ecumenical councils before the Roman Empire was torn apart by barbarians.

§14 (b) by the example of other Scholastics. For this doctrine is older than Thomas and, if I am not mistaken, the whole school defends it with the exception of Durandus²⁷ and a few others, although even Durandus seems to have admitted at least a general concurrence to single acts. Thomas Bradwardine,²⁸ who preceded the champions of "Physical Predetermination" already in the fourteenth century, reports that the following propositions were damned by Bishop Stephan of Paris:²⁹ "the second cause has an action which it does not receive from the first"; "when the first cause ceases (from cooperating) the second does not cease from operation."

§14 (c) This should be taken so that we understand that whatever there is of absolute reality or perfection in good or evil acts flows from God; and things are connected in such a way that the future is not born out of the past *necessarily* but only *with certainty*.

§14 (d) In this same way the issue arises again when one distinguishes between a *hypothetical necessity*, from a series posited and preestablished at the same time, and *an absolute necessity* which is always absent in the case of freedom. The connection of causes in deliberating minds, unchanging in consideration of ends and means, is not *necessitating* but *inclining*. On both issues, therefore, we rightly disagree with Bradwardine whose hand, as Grotius³⁰ tells it, was against everyone just like Ishmael's³¹ (moved by an evident necessity) because he did not, as I see it, hesitate to fight against Anselm, Lombard, Thomas, and other important Scholastics.

opinor autoritate et doctrina, excitatus Wiclefus, crudius adhuc omnia ex necessitate evenire mox scripsit: quod dogma vel potius loquendi genus deinde in alios non nullos Romani Dominatus Antagonistas propagatum, sed eruditorum virorum prudentia cohibitum est. Recte Thomas (qu. 23 de veritate, artic. 5) Compossibilita sunt haec: Deus decernit istum salvari, et ipse potest damnari. Sed non sunt compossibilita haec: Deus decernit istum salvari, et iste damnatur. Nempe ita absolute loquendo et in sensu diviso, possibile est fieri, quod certum est non esse futurum. Et Scherzerus (disp. 5 contra Calvinian) cum scientiam medium defendit, bene agnoscit, non omne, quod infallibile est, necessarium esse.

§14 (e) Haec quoque doctrina, quod peccatum sit naturae privativae, iam est Augustini nec spernenda, vide §56b, d §57a infra.

§14 (f) Ludovicus Pereir a Dola Capucinus Durandum singulari libro defendit. Idem fecit Bernietius Gallus nuperrime, is qui assendum propugnavit et in compendium redegit. Neuter mihi rem pro dignitate explicare est visus: contra Pereiram a Dola scripsit Theoph Raynaudus.

§15 (a) Cajetanus tamen Cardinalis et Sylvester Prierias Sacri palatii magister, erant Thomistae. Et passim Lutherus in Thomistas invehebatur: nam ipse Nominalium sectam sequebatur, Thomistae in primis Reales, scotistae Reales quidem sed luxiores habebantur. Interim in hoc negotio major adversariorum Lutheri pars et a Thoma dissentiebat. Lutherus in Lipsiensi disputatione professus est, se maxime sequi Gregorium Arminensem, qui Augustiniam et ipse ordinis, et Magister ejus fuerat Generalis, et acerrimus Augustini sectator et Nominalis; ut ipse Lutherus et non pauci tunc Theologi Germani post Gabrielem Bielem.

§15 (b) atque etiam Doctorum Lovaniensium, ut ex Vargae Epistolis patet, ante controversiam Mich. Baji Lovaniensis Theologi, qui postea, cum paulo rigidius scripsisset, ad palinodiam Romae autoritate adductus est.

§15 (c) Lainez tamen Praepositus Generalis Jesuitarum, qui Concilio Tridentino interfuit, creditus est jam inclinare ad eorum partem, qui dissentunt ab Augustino. Etsi autem Claudius Aquaviva itidem Praepositus Jesuitarum, veritus fortasse aliquod detrimentum Societatis, si ab Augus-

His authority and doctrine, I suspect, motivated Wyclif,³² who, soon after and even more harshly, taught that all things happen out of necessity; and this dogma, or rather, way of speaking, spread to some others antagonistic to Roman powers, but it was repressed by the prudence of learned men. Thomas put it rightly in *De veritate* q. 23, a.5: "These things are compossible: that God decrees this one to be saved and yet that same one can be damned. But these things are not compossible: that God decree this one to be saved and this same one is damned."³³ Speaking "absolutely" and "in the divided sense," it can happen that what is certain will not take place. And Scherzer³⁴ (in *Contra Calvinian*, disp. 5) when he defends middle knowledge, acknowledges rightly, that not everything that is infallible is necessary.

§14 (e) This doctrine also, that sin is of a privative nature, is from Augustine and should not be rejected, see below §§56b, d, 57a.

§14 (f) Father Louis of Dole the Capuchin defended Durandus in his only book.³⁵ The Frenchman Bernietius³⁶ most recently did the same thing when he defended one who agreed [with Durandus] in a compendium. To me, neither seemed to explain the matter in a worthy manner; Theoph. Raynauld wrote critically of Father Louis.³⁷

§15 (a) Cardinal Cajetan³⁸ and Father Sylvester, Master of the Sacred Palace,³⁹ were Thomists. And here and there Luther attacked the Thomists: for he himself followed the sect of the Nominalists, while the Thomists, first of all, are held to be Realists, and Scotists were also certainly Realists but of a more excessive sort. However, in this matter the majority of the adversaries of Luther also dissented from Thomas. In the Leipzig disputation Luther professed that he followed Gregory Arminiensis,⁴⁰ who was an Augustinian of the same order and was his Master General, and was also the sharpest of the Augustinian sect and a *Nominalist*; as was Luther himself and not a few other German theologians after Gabriel Biel.⁴¹

§15 (b) And (as is clear from the letters of Varga)⁴² likewise with the Doctors of Louvain prior to the controversy with Michael Baius⁴³ (also of Louvain) who, because he had written a little more rigidly, was thereafter forced by the Roman authorities to renounce his teaching.

§15 (c) Still, Lainez,⁴⁴ General of the Jesuits, who took part in the Council of Trent, was believed to incline to the position of those who dissent from Augustine. Even if Claudio Aquaviva,⁴⁵ himself a leader of the Jesuits, perhaps fearing that there would be a certain detriment to the Soci-

tini et Thomae sententiis longius recederent sui, libertatem sentiendi decreto 24 Decembris 1613 restringere voluerit, ut apud Tannerum in Theologiae suae opere de Gratia tractantem (disp. 6) videre est; praevaluuit tamen ruptis autoritatis repagulis (perspecta praesertim Pauli V indulgentia) vetustissima sententia de Electione respectiva, quam plerique ante Augustinum secuti erant. Cum paulo ante et Alfonsus Salmero et Ludovicus Molina ex eadem Societate ab Augustini rigore in alteram partem declinantes, Ambrosii Catharini et Alberti Pighii Sententiam de parvolorum sine baptismo et actuali peccato extincitorum naturali Beatitudine extra coelestem Regnum, non omnino autorum anteriorum expertem (etsi paulo ante a Bellamino rejectam) editis scriptis adoptassent; Salmero commentario in Epistolam ad Romanos, Molina in concordia Gratiae et Liberi arbitrii.

§16 (a) Scientia simplicis intelligentiae posset ita sumi ut medium completeretur. Nam scientia possibilium involvit eorum connexiones: unde complectitur, quid uno in actum posito esset consecuturum; nec tantum connexiones necessarias, sed et contigentes, seu quae tantum inclinant, neque enim talis causarum series obest libertati. Interim nihil prohibet hanc partem scientiae divinae medium appellare inter scientiam necessariorum et scientiam contingentium actualium seu visionis. Et mirum est doctos quosdam hujus scientiae adversarios negasse futura conditionalia esse determinatae veritatis. Aut enim dicendum est (nullo colore) intelligibilia non esse, aut fatendum, alterutram contradictionem in tali etiam questione veram esse. Nec refert, si jam olim hac scientia abusi Pelagianizantes. Exempla DEI de conditionalis contingentibus pronunciantis complura producuntur ex scriptura sacra, velut Gen. XI, 6. Ex. XXXIV, 16. Deut. VII, 3, 4. Et 1 Sam. XXIII, 12. et 1 Reg. XI, 2 et II Reg. II, 10. XIII, 19. Ezech. II, 16. Matth. XXVI, 53. Caeterum Praedeterminationis Physicae vox, cuius doctrina est Thomistarum recentiorum, vix viginti annis scientiae mediae vocabulum antecessit, si Molinae ipsi credimus scribenti circa ann. 1570 sic enim fere loquitur: Doctores Hispani qui a viginti annis scripserunt, cum non alium invenirent modum, quo Deus futurorum contingentium certissimam scientiam haberet, praedeterminationes ejus ad singulos actus liberos invexere. Sed cum ipse Molina putaret, hoc modo libertatem de medio tolli, scientiam suam Medium cum Fonseca propo-

ety if, because of him, they were to differ greatly from opinions of Augustine and St. Thomas, willed to restrain the freedom of opining by the decree of 24 December 1613, as is seen in Tanner's theological work *De gratia*, disp. 6;⁴⁶ still when the limits of authority were broken (once the liberality of Paul V was fully known),⁴⁷ the most ancient opinion concerning *respective election* prevailed which many had followed before Augustine. Still, a little before, both Alfonsus Salmeron⁴⁸ and Luis Molina, who were from this same Society and who turned away from the harshness of Augustine to the other faction, had adopted the opinion of Ambrosius Catharinus⁴⁹ and Albertus Pighius⁵⁰ from the published writings, concerning the natural beatitude of children without baptism and without actual sin outside the heavenly kingdom, a view not wholly absent from the published works of the above authors (even if it was rejected a little before by Bellarmine). Salmeron says this in his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans⁵¹ and Molina in the *Concordia gratiae et liberi*.

§16 (a) Knowledge of *simple intelligence* could be taken so as to include *middle* knowledge. For knowledge of the possibles involves their connections (and thus it includes what would happen when a thing is posited in act), including not only the necessary connections, but also the contingent ones, that is, those which merely incline, for such a series of causes does not obstruct freedom. However, nothing prevents this part of the divine knowledge from being called *middle*, that is, between knowledge of necessary things and knowledge of the contingent actual, or *vision*. And it is amazing that certain learned adversaries of this doctrine deny future conditionals to be of determinate truth. For it must be held (without any “spin”) either that these propositions are not intelligible, or that one of the contradictories is true in such questions. It does not matter, moreover, that adherents of Pelagianism abused this knowledge for a long time. Several examples of God making pronouncements concerning conditional contingents can be produced from the sacred scriptures, such as Gen. 11:6, Exod. 34:16, Deut. 7:3 and 4, I Sam. 23:12, I Kings, 11:2, II Kings 2:10 and 13:19, Ezek. 2:16, and Matt. 26:53. On the other hand the expression *Physical predetermination*, which is the doctrine of more recent Thomists, preceded the language of *middle knowledge* by scarcely twenty years, if we believe the writings of Molina in about 1570. For here he says, “the Doctors of Spain who wrote twenty years ago, when they did not find another way by which God could have most certain knowledge concerning future contingents, attached His predeterminations to singular free acts.” But because Molina thought that in this way liberty is destroyed, he proposed his middle knowledge with Fonseca.⁵² Thus it is clear that

suit. Ita patet, ipsum libertati, sed illos praescientiae consulere voluisse. Et tunc datum est inter Dominicanos et Jesuitas belli Theologici signum. Caeterum nescio, an non melior sit via quam ingressi sumus totam seriem Universi hujus actualis semel ex omnibus universis possibilibus electam considerantes; ita et infallibilitas sibi constat praescientis Dei id quod delegit, et libertas praesciti adjutique hominis, qualem Deus in possibilibus naturis invenit. Tametsi Durandi quoque sequens sententia et verissima sit, et nostrae in sit, qui notavit etiam futura contingentia ex suis causis determinate cognosci, omnibusque perspectis, quae vel impellent vel absterrebunt voluntatem, exinde ab omniscio intelligi, quorum se sit conversura. Hoc ille recte, (add. §43a) modo adjiciatur, determinationem esse inclinantem non necessitatem; adeoque ut alias ita hic quoque distinguendam esse determinationem (seu certitudinem objectivam) a necessitate, quod male in Cajetano reprehendit Catharinus opusculo de Praescient. et Provid. add. hic §74 et §11e fin. Interim et si Deus eventa in suis causis videat, eo ipso, dum omnes rerum connexiones intelligit; non ideo tamen minus ex alio capite, (totius scilicet possibilis seriei simul spectatae) et causas et eventa aequaliter videt in eodem rationis signo. Caeterum verendum est, ne tota doctrina sive de Physicis Praedeterminationibus ad praescientiam contingentium necessariis (ultra emanationem perfectionum creatarum a Deo extensa) quemadmodum et sententia, de uno quodam et unice admittendo perfecto auxilio interno actuali per se victorioso; nova sit et post Concilium demum Tridentinum increbuerit, non minus quam scientiae mediae appellatio et expressior usus. Augustinus et Thomas videntur efficaciam gratiae hominem convertentis quaevis in variorum auxiliorum internorum externorumque concursu ab omniscio conversionis autore ad hominem convertendum circumstantiasque ita accommodato, ut effectum secuturum esse constaret. Legi mereatur Thomas qu. 6 de Veritate art. 8. Distinguendaque sunt auxilia ab ipsa gratia sanctificationis, quae eo ipso, quod infunditur, jam est per se efficax, victoriosa irresistibilisque; omnibus utique obstaculis complanatis. In universum enim omnis (hoc sensu) infusio, imo naturalis intro ductio qualitatis aut formae, irresistibilis est, nempe hypothetice ex ipso statu

he wanted to build his system around liberty whereas the other school wanted to build their system around prescience. And thus begins the theological debate between the Dominicans and the Jesuits. In contrast I do not know that there is a better way than the one we have entered into, considering the total series of the actual universe chosen once for all out of all possible universes; so it is both the case that the infallibility is established in virtue of God's own knowledge of that which he chose, and that freedom of foreknown and aided man is established in just the way God discovers him in the nature of possibles. Nevertheless the following opinion of Durandus is both most true and implied in our view, who noted that even future contingents are known determinately from their causes, and because all things are known, which either move or repel the will, it follows that an omniscient being will know which way it will turn.⁵³ It is true (see §43a), provided we understand that the determination in question is inclining and not necessitating, so that in this case as in others, determination (or *objective certitude*) should be distinguished from *necessity*—a view which Catherinus reproves poorly (against Cajetan) in *Concerning Foreknowledge and Providence* (see §74 and §11e to the end).⁵⁴ But even if God sees events in their causes and by that very fact knows all the connections of things, nonetheless it is not less true from the other side (that is, from the whole possible series seen at one time) that he sees both events and causes equally under the same sign of reason. Furthermore, one should fear the doctrine of the necessity of Physical Predetermination for the foreknowledge of contingents (beyond the emanation of the perfections of the creatures extended from God) as much as the opinion of one who also defends a perfect actual internal grace, which is victorious *per se*. Also, we must be concerned by the novelty of some of these ideas, which arose only after the Council of Trent. I mean the whole doctrine of the necessary pre-determination of the foreknowledge of contingents, as well as the opinion concerning some one perfect individual aid, admitted once for all and victorious *per se*. Though this is no less novel than the term middle knowledge and its rather prominent use. Augustine and Thomas seem to have looked for the efficaciousness of grace for converting man in the concurrence of various internal and external helps which are accommodated by the omniscient author of conversion to the conversion of man and circumstances, so that it might be sure that the effect would follow. Thomas' *De veritate* q. 6, art. 8⁵⁵ deserves to be read. "Helps" in this sense should be distinguished from the "grace of sanctification," which, by the very fact that it is given, is efficacious *per se* and irresistibly victorious because all the obstacles have been removed. In general, the infusion of all grace in this sense, that is, the natural introduction of quality or form, is irre-

subjecti utique ut par est praeparati: Add. §4a.

§16 (b) quoad auxilia gratiae.

§17 (a) Typis tamen post mortem demum prodiit, cura imprimis Liberti Fromondi.

§17 (b) Libellus est doctrina eloquentiaque insignis, cui titulus: Alexandri Patricii Armacani Mars Gallicus.

§17 (c) Ianseniani (quos vocant) negant in libro Iansenii monstrari posse quinque articulos ab Innocentio X Pontifice Romano damnatos, quidam addunt, saltem ibi non extare eo sensu, quo sunt damnati: cum ipsis fere Augustini verbis niti soleat, quem damnare noluit Pontifex. Tota propositum res illa consistit in sensu commodo aut incommodo, quo possibile necessariumque aut horum opposita accipiuntur: ita doctrina logica modalium in Theologicam versa est. add. §35b.

§17 (d) et gratiae per se efficacis sive victoriosae, electionisque absolutae seu gratitas

§17 (e) Innocentius XII voluit condemnatos censeri in sensu obvio. Itaque qui Augustini et Thome doctrinam tuentur, dicent, Articulos damnatos non nisi in sensu coacto ad eam accommodari posse. Sed non idem sensus omnibus obvius est.

§18 (a) Clementis IX moderatione, quam imitatus est Clemens X, Arnaldo ipsi eximio viro, etsi alicubi justo acriori, non obscure favens. Cujus in ea re laudabile exemplum secutus est Innocentius XI. Etsi idem et Sfondratum foverit, cum diversa omnia sentire non ignoraret virum, qui Romanae Ecclesiae presbyter Cardinalis posthumum tandem opus reliquit longe ultra Molinam profectum, titulo Nodi Praedestinationis soluti, quod editor in ipsa Roma ab Innocentio XII commendatum scripsit cardinali Alzano tunc Brevium secretario, nunc sub Clementis XI nomine Pontifici Maximo; cuius (ut idem editor addit) editionem procurarunt Magnus Heturiae Dux et Cardinalis Coloredius; cuius autorem non passim concesse scribendi in hoc argumento libertate dignum judicavit Cardinalium Congregatio; quod approbarunt Doctores et ex Dominicanis etiam ipse Magister Sacri Palatii Bernardinus: ut intelligas, Romam hic stare pro sentiendi

sistible, hypothetically to be sure, depending on the state itself of the subject, at least as far as one is prepared. See §4a.

§16 (b) as far as the help of grace was concerned.

§17 (a) It finally appeared after his death, in the first instance through the efforts of Libertus Fromond.⁵⁶

§17 (b) This little book, the title of which is *Alexandri Patricii Armacani Mars Gallicus*, contains eloquent and distinguished doctrine.⁵⁷

§17 (c) The Jansenists (of whom they spoke) deny that the five articles condemned by the Roman Pope Innocent X⁵⁸ can be found in Jansen's book, and they add that they surely are not to be found in the sense in which they are condemned, because Jansen generally relied on the words of Augustine, which the pope did not wish to condemn. The issue consists almost entirely in the way in which the terms "possible" and "necessary" or their opposites are taken (that is, whether they are taken in an agreeable or disagreeable sense): thus the logical doctrine of modality was dependent on theology. See §35b.

§17 (d) Both concerning grace which is efficacious or victorious *per se* and concerning absolute or gratuitous election.

§17 (e) Innocent XII⁵⁹ wanted the condemned articles to be censured *in the obvious sense*. And so, those who hold to the doctrine of Augustine and St. Thomas say that the condemned articles cannot be reconciled with them, except in a forced sense. But this sense is not obvious to all.

§18 (a) Through the mediation of Clement IX⁶⁰ whom Clement X⁶¹ followed by openly favoring Arnauld, himself an exceptional man, even if he was more harsh on some occasions. Innocent XI⁶² followed his laudable example in this matter. Even though he favored Sfondratus,⁶³ he was not ignorant of the fact that the man held entirely different views and, as a cardinal presbyter of the Roman church, advanced far beyond Molina in a posthumous work he left behind entitled *Solutions to the Knot of Predestination*, about which the publisher wrote, in Rome itself, that the work received a commendation from Pope Innocent XII to Cardinal Alban,⁶⁴ then secretary of the Brevium, and now pope under the name Clement XI. An edition of this work (the publisher tells us) was obtained by the Grand Duke of Tuscany and Cardinal Colloredo.⁶⁵ In addition, the Congregation of Cardinals judged the author of the work worthy of the freedom of writing on this subject, a permission not given lightly; and so the doctors and even the Master of the Sacred Palace, Bernardinus,⁶⁶ a Dominican, approved it: so, you see, Rome stands firmly in favor of this liberty of think-

libertate. Etsi postea apparuerit quosdam Excessus Posthumi Operis non placuisse, ut quod innocentia infantum sine peccato actuali decedentium beatitudinemque (ipsius sententia) naturalem consequentium praestet beatitudini supernaturali poenitentium; et quod Deum ignorans mortaliter non peccet. Interim quinque Gallicani praesules, qui ad Innocentium XII contra Sfondratum acriter scripsere, doctrinam, quae parvulos illos a poena sensus eximit, a se non damnari fatentur, cum Thomae Aquinati aliisque insignibus viris eam placuisse constet: videntur tamen et ipsi et alii multi Gallorum Theologi (quod miror) magis hodie inclinare in Augustini rigidiorem sententiam et Gregorii Ariminensis, qui suo aeo paucos in ea re sectatores habuit, et tormentum infantium dictus est; cuius et Concilii Tridentini Patres doctrinam improbabant: solaque Augustini reverentia, ne damnaretur effecit, ut ex Pauli Sarpii Historia intelligi potest. Postremo et in causa Sinensi Roma moderatior visa est quam Sorbonici quidam, ne causa parum cognita magnam gentem Atheismi, ut idolatriae ab antiquissimis temporibus receptae damnaret.

§18 (b) Nuper res iterum in nervum erupit, responso quorundam Doctorum Gallicorum, qui ad exilium vel palinodiam sunt adacti. Et secutae sunt acres in Belgio foederato turbae inter Romanae partis homines, quibus factum est, ut Archiepiscopus Sebastensis etsi vir caetera satis probatus, ob Iansenismi suspicionem gradu Vicarii Apostolici dejiceretur: resque eo processit, ut tandem Ordines Foederati (etsi alterius in sacris sententiae) autoritatem interponere cogerentur. Postremo Clemens XI. Praedecessorum Innocentii X Alexandri VII Innocentii XII decreta, quanta potuit verborum efficacia, confirmavit, sensuque Iansenii damnatas esse propositiones non tantum signari sed et credi iussit, quantum hoc juberi scilicet potest.

§19 (a) Tolerantiam Ecclesiasticam non omnes semper Evangelici Reformati negarunt. Nam ut de Melanchthoni et asseclis nil dicam, certe Helmestadienses, Regiomontani, Rintelenses aliquique nostri Reformatorum sententias minime damnandas censuerunt; Ducibus in primis insignibus Viris, Georgio Calixto, et Conrado Hornejo, Brunsuicensium Principum Theologis, quorum autoritatem et doctrinam multi alii sunt secuti, qui nec in articulo de persona Christi multum adeo a Reformati recessere. Iidem

ing. And yet it would thereafter become clear that certain excesses of the posthumous work were not agreeable, for example, that the innocence of children who die without having committed an actual sin and who therefore obtain natural happiness (on his view) exceeds the supernatural happiness obtained by the repentant sinner; and that one would not mortally sin in *being ignorant of God*. Meanwhile, five French prelates, who wrote to Innocent XII bitterly opposing Sfondratus, acknowledged that the doctrine that keeps little ones from sensible punishment is not condemned by them, since it is known to have pleased Thomas Aquinas and other remarkable men: still these and many other French theologians seem more inclined today toward the more rigid opinion of Augustine or toward Gregory Arminiensis, who had a small number of followers in this matter during his lifetime, and is called “the tormentor of the infants.” Further, the fathers of the Council of Trent disapproved of his doctrine: and only out of reverence for Augustine was it not condemned—as can be gleaned from the history written by Paul Sarpius.⁶⁷ Last, in the China affair, Rome showed more moderate behavior than some professors of the Sorbonne, and thus refrained from condemning a great race for atheism (caused by a lack of knowledge) but instead condemned [merely] the idolatry received from ancient times.⁶⁸

§18 (b) Recently the matter has again vigorously erupted through the response of certain French doctors who were forced into exile or into renunciation of their views. There followed, in Belgium, bitter fights among the men from the Roman side, with the result that archbishop Sebastensis, while a good man otherwise, has been removed from his position as apostolic vicar since he was suspected of being a Jansenist: and the matter proceeded in this way so that ranks of the Federation (even though of a different opinion in sacred matters) was compelled to impose an authority. Finally, Clement XI, confirmed the decrees of his predecessors, Innocent X, Alexander VII and Innocent XII, with as much force of words as he was able and ordered, as much as something like this can be ordered, that the propositions in Jansen’s understanding were not only to be outwardly confessed as condemned but also inwardly believed to be such.

§19 (a) Evangelical Reformers do not always resist ecclesiastical toleration. So, while I cannot say anything about Melanchthon⁶⁹ and his followers, Helmstedians, certainly, and Regiomontanians, Rintelensians, and others among our Reformed judged the opinions to be condemned only minimally; further through the leadership of especially distinguished men, Georg Calixt,⁷⁰ and Conrad Horneius,⁷¹ theologians of the princes of Brunswick whose authority and doctrine many others followed, they differed widely from the Reformed in the article concerning the person of

nec a communione Eucharistia eos excludere voluerunt, qui realem praesentiam aut perceptionem sincere admittunt, etsi ea moralem aut corporalem appellandam negent. Severius judicant Saxonici plerique, et alii quoque multi, qui in primis Praedestinationis doctrina Reformata invenire sibi videntur, quae condemnationem mereantur, tolerantiaeque adeo Ecclesiasticae obsistant. Plerumque tamen condemnationem suam inaedificant non tam disertis doctrinis communibus Reformatorum, quam consequentiis inde deductis et controversis, et quas, ni fallor, Reformati salva doctrinae suae summa vitare possunt. Ex his intelligitur, Evangelicis nostris hactenus in ea re non satis convenire, nec spem deesse, satis fieri posse et jam rigidioribus, prudentibus tamen et bene animatis; luculenta, candida et commoda doctrinae expositione a Reformati profecta.

§19 (b) Synodus tamen Dordracena rem explicat secundum principia Sublapsariorum, et ipsius pro bona parte Augustini, etsi Supralapsarii notam inurendam non putavit.

§20 (a) non tanquam in quinque articulis errorem Arminius docuisset fundamentalem, sed quod non viderentur tunc commode praefici posse Reformati Ecclesiis et Scholis, qui ita docerent, praesertim cum alias sententias suspiciones Socinianismi adnoscerent Arminii discipuli non pauci. Alioqui nude Remonstrantes non ejurata sententia ad communionem Reformatorum admitti posse dudum placuit.

§21 (a) nam ipsi Anglicanae Ecclesiae Articuli utrique dogmati locum relinquent. Loquitur Artic.17 (qui hujus est argumenti) non nisi de Praedestinatione ad vitam. Dicit quidem Electos vocari et justificari, sed non addit solos. Commendat promissiones divinas, ut nobis in sacris literis generaliter propositae sunt, sequendamque ait voluntatem revelatam, scilicet distinctam ab arcana et semper effectum habente, quam, cum ignota sit, in praxi adhibere non licet. Solicite in primis notat, Electionem fieri in Christo (quanquam hoc plerique Reformati admittunt) neque adeo decretum tam absolutum fingi debere ut Christi mediatoris consideratio id non ingrediatur. Verissime consilium Dei eligentis nobis occultum in eodem articulo dicitur, nam et Lutherus ad DEUM absconditum hic cum Paul confugit. Et Evangelici quoque Theologi agnoscent in externis saltem salutis mediis dispensandis locum habere το βάθος, quae utique integrum

Christ. Yet these same men did not desire to exclude from the Eucharist any who sincerely admit the real presence or perception, even if they deny that this presence should be called moral or corporeal. Many Saxons and others as well judge more severely those who are seen to hold to Reformed doctrine, especially with respect to predestination, views which merit condemnation and stand in the way of ecclesiastical toleration. They generally reinforce this condemnation, not so much with the eloquent doctrines common to the Reformed, as by the consequences and the controversies deduced from them which, if I am not mistaken, the Reformed can avoid with the integrity of their own doctrines intact. From this it is clear that there is not as yet enough agreement in this matter among our Evangelicals, but hope is not lost that even the more rigid yet prudent and well-minded theologians will be satisfied by a lucid, straightforward, and fitting exposition of their doctrine carried out by the Reformed. The doctrines truly set forth by the Reformed are clear, candid, and suitable.

§19 (b) The Synod of Dordrecht explains the matter according to the principles of the sublapsarians and, in large part, of Augustine himself, even if it did not judge that a brand should be burned on the supralapsarians.

§20 (a) It was not as if Arminius had taught fundamental error in the five articles, but that those taught in this way could not, it seemed, be put in charge of Reformed churches and schools, especially since not a few of the disciples of Arminius claimed as their own other views suspected of Socianism. In any case, it was clearly good that the Remonstrants some time ago could be admitted into the communion of the Reformed even without giving up that view.

§21 (a) For these articles of the Anglican church allow room for both dogmas. Article 17 (which concerns this argument) speaks only concerning predestination “to life.” It says indeed that the “elect” are called and “are justified” but it does *not* add “only those.” It sets off divine “promises,” as they are proposed to us “generally” in sacred writings, and it says that the revealed will that follows is certainly distinct from the secret will or the will that always has its effect, which, because it is unknown, is irrelevant in practical matters. It first notes painstakingly that “election” comes about “in Christ” (although many Reformed admit this) and that one is not bound to represent the decree as so absolute that consideration of Christ as mediator does not enter in. It is quite rightly said in this same article that the “plan of God” in electing us is “hidden,” for even Luther takes refuge in the hidden God on this point along with Paul. And the Evangelical theologians also acknowledge that “the depths”⁷² is applicable to at least external means for dispensing salvation, which [means] certainly apply to the

Dei consilium in homine ad salutem perducendo ingrediuntur. add. §9b, §30b. Denique nulla in toto hoc articulo enunciatio est, quam Evangelicus sano sensu suam facere non possit.

§22 (a) Hobbesius vir utique peringeniosus, in peculiari libro contra Bramhallum Episcopum et alibi quaedam non spernenda dixit; sed in eo in primis lapsus est, quod contingentia omni ex rebus sublata, quaecumque eveniunt, absolute necessaria esse putavit, tanquam omnia existantia essent necessaria, aut tanquam sola existentia essent possibilia, quae res delectum et sapientiae usum tolleret in autore rerum; injustis, ineptisque omnibus extitidis aequa ac caetera meliora; quale quid etiam ex Cartesii illo dogmate derivatum est, quo materiam omnes successive motus recipere, fortasse incogitanter dixit, quod arreptum est a Spinoza.

§24 (a) Sed dum seipsum Deus considerat, non potest non considerare possibles rerum ideas; et dum ad suam gloriam omnia dirigit, simul respicit ad rerum perfectiones, quarum productio sapientia ejus ac potentia digna est. Sane possibilitates rerum, cum sint aeternae veritatis, fluunt ex divina essentia; et perfectiones earum actuales, cum in tempore proveniant, oriuntur ex divina voluntate, sapientiae regulis summe conformi.

§24 (b) Deus tamen considerat creaturas tanquam possibles in serie sua, antequam earum creationem decernat; neque ita Deus ab homine dependens redditur, sed divina voluntas accommodatur intellectui divino, in quo ideae sunt creaturarum, adeoque et rerum possibilitates comprehenduntur. Secus foret, si decreta Dei ab actualibus aliarum creaturarum operationibus suspenderentur quod in hominibus aliisque creaturis intelligentibus fieri necesse est, quia omnia in ideis rerum possibilium invenire, et a priori intueri non possunt.

§24 (c) Sed summa et perfecta sapientia non potest prorsus de fine decernere, nisi mediis exploratoris. Finis esto structura aedificii commodi et magnifici. Multis hoc modis obtineri potest: sed Architectus non decernit de forma ejus, nisi mediis inspectis, nempe situ, sumtibus, materiis, operariis etc. Nec quaestio, an aliiquid sit agendum a quaestione quomodo, separari potest in sapiente; nisi in iis bonis assequendis, pro quibus alia meliora substitui non possunt, veluti virtute, felicitateque deliberantis, de quibus an expetenda quaerendaque sint, dubitari non debet. Neque sem-

“whole plan” of God for leading men to salvation. See §9b, §30b. Finally, nothing in this entire article is set forth such that an Evangelical would be unable to adopt it in a reasonable way.

§22 (a) Hobbes, certainly a most ingenious man, said certain things in his own book and in other places against Bishop Bramhall⁷³ that ought not be rejected; but in one point especially he is mistaken: that because all contingency has been removed from things, whatever happens is, he supposes, absolutely necessary, as if all existing things would be necessary, or as if only those things that exist are possible, which would remove choice and the use of wisdom in the author of things, because unjust and unsuitable things, as well as other, better things, would have the same claim to existence.⁷⁴ Such is derived from that Cartesian dogma in which he said, perhaps unknowingly, that matter receives all motions successively, a point seized upon by Spinoza.

§24 (a) But while God reflects on himself it is impossible for him not to reflect on the possible ideas of things; and while he directs all things to his glory, he, at the same time, considers the perfections of things, whose production is worthy of his wisdom and power. It is true that the possibilities of things flow from the divine essence because they are eternal truths; and the actual perfections of these things, because they come about in time, arise out of the divine will, and are conformed to the rules of highest wisdom.

§24 (b) Still, God considers the creatures as possibles in their series before he decrees their creation; and so God is not reduced to a dependence on man, but the divine will is accommodated to the divine intellect, in which the ideas of creatures are found, and the possibilities of things comprehended. It would be otherwise if God’s decrees depended on the actual operations of other creatures, which must be the way it is in the case of man and other intelligent creatures, because they cannot discover and intuit a priori all matters in the ideas of possible things.

§24 (c) But even a maximally and perfectly wise person cannot decree fully concerning the end without exploring the means. Let the goal be the construction of a suitable and magnificent building. This can be brought about in many ways: but the architect does not make a decision about its form without at least inspecting the means such as the site, the costs, the materials, the workmen, and so on. The question of *whether* something should happen cannot be separated from the question of *how* it will happen, in the case of the wise, unless we are talking about acquiring those good things which can be subordinated to some higher good, such as when one considers virtue and happiness, ends which no one can doubt should

per, quod ultimum in executione sapientis, primum est in intentione: alioqui omnis causa esset propter effectum, cum tamen possit in ea esse, cur per se expetatur. Quin potius sapientis est, qua licet, mediis uti, quae et ipsa sint fines, expetique mereantur: ita augebitur perfectio operum ejus. Itaque non admittenda haec regula est, quemadmodum nec contraria eorum, qui eundem esse ordinem in operationibus et in decretis volunt. Neutra in universum defendi potest, neutra hanc questionem decidit.

§24 (d) Paupertinae sunt cogitationes putantium, Deum manifestare sapientiam, bonitatem et justitiam suam in solo pene novissimo die. Perpetuo manifestat, et perpetuo manifestabit, sed varie in diversis et apud diversos. Interim quod ad genus humanum attinet, verissimum est, scripturam sacram ei praestituere decretorum quendam diem.

§24 (e) Haec doctrina a ratione alienissima est, nec Deo digna. Deus cum sit omniscius, nihil neglit, omniaque prout sunt, considerat. Geometrae reperiunt, etiam infinite parva, etiam si magnitudinibus ordinariis incomparabilia, esse tamen comparabilia inter se; atque hinc etiam plurimum influere in ea, quae infinites sunt majora; ut appareat ex Tangentium et curvedinum consideratione, quae pendet ab infinite parvis inter se comparatis.

§24 (f) id nostrae ignorantiae imputandum est, qui angustis limitibus circumscripti, si parva omnia curaremus, majorum rationem debitam saepe habere non possemus, quod impedimentum in Deo locum non habet. Scio, quosdam etiam ingeniosos homines, cum forte vermem ambulantes obtrivere, ita loqui, tanquam par sit ratio nostri apud Deum. Sed est in ea re quidam, ut sic dicam, Anthropomorphicus error, non corporis sed mentis respectu; dum ita divinam mentem humanae nimis assimilamus. Quanquam hujus doctrinae autores hunc ipsum errorem dissentientibus objicere soleant. Sed fatendum est, non raro hic utrinque peccari.

§24 (g) Nihil finitum potest magnum aut parvum haberi, pretiosum aut vile, nisi comparatione. Deus, qui res videt, quales sunt, id est, qui videt rerum Analogias et comparationes; simul videt, nos esse creaturas viles re-

be desired and pursued; and, with the wise, that which is first in intention is not always last in execution; otherwise, all causes would happen because of the effect, though why it is desired in itself can inhere in it (as a cause). Rather, it is characteristic of a wise man, where possible, to *use means which are themselves ends* and which deserve to be pursued: in this way the perfection of his works will be increased. And so this rule should not be admitted nor should the contrary view be admitted, that is, the rule of those who hold that the same order is found both in operations and in decrees. Neither can be defended in general and neither resolves this question.

§24 (d) Poor are the reasonings of those who think that God manifests his wisdom, goodness, and justice only in the last day. He manifests them perpetually and He will manifest them perpetually, but variously, in diverse ways and toward diverse things. Meanwhile, as regards the human race, it is most true that sacred scripture clearly prescribes a certain day of judgment for them.

§24 (e) This doctrine is most estranged from reason and is unworthy of God. Since he is omniscient, God neglects nothing and he considers all things according to the way they are. Geometers discover that infinitely small units are still comparable among themselves, even though incomparable to ordinary magnitudes; and so also many things flow into those which are greater infinities; just as that which hangs on the comparison of infinitely small things among themselves becomes clear out of the consideration of the tangent and the curved line.

§24 (f) This should be blamed on our lack of knowledge, which, since it is circumscribed within narrow limits, is such that if we were to give attention to all the little things we would not often have a chance to consider the big picture, an impediment not applicable to God. I know that some ingenious men say that in the same way that people who walk perhaps trample worms, so is our reason related to God's. But in this same matter there is, as I would say here, an "anthropomorphic error," not with respect to the body but the mind, especially when we assimilate the divine mind too much to the human mind. Nevertheless, the authors of this doctrine are accustomed to raising this very deception against those with dissenting views. But it ought to be admitted that both go wrong often.

§24 (g) Nothing finite can be held to be great or small, precious or vile, except by comparison. God who sees things just as they are, that is, who sees the analogies and comparisons of things, at the same time sees that we are vile creatures in comparison to things much more noble, and that

spectu multo nobiliorum. et pretiosas ac nobiles respectu multo viliorum.

§24 (h) Sed gloria ejus utique in aptissima operum per decreta ordinatione apparent.

§25 (a) Hoc fundamentum (si ita interpretere, ut gloriam Dei separat a consideratione rerum, quemadmodum quosdam fecisse dictum est) infirmum et pravum est, et divinis attributis vim infert: Itaque spero nulli sapienti hodie placitum. Et fortasse olim quoque magis calore quodam certaminis quam maturo judicio huc est deventum.

§25 (b) Contingentia et in se certa sunt, et ideo certo praevidentur. Contingentia pugnat necessitati, non certitudini. Plerique Scholastici consentiant, futura contingentia esse determinatae veritatis. Objectiones, quae hic exhibentur, ex eo natae sunt, quod vera notio contingentiae et necessitatis non satis esset explicata. Tollere contingentiam non tam Theologorum Reformatorum est, quam Mahumedianorum, Hobbesii, Spinosae. Constat Reformatos Theologos contra Hobbesium et Spinosum in hac ipsa causa non sine Zelo pugnasse.

§25 (c) Futuritio oritur non tantum ex decreto, sed et ex objecto decreti, sumto, ut possibili, sed in quo merat ratio decernendi: quam tamen ipsum voluntatis divinae decretum completam reddit. add. §16a. Futura ergo quodammodo, non tamen plene et aequilibrate ante decretum indifferentia sunt ad futuritionem; habent enim in ipso adhuc possibilitatis seu idealitatis statu nudo rationem, quae inclinat divinam voluntatem ad decernendum vel saltem permittendum.

§25 (d) Fatentur omnes, esse quandam in contingentibus hypotheticam necessitatem seu pendentem ex hypothesi futuritionis, praevisionis, decreti. Nulla ergo hic contradictio est, cum absoluta necessitas negatur.

§25 (e) Praescientia decretum de rei praescitae existentia praecedens et a decreto independens non est pura aut aliquid futurum absolute repraesentans, sed orta ex nuda consideratione possibilium; et existentiam non actualem involvit, sed hypotheticam ut scilicet videat Deus, quid data re, et datae seriei parte admissa, in toto; et unius in serie temporis statu admisso, in reliquo tempore sit futurum.

we are precious and noble creatures in comparison to things much more vile.

§24 (h) But His glory is certainly clear in that most suitable ordering of His works through His decrees.

§25 (a) This basis (if it is interpreted so that it separates the glory of God from the consideration of things, as some are said to have done) is sick and weak and it attacks the power of the divine attributes: therefore I hope that no wise person today will find this acceptable. And perhaps in the past it was a view arrived at more in the heat of battle than by way of mature judgment.

§25 (b) Contingent truths are both certain *in themselves* and foreseen with certainty. Contingency is incompatible with necessity but not with certainty. And many of the Scholastics agree that future contingents have determinate truth. Objections which are raised here arise out of the fact that the true notion of contingency and necessity has not been explained adequately. The destruction of contingency comes not so much from the Reformed theologians as from the Mohamedans, Hobbes, and Spinoza. It is well known that the Reformed theologians have fought against Hobbes and Spinoza in this cause, and not without zeal.

§25 (c) *Futurition* arises not only out of the decree but also out of the object of the decree being taken as possible, in which the reason for decreeing would be found⁷⁵ which comes back again to the complete decree of the divine will. See §16a. And so in a certain way future things are not fully and equally indifferent to futurition before the decree; for they have, while still in the state of mere possibility or ideality, a certain feature, which (feature) inclines the divine will to decreeing or at least permitting them.

§25 (d) All admit that there is, in contingent matters, a certain hypothetical necessity or a certain dependence by reason of the futurition, prevision, or decree. So there is no contradiction here because absolute necessity is denied.

§25 (e) Foreknowledge both preceding a decree concerning the existence of the foreseen thing and obtaining independent of the decree is not pure, that is, representing something absolutely future. Instead it arises out of the bare consideration of possibles; and it does not involve actual existence, but hypothetical, as though God sees what there is in a given thing and, once it is admitted as part in a given series, he sees it in the whole series. And once having admitted one of them into the state in a temporal series, it will take place in the future time.

§26 (a) Dicere voluntates conditionatas esse imperfectas et Deo indignas, perinde est ac dicere, cognitiones veritatum conditionalium esse Deo indignas, quales tamen sunt in effectu etiam omnes necessariae veritates circa res non necessarias. Nam in sapiente voluntas est analoga cognitioni, et a quavis veritate afficitur pro rata parte realitatis. Minae aut promissiones Dei revera continent tales voluntates, ut Num. XIV, 12 et I Sam. XIII, 13 ubi Deus praeparavit Sauli regnum, si stabit in obsequio. Quae sententia conditionalis est, ut ipse ait Piscator in quaestionibus, ubi ad hunc locum.

§26 (b) Voluntas, ut cognitio, debet accomodari objecto, neque in eo ulla vel subjectio vel dependentia est.

§26 (c) Sunt quidam gradus in voluntate, ut in veritate et cognitione. add. quae supra ad §3. Gradus inferior non excludit superiorem. Voluntas Dei excludendi malum seria est inclinatio, sed non tanta semper, ut perveniat ad sumnum conatum; quia interdum admisso malo major aliunde perfectio obtinetur. Inclinationes sapientis sunt proportionales naturis rerum. Itaque non semper locum habet summus conatus, qui demum oriri debet causa per fecte cognita ex omnium inclinationum conflictu, ut sic dicam inter se. Voluntas inferioris gradus non statim imperfecta est sed tantum quatenus apud nos fundata est in ignorantia ex impotentia, et inde cum molestia conjuncta; quorum nihil in Deo est, neque etiam in sapiente quatenus Deum imitatur et in Deum resignatur. Deus non nisi modificate vult quae non fiunt; sapiens Dei imitator omnia modificate vult, praeter divinam gloriam et suam salutem.

§26 (d) Bonitas Dei, quemadmodum et scientia, non ultra potentiam extenditur sed ultra actionem. Deus plura potest, scit, vult, (certo volendi modo) quam agit.

§26 (e) Deum aliquid optare incongrua satis locutio est. Posse exsequi quae velit, quis negat? Sed sunt, quae vult modificate tantum.

§26 (f) agnosco, si idem sit optare quod velle pleno conatu, sive adhibito virium extremo.

§26 (g) Hoc loco non est opus recurrere ad figuratas. Intellectus et voluntas non figuratae sed proprie competit Deo, nisi cum Spinoza facere velimus. Aliud est voluntas, aliud sunt affectus quos passiones dicimus quae utique

§26 (a) To say that conditioned willings are imperfect and unworthy of God is also to say that cognitions of conditional truths are unworthy of God, such as, in effect, are all necessary truths about things which are not necessary. For in wise individuals, will is analogous to cognition, and it is affected by every truth whatsoever in proportion to its reality. Threats or promises of God certainly contain such willings, as in Numbers 14:12 and I Samuel 13:13, where God prepared the reign of Saul, if he would remain obedient. This opinion is conditional as Piscator says in questions where he speaks to this.⁷⁶

§26 (b) The will, like cognition, ought to be accommodated to the object, and there is neither any subjection to nor dependence on the object.

§26 (c) There are degrees in will just as there are degrees in truth and cognition. See what was said above at §3. Lower degrees do not exclude higher ones. The will of God to exclude evil from the series is an inclination, but not such that this always becomes the ultimate effort; because, when evils are admitted now and then, greater perfection arises from other quarters. The inclinations of a wise man are proportional to the natures of things. And so the best effort, which ought to arise through perfect cognition out of a conflict among all the inclinations (as I would say), does not always take place. A will of inferior degree is not from this fact imperfect, but only insofar as it is grounded in us through an ignorance which arises from our weakness, and which is thereafter conjoined with annoyance; none of which is in God, or in one who is wise insofar as he imitates God or resigns himself to God. God does not will those things which are not made, except in a modified way; the wise imitator of God wills all [such things] in a modified way, for the divine glory and his own well-being.

§26 (d) The goodness of God, just as the knowledge of God, does not extend farther than his power, but it does extend farther than his action. God is able to do, know, and will (in a certain sense of willing) many more things than he actually does.

§26 (e) The phrase “God wishes for something” is quite incoherent. Who would deny that God can bring about that which he wills? But there are some things which he wills only in a modified fashion.

§26 (f) I admit this if it is the same thing to hope as to will by full inclination, or to will in the final application of one's power.

§26 (g) In this place it is not necessary to have recourse to figurative talk. The intellect and the will are not assigned to God figuratively but properly unless we want to become like Spinoza. Having a will is one thing, but af-

imperfectionem continent. cum earum natura confusam quandam perceptionem involvat. Quaecumque ergo in DEO ad instar affectuum concipiuntur, consistunt in cognitionibus distinctis. Irascitur, id est, vult punire non improvisa crimina; poenitet, id est, vult mutare, quae dudum constituerat ad mutationem perducenda.

§26 (h) Concertatio mihi aliquando fuit cum Clmo Viro Paulo Pelissonio, utrum aliae sint Deo quam nobis justitiae notiones. Huc ipse inclinabat, et Poeta, qui dicit: Sunt superis sua jura. Ego contra contendi: uti quaedam communis Deo et nobis Arithmetic et Geometria est, et quae nobis in eo genere verae sunt, etiam apud Deum valent, etsi amplior sit divina scientia infinitis modis: ita aeternas circa justitiam veritates, quae apud nos demonstratione certa constant, etiam a Deo observaris nam et aequitas suis proportionibus continetur. Has regulas violari a Deo nostra tantum ignorantia credi facit.

§26 (i) imo non ob hoc tantum, sed etiam ob majus ipsorum et aliorum bonum.

§26 (k) Tale nihil Deus facit, ne ad tempus quidem. Aliud est conciliari aliquid cum nostris justitiae regulis non posse, aliud conciliationem nobis non apparere ob totam negotii seriem non perspectam; quo casu incivile est de ea judicare ex paucis, ut si quis ex Actis judicialibus mancis et multilis sententiam ferat. Hic ergo nostra ignorantia non est juris sed facti. Fuere, qui docuerunt, Deum jure absoluti dominii; potuisse in aeternum exitium praecipitare innocentes. Haec sententia Petro de Alliaco tribuitur, videnturque secuti eam Beza, Chamierus, Whitakerus, Amyraldus aliique non pauci. Sed non possunt excusari, nisi explicentur de jure quodam stricto ἀνυπεύθυνος, libertatis a reddenda ratione, (quae facit quod Angli vocant accountable) impunitatis seu incogibilitatis, irrectractabilitatis, quali posset res judicata, aut quali praetor jus reddere dicitur, etiam cum inique decernit; quae in Deo est etsi iniquum statuere non possit: neminem enim habet superiorem aut qui acta ejus irrita reddere possit. Sed peccant graviter qui justitiam ipsam in solo potentis arbitrio fundant se-

fects, which we say are passions, and which contain a certain imperfection, are another matter because by their nature they involve a certain confused perception. Thus, whatever things they conceive to be in God that correspond to an image of a passion, those things consist rather in distinct cogitations. “He gets angry” means that “he wills to punish while the criminal acts are not unforeseen”; “he repents” means “he wishes to change those things which he had formerly established.”

§26 (h) Once I had a dispute with Paul Pelisson⁷⁷ over whether God has notions of justice different from our own. He was inclined to a view like the poet who says “Sunt superis sua jura.”⁷⁸ I have argued against this: just as geometry and arithmetic are common to both God and us, and all truths of this type are valid for us as they are also before God, even if the divine intellect is infinitely higher: and likewise, concerning the eternal truths about justice, which are established for us by certain demonstration. For the eternal truths regarding justice are respected even by God, and equity too is held within its bounds. Only our ignorance makes us think that God violates these rules.

§26 (i) Certainly it is not only on account of this but also for more of these and other goods.

§26 (k) God does no such thing, not even for a time. It is one thing when something cannot be reconciled with our rules of justice and another thing when the reconciliation does not appear to us because we have not seen the total series of events; and so it is contrary to the principles of justice to judge concerning these matters with so little information, as if one were to render an opinion based on incomplete and mutilated court records. Thus, our ignorance here is not of law but of fact. There were some who taught that God was able to cast down innocents into eternal destruction by the right of absolute dominion. This view was attributed to Peter d'Ailly,⁷⁹ and Beza, Chamierus, Whitaker, and Amyrauld,⁸⁰ and no small number of others seem to follow it. But they cannot be excused, unless their views concerning justice are explained as ἀνυπεύθυνος⁸¹ or, we might say, released from having to give an account, or not accountable, or not knowledgeable, or irrevocable (a condition which the English call *in-accountable*), just as a case could be declared “judged”⁸² or as a judge is said to “administer justice,” even if he decides the outcome unfairly; this lack of accountability is found in God since he has supreme power and so has no superior who is able to render his acts void, even though he would be unable to bring about an unfair state of affairs. But those who ground justice in the mere choice of a power err gravely, having set aside the prin-

positis sapientiae et bonitatis rationibus; uti vel hinc Hobbius Omnipotenti jus ad omnia tribuit. Et huc accedunt, qui justitiam a lege, superiore, coactione unice derivant. Sed haec juris imperfecta notio est: perfectae justitiae, Deoque maxime dignae altior origo est, ex confluxu duplicitis fontis, Sapientiae nempe et Bonitatis. Ita justitia porrigitur non tantum ad facultatem, (ut cum Grotio loquor) sed etiam ad aptitudinem; nec tantum ad condignum, sed etiam ad congruum; nec tantum quaeritur, an actionem habeat Iesus seu remedium juris, sed etiam an habeat causam conquerendi; imo non tantum an Deus satisfaciat aliis, sed etiam an sibi, id est, summe sapienti. Imperfecta valde ea justitia esse debet quae etiam locum haberet, si cacodaemon aliquis, seu malus Manichaeorum Deus omnia gubernaret, contra quem nullum daretur juris remedium, etsi maximae essent conquerendi rationes. At contra Deum neque remedium juris locum habet neque remedii juris necessitas cum nemo intelligit acta.

§27 (a) Etsi Creatura Deo comparata quodammodo pro nihilo haberi possit, ut incalculo infinitesimali quantitatum infinite parvarum additio et subtractio ad ordinarias aut ab ordinariis negligitur: non possunt tamen pro nihil haberi vel infinitesima vel creaturae, cum comparantur inter se. Et ut infinite parvarum linearum proportionalitates inter se non negliguntur a Geometra, ita creaturarum relationes mutuae ne a Deo quidem: alioqui nihil pulchri futurum esset in productione creaturarum. Add. §24e.

§27 (b) Si gratificatio divina ita libera intelligeretur, ut ratione impellente careret, parum rationi consentanea foret. Abyssus est sed sapientiae, ut pulchre Paulus.

§27 (c) Deus nobis etiam dat facultatem et voluntatem bene utendi. Hoc ergo solis Pelagiani zantibus opponi debet. Gratia Dei etsi per se non esset efficax, sed per circumstantias, non ideo tamen laus et gloria nobis esset debita. Circumstantiae enim illae favorables, quibus sit, ut aliquando eadem gratiae mensura in diversis diversam efficaciam habeat, non a nobis veniunt, nec in nostra sunt potestate, sed refunduntur in seriem rerum, id est, partim in intellectum divinum partim in voluntatem. Nam in rerum possibilitate creaturae conditionaliter considerantur ab intellectu divino, una cum iis, quae ipsis convenienter, si existere ponerentur.

§27 (d) non est putandum DEUM per omnia et in omnibus sese eodem

ciples of wisdom and goodness, as does Hobbes when he attributes justice to an omnipotent being in all matters. And those who derive justice solely from law, superiority, and coercion approach this [point] as well. But this is an imperfect notion of law. The origin of perfect justice, meaning justice worthy of God, is higher, from the interweaving of two sources, namely, wisdom and goodness. So, justice is extended not only to the faculty (as I say along with Grotius) but also to the aptitude; not only to that which is very worthy, but to that which is suitable; it is sought not only if the injured person has a legal remedy but also if he has a sure cause of his complaint. Certainly it is asked whether God gives all that is required not only to others, but also to himself, i.e., to a most wise person. If some evil demon or evil Manichaean deity, against whom there is no remedy of justice, even if reasons for complaining against it were very great, governs all things, then a very imperfect justice would have to apply. But neither a remedy of justice nor a need for a remedy of justice applies against God, because no one understands His acts.⁸³

§27 (a) Even if the creature who, compared to God, can be held to be nothing in a certain sense, just as in the case of *incalculable infinitesimals*, addition or subtraction of infinitely small quantities to or from ordinary numbers is negligible, still neither infinitesimals nor creatures can be regarded as nothing when they are compared among themselves. And just as proportionalities of an infinity of small lines are not regarded as insignificant among themselves by geometers, so indeed are the mutual relations of creatures not regarded as nothing by God: otherwise there would be nothing beautiful in the production of the creatures. See §24e.

§27 (b) If divine favor were understood to be free in such a way that it would lack an impelling reason, it would hardly be agreeable with reason. But this is the depth of divine wisdom, as Paul so beautifully renders it.⁸⁴

§27 (c) God gives both opportunity and will to us for good use. This position is bound to be opposed only by the Pelagians. Even if the grace of God were not efficacious *per se* but through circumstances, still the praise and glory would not be due us. For those favorable circumstances, by which it sometimes happens that a measure of grace has different efficacy in different people, do not come from us, nor are they in our power, but rather they come back to the series of things, that is, partly in the divine intellect and partly in the divine will. For creatures are considered by the divine intellect conditionally, in the realm of possibility, together with the circumstances that would be needed if the creatures were ordained to exist.

§27 (d) It should not be held that God, through all things and in all things,

modo erga omnes homines in gratiae suae dispensatione habere aut hoc ab Evangelicis doceri; cum experientia manifeste repugnet, illud defendi potest, Deum voluntate antecedente ad omne bonum tendentem, quo ipso cujusque animae salutem intendere et aequaliter quidem quatenus una aliis melior aut dignior non est, si in se spectentur. Sed quoniam Deus universi curam habet et animae differunt inclinationibus et pro diversis objectis, plus minusve ad prava facilitatis et ad bonum repugnantiae exerunt. Nec patitur ordo rerum, ut cuique aliique favoribiles pro sua inclinatione assignentur circumstantia hinc fit ut licet divina benevolentia (antecedente) sit aequalis homines tamen ea (consequenter) non eodem modo fruantur. Ita etiam sit aliquando, ut qui magis resistit ampliore affluxu exerentis super circumstantias gratiae expugnetur. Etsi credibile sit saepius fieri, ut ingratitudo hominis gratiam pervicacius respuenti, hujus circumstantialis gratiae postea subtractione puniretur, Deo omnia justissime, et tamen et misericorditer et cum longanimitate dispensante. Itaque Praevisus Deo bonus usus gratiae, vel potius (ex quorundam Evangelicorum sententia) praevisa minor resistantia in quodam concursu circumstantiarum positi, confert aliquid persaepe, sed non semper regulam facit. Deus multa respicit, et interdum durissima corda emollit. Altior igitur (fateor) ratio est electionis, nec uni regulae a nobis comprehensibili adstringenda: et parum credibile est inter tot Americanos a tot seculis Christi ignaros nullum fuisse, qui oblatam gratiam aequa fuisse admissurus ac quidam ex nostris. Si quis ad talia confugit, vix est, ut non videatur cecidisse causa. add. §9b. Non igitur homo solus se discernit in salutis negotio, sed cum homine concursus circumstantiarum aut potius series rerum. De caetero tam necesse est hominem se discernere ab alio, quam necesse est, me non esse te. Profecto enim cognitio et voluntas objecto accommodari debent, ita, ut, quod ejus ab aliis discrimen facit, necessario in rationes peculiare aliquid decernendi de ipso ingrediatur: alioqui decretum ratione niti nequit. Ut adeo jam olim scriptor quidam celebris (Hugo a S. Victore ni fallor) quaerenti, cur Deus Iacobum dilexerit, Esavum odio habuerit, non inepte responderit; causam esse, quod Iacobus non fuerit Esavus. add. §12d.

has the same stance toward all men in the dispensation of his grace, or that this doctrine is taught by the Evangelicals, since it is clearly contrary to experience. One can defend the view that God has an inclination toward all good by an antecedent will, by which he intends the salvation of every soul, and all souls equally, since one is not better or more worthy than another, if they are considered in themselves. But because God has care over all things and souls differ in their inclinations and are directed to diverse objects, they more or less impel themselves to the evils of heedlessness or to the good of resistance. The order of things does not allow that favorable things are assigned in each circumstance and to each one according to his inclination, with the result that, although divine benevolence is (*antecedently*) equal, [all] men do not enjoy it (*consequently*) in the same way. So also, it is sometimes the case that the one who resists more is overcome by an exertion coming to him over and above that provided by the circumstances of grace. Even if it is credible that it is more often the case that the ingratitude of a man who stubbornly refuses grace is later punished with the removal of the circumstantial grace, God dispenses everything most justly, compassionately, and with long suffering. And so, the good use of grace, having been foreseen by God, or rather (as the Evangelicals have it) the lesser resistance in the concurrence of certain posited circumstances having been foreseen, very often contributes something, but this does not always make a rule. God considers many things and in the meantime softens the hardest hearts. So (I think) the reason for election is higher and is not drawn together in a single rule comprehensible by us: and it is hardly believeable that there were none among so many Americans ignorant of Christ for so many ages, who would have equally received grace; and the same is true for those from among our own number. If one were to have recourse to such a view, there is a difficulty, because the cause does not seem to have been shown. See §9b. Thus, man alone does not determine himself in the business of salvation, but the concurrence of circumstances, or rather the series of things, along with man, does. Concerning the rest, it is as necessary that one man is distinguished from other another as it is necessary that I am not you. For indeed cognition and will must be accommodated to the object in such a way that what makes a certain individual's cognition and will distinct from that of others necessarily enters into reasons of deciding some specific matter for oneself: otherwise the decision cannot depend on one's own reason. Indeed, long ago a certain celebrated writer (Hugo of St. Victor,⁸⁵ if I am not mistaken) once responded correctly to someone who asked why God loved Jacob and held Esau in disdain: the cause was that Jacob was not Esau.⁸⁶ See §12d.

§27 (e) rectissime dicitur, omne bonum divinae gratiae unice esse debitum. Modo divinae gratiae nomine omnia Dei beneficia intelligamus, gratiamque, tam naturali seu ordinaria via, quam extraordinaria et miraculosa in nos collatam computemus. Nam naturalia bona non minus sunt dona Dei quam spiritualia, et omnis perfectio fluit a divino fonte. Caeterum omne nostrum bonum ita a Deo est, ut omne nostrum malum possit esse a nobis aut aliis creaturis malis.

§27 (f) ita est haud dubie: quis dubitat praeter beneficia Dei universalia dari particularia?

§27 (g) Qui sic ratiocinantur, diversa miscent. Verum est, plus nos petere et plus aliquibus adesse, quam quod omnibus datur; sed ideo non est absurdum, id quod datur, saepe inefficax esse, sive vitio hominum sive etiam impedimento circumstantiarum: inefficax inquam, non quasi omnino sit inutile, sed quatenus id, de quo agitur, non efficit omnino.

§27 (h) omnem Dei gratiam talem esse, minime sequitur ex doctrina eorum, qui decreta conditionata admittunt, vel gratiam per se efficacem negant. Alter alteri nimium imputat: Etsi non desint aliquando, qui in fervore disputandi longius, quam par est, procedunt.

§28 (a) Quotus quisque hominum est, qui in praxi attendat ad has subtilitates? Et, si quis attendet, reperiet, omnia sua bona a Deo esse, omnia mala a se aut aliis pravis naturis; beneficia divina, vel generalia vel peculia, sibi non deberi; Inter maxima divina beneficia ipsas esse circumstantias, in quibus collocati fuimus, quibus factum est, ut a prava educatione, malorum consortiis aliquisque causis seducentibus magis fortasse quam alii quidam, fuimus praeservati, aut occasionibus objecti, quibus magis aedicaremur. Itaque non omnis gratitudo nostra gratiae cuidam internae per se efficaci debetur: neque hoc nisi ab eo statui potest, qui caetera divina beneficia non satis aestimare novit.

§29 (a) Qui sic ratiocinantur, perinde loquuntur, ac si plerarumque creaturarum rationalium notitiam haberemus, cum tamen dubitandum non sit, maximam earum multitudinem per totum Universum esse diffusam, cuius vix punctulum ac ne vix quidem exploratum habemus. Itaque facile judicare licet ex divinae sapientiae rationibus felices mentes immenso excessu

§27 (e) It is exactly right to say that all good is uniquely due to divine grace provided that we understand by the name of divine grace all the benefits from God, and we find that grace is brought to us both in the natural and ordinary way and in the extraordinary and miraculous way. For natural goods are no less gifts of God than spiritual goods are, and the perfection of all things flows from the divine font. In such a way every good in us is from God with the result that all of our evil can be said to be either from us or from some other evil creatures.

§27 (f) So it is by no means in doubt: who doubts that particular goods are given apart from the universal gifts of God?

§27 (g) Those who reason thus, confuse the matter in a number of ways. It is true that we seek more and that more is present for some than that which is given to all. But it is not absurd to say that what is given is often inefficacious, either by the imperfection of men or even by an impediment of the circumstances: it is inefficacious, I say, not because it is wholly useless, but insofar as that which is given has no effect at all.

§27 (h) It at least follows from the doctrine of those who admit conditioned decrees, or who deny grace that is efficacious *per se*, that all such grace is from God. One side imputes too much to the other; even if they are not wrong at times, they proceed in fervent disputing longer than is appropriate.

§28 (a) How few are the men who, in practice, attend to these subtleties? And if one were to consider carefully he would discover that every good in him is from God, and every evil is from himself, or from the depraved nature of others; the divine benefits, whether general or particular, are not due to himself; among the great divine benefits are circumstances themselves, in which we were placed, and by which it came about that we, perhaps more than certain others, were preserved from a bad upbringing, from bad associations and other causes of misdirection, or that we came across happy circumstances, through which we were more greatly edified. And so we do not owe all of our gratitude to *per se* efficacious internal grace; and this cannot be established except by the one who does not know how highly to value God's other kindnesses.

§29 (a) Those who reason like this, speak in the same way. And even if we had knowledge of several rational creatures, it should not be doubted that the greatest bulk of them are scattered about the universe, a universe which we have scarcely penetrated and hardly explored. And so one may easily hold, from considerations of the divine wisdom, that happy minds

infelibus esse numerosiores, et agnoscere licebit amplitudinem regni coelestis (de qua Coelius Secundus Curio libellum scripsit nuper recusum paulo tamen alio sensu) etsi ea ex praesenti generis humani statu non appareat, quem et ipsum nihil necesse est semper eundem manere. Itaque nos, qui non multa novimus, nec nisi exiguum hunc globum, et pauca secula intuemur, inepte hinc judicabimus de consiliis Dei: cum ne illud quidem constet, quid hodie intra animas ante obitum peragatur in hac vita: tantum abest, ut sciamus omnia futuri temporis et futurae vitae arcana. Multi viri pii crediderunt, eos qui tota vita luce quadam necessaria caruere, eam vel in agone habituros. Et cum omnes fere Theologi divinam quandam gratiam internam supernaturalem admittant, multique et infantibus in baptismo tribuant fidem quandam, caritatem plures; cuius tamen infantes nec consci sunt, nec meminerunt; non video, cur hanc gratiae speciem, etsi parum notam, rejicere certo possint, quae ad huc facilior videri queat; quando, cuius rei consci morientes fuerint, a mortuis quaeri non potest. Et recte ex eodem principio Thomas de Aquino judicavit, Providentiam cui vis suppeditare media salutis, dum modo ex ejus parte non impediatur; et, si aliquis nutritus in Sylvis inter bruta animalia ductum rationis sequeretur, certissime esse tenendum, quod deficiente praedicatore fidei Deus ei per inter nam inspirationem revelaret necessaria ad credendum. qu. 14 de veritate artic. 11 ad 1. Et Thom. Bradwardinus (qui ad Archiepiscopatum Cantuariensem ascendit) etsi auctor in libro de Causa Dei habitus non procul initio scripsit: credo constanter, quod Deus pius et justus omni eum amanti praे omnibus, volentique efficaciter ipsum cultu et modo debitissimis venerari, et diligentiam debitam perseveranter adhibenti, revelet quandoque religionem debitam et necessariam ad salutem, videlicet Christianam, implicite vel explicite. Ibidem putat dici posse quosdam inter idololatas ob bonam voluntatem salvatos, etsi creaturas ut servos Dei coluissent. Quae altioris sunt indaginis.

§30 (a) Oeconomiam sive dispensationem mediorum gratiae externorum involvere aliquid arcani et quantum ad cognitas rationes, absoluti; non pauci Viri docti apud Evangelicos dudum agno vere. Ut jam notatum §9b et §21a.

are more numerous than unhappy ones by a significant margin, and one will be able to know the size of the kingdom of heaven (concerning which, Celio Secondo Curione⁸⁷ recently wrote a book which startled a few, though in another sense) even if it is not evident from the present state of the human race, a state which by no means must always remain as it is. And so we, who do not know many things, except in our little sphere, and who consider this small period of time, for this reason make poor judgments concerning the plan of God since we cannot even establish today what goes on within the souls in this life, that is, before death. How much less then can we know all the mysteries of the future time and of the future life. Many pious men believed that those who lacked the necessary light throughout their lives would have it when they are about to die. And while nearly all theologians admit a certain internal supernatural divine grace, many also attribute a certain kind of faith to infants in baptism, and even more theologians admit a certain charity in such children; still infants are not conscious of this faith nor will they remember it. Even if it is little known, I do not see how they can reject this species of grace with certainty, which can still be seen so easily since we cannot ask a corpse what dead men have been conscious of. And from this same principle Thomas Aquinas rightly judged that providence supplies the means of salvation to anybody, provided that it is not, for its part, impeded in some way; and if someone were brought up in a forest with brute animals but followed the guide of reason, one can be quite certain that in the absence of someone to teach the faith, God would reveal to him, through an internal inspiration, whatever is necessary for believing (Q. 14 *De veritate*, a.11, ad 1). Thomas Bradwardine⁸⁸ also (who ascended to the position of archbishop of Canterbury) has written even more harshly in his book *De causa Dei*, not far from the beginning: "I firmly believe that, to those who love God before all things, and who efficaciously will that He be venerated by the means and respect due Him, and who resolutely offers the reverence he owes Him, God, who is pious and just, reveals the religion which is necessary and required for salvation, namely, the Christian religion, either implicitly or explicitly." He also reckons that one can say that there are those among idolaters who are saved on account of a good will, although they gave worship to creatures as servants of God. These matters are beyond finding out.

§30 (a) In any case, it is evident that the economy or dispensation of the external means of grace involves something mysterious, and from the perspective of reasons to which we have access, something absolute; not a few teachers among the Evangelicals have for some time claimed this, as has been noted in §9b and §21a.

§30 (b) absolutum, inquam, non ab omnibus rationibus respectibusque sed a cognitis tantum. Ita Aretius loco de Praedestin. p. 18. Divinam voluntatem habere justissimas, nobis tamen plane incognitas praedestinandi causas. Sane fieri non potest, ut omnino stet pro ratione voluntas, praesertim in sapiente; Divinae praedestinandi causae occultae esse possunt, justitiae et sapientiae expertes esse non possunt, uti Crocius Marpurgensis Theologus rectissime dixit post Calvinum.

§30 (c) omnis, quantumvis mera benignitas sapienter agentis ratione nitiatur, inquam ingredi oportet considerationem peculiarem ejus cui peculiariter benefit. Alioqui factum aliquid esset praeter rationem. Itaque necessario aliquid praevisum fuit, relatum ad objectum, quod Deum moverit, etsi non sit dignitas objecti.

§30 (d) liberum, sed cum ratione.

§30 (e) Placuit, sed profecto non sine causa. Placuit id est, visum est bonum in oculis Tuis, vel ut Anglicum hic habet, it seemed good in thy sight. Si ita Deo visum est, certe ita fuit.

§30 (f) Fateor talibus nec semper esse concessa nec semper denegata. Quid plerumque fiat, definire hoc nolo: saepe tamen ad minorem resistentiam pro circumstantiis objiciendis respici verisemile putem. Civitates Galilaeae majori quidem benefico quam Phoeniciae sunt affectae, sed non majori suo fructu, imo graviori condemnatione. Itaque exemplum eorum non pertinet ad eos, in quibus divina beneficia effectum habent; et vel ideo data sunt, quod majorem in illis effectum pro circumstantiis habitura praeviderentur. Tales autem non sunt omnes, qui convertuntur, sed interdum Deus potentiam suae gratiae in maxime obstituris exercere decrevit.

§30 (g) Si melioribus, licet simplicioribus utique minus male proclivibus; idque volunt, qui volunt praeferriri melius usuros. Ego tamen fateor, nihil in hoc genere statui posse universale. Non semper praefertur, quod est absolute melius, sed quod est aptius ad finem: uti aliquando saxum minus aut irregularius aut deformius, structurae inferitur, quia locum, qui superest, implet. Add. §34b.

§30 (h) Beneplacitum, guth-finden, trouver bon, bon plaisir, vocabula sunt, quae per se ipsa indicant, voluntatem etiam Dei non despotice arbitraria

§30 (b) “Absolute,” I say, not when considering all reasons and respects, but only when considering those things we actually know. So Aretius⁸⁹ said on p. 18 of *De predestinatione* that the divine will contains the most just things, although the causes of predestining are completely unknown to us. To be sure, it cannot happen that will takes the place of reason, especially in the wise; The causes of divine predestination can be hidden and yet cannot be lacking in wisdom and justice as the theologian Crocius of Marburg⁹⁰ most rightly said following Calvin.

§30 (c) Every kindness, no matter how pure, depends on the *reason* of the one acting wisely; I say that particular consideration of him to whom God gives a particular benefit must enter into the matter. Otherwise, something would happen which bypasses reason. And so necessarily something was foreseen, related to the object, which moved God, even if it was not the dignity of the object itself.

§30 (d) Free, but with reason.

§30 (e) It was good, but certainly not without cause. “It was agreeable,” i.e., it seemed good in Your eyes, or as the English expression goes, “it seemed good in Thy sight.” So, if it seemed good to God, it certainly was.

§30 (f) I admit that in such cases it is neither always given nor always denied. I do not wish to settle the matter of what is happening in most cases. Nevertheless, I should think that one must often look to less resistance rather than to obstructing circumstances. The citizens of Galilee are affected by a greater favor than the Phoenicians, not in terms of greater fruit, but rather with a more grave condemnation.⁹¹ And so their example does not pertain to those in whom the divine benefits have an effect; and so these gifts are given because they have been foreseen to have more effect in them under these circumstances. However, not all who are converted are acted on in this way, since meanwhile God decreed that the power of His grace be exercised on those resisting the most.

§30 (g) If by “better, though more simple,” one means less inclined to evil; they who want a better use made [of grace] favor this view. I admit that nothing can be established in this matter generally. That which is absolutely better is not always that which is preferred, but that which is more suited to the end, as it sometimes happens that a lesser or more irregular or more deformed stone, is preferred because it fills up a place in which it is left. See §34b.

§30 (h) “Beneplacitum, guth finden, trouver bon, bon plaisir,”⁹² are words which indicate per se that the will of God is not arbitrary in a despotic

esse, sed in bono fundatam, et in sapientissimo ex cognitione optimi ortam, et essentialibus Deo legibus justitiae, sanctitatis, aequitatis regi.

§31 (a) Fatendum est, et utrique parti agnoscendum, in quibusdam esse τὸ θεός, nec mirum. Ultimae enim rationes recidunt in totam seriem rerum, quae infinitum involvit.

§31 (b) Hoc intelligendum de voluntate plena. quae adhibet summum conatum.

§31 (c) Voluntas signi non debet accipi pro signo voluntatis et quidem simulatae, sed pro voluntate vera signis declarata, etsi minus plena et quae non nisi damno inobedientium effectu rarebit, quanquam hac distinctio alio sensu ab antiquioribus accipiatur. At voluntas beneplaciti hoc loco designare potest voluntatem plenam, sed fortasse arcanam ad ipsam obedientiae procreationem peculiarem vel inobedientiae permissionem, horumque effectus relatam; quam subditos nosse non convenit, nec rerum id ferre solet natura: quae distinctio in deo in primis locum habere debet, quia simul est Rex mentium, et causa rerum, quod alibi sine exemplo est etsi imperfecta quaedam adumbratio fingi possit in aliis Rectoribus. Caeterum ad ostendendum, posse Deum mandare, quae fieri non vult, solet allegari injunctum Abrahamo sacrificium Isaaci. Ubi Rivet in Genesin statuit, DEUM voluisse affectum non effectum, quam interpretationem non rejicit Scherzeru in disp. Anti Calv. 5. Hoc tamen nolim ad ea Dei jussa applicari, quae pertinent ad actus sua natura bonos et virtuosos, eaque omnia, quae revera antecedenter Deum velle consentaneum est, seu quae continent, quod Schola vocat, perfectionem simpliciter simplicem.

§31 (d) quidni etiam de internis, sufficientibus apud homines bonae voluntatis?

§32 (a) et merito quidem. Sed non frustraneum est, quod non omnia assequitur, ad quae tendit. At, inquires, majore certe parte excidit intentio? Sed sciendum est, inclinationes ad bonum praesertim divinas ne tum quidem, si nihil boni, ad quod tendunt, assequerentur, frustraneas fore, quando id

manner, but that it is founded on the good arising in a most wise manner out of the cognition of the best and that it is directed by God through the essential laws of justice, holiness, and equity.

§31 (a) It should be admitted that both parts know that some questions are too deep for understanding, and it is no wonder. The ultimate reasons come back to the series of things which involves an infinite number of factors.

§31 (b) This should be understood concerning the full will, which brings to bear the final effort.⁹³

§31 (c) “The sign of his will,” must not be understood as equivalent to “on behalf of his will” or anything like this, but instead as “the sign of the true declared will,” even if it is less than full; and this will would not arise except for the damning effect of those who disobey, although this way of making the distinction is different than the way accepted by more ancient figures. But can the “well-pleased will” indicate here the full, even if perhaps hidden, will, related to the particular control of obedience and the permission of disobedience and of their effect? And so one should not say that those who are subjected to this will understand it—not that the nature of things usually produces such understanding. So this distinction must apply, especially in God, because he is at the same time King of minds and the cause of things, which is without example elsewhere, even if a certain imperfect shadow of Him could be conceived in other rulers. As other examples show, God can mandate things which he does not want to happen, as is usually demonstrated by the command that Abraham sacrifice Isaac. Rivet⁹⁴ established in his *Commentary on Genesis* that God willed the disposition, not the effect, an interpretation which Scherzer does not reject in his *Disputationes Anti-Calvinus 5*.⁹⁵ Still I would not like this to be applied to the commands of God which pertain to acts that are good and virtuous by their nature, and to all those things about which it is certainly reasonable to say that God wills antecedently, that is, those things that contain what the School calls absolute perfection.

§31 (d) Why not also of internal sufficient means with the men of good will?

§32 (a) and indeed this is said with merit. But that which fails to bring about everything toward which it tends is not “in vain.” But, you object, hasn’t this intention for the most part failed? Instead, it should be understood that inclinations toward a good, especially in the divine case, would not be in vain even if nothing of the good toward which they tend is real-

contingit ex concursu aliarum ad bonum inclinationum. Semper enim obtinetur, quod ex concursu obtineri debet inclinatioque postulat in concursu. Adde, quae supra ad §3 sunt dicta. Et mobile, quod ad punctum aliquod remotius tendit, sufficit interdum ad proprius pervenire, ad quod utique etiam tendit; vel certe pertingi sufficient ad aliud, licet nonnihil a priore declinans, cui tamen sic saltem magis quam ante acceditur; qua sane in motuum compositionibus locum habent.

§32 (b) Hae merae logomachiae forent. Vere dici potest, Christum pro omnibus fuisse mortuum, ut toties insinuat scriptura, certo paulo ante explicato intentionis gradu; etsi non ad omnes perveniat fructus mortis. Et vere dici etiam potest pro iis tantum esse mortuum, quibus profuit mors ejus; spectata intentione Dei plena seu consequente.

§32 (c) Cum uno loco Deus dicatur dilexisse mundum, alio Christum non orare pro mundo, sed tantum pro Electis, facile intelligitur conciliari ista per diversos volendi gradus. Certum est, Christum etiam pro perditis patrem orasse, cum dixit: ignosce Pater, nesciunt, quod faciunt. Quis enim dixerit eos omnes, quorum studiis et clamoribus cruci affixus est, ad fidem aut ad salutem pervenisse. Itaque appareat, diversimode velle Deum, et similiter diversimode orare Christum.

§33 (a) Praestat forte dicere, implenda fuisse Christi verba in tota sua latitudine, sed non statim seu simul ac semel. Paulatim enim praedicatio Evangelii omnes nationes pervasit aut pervadet.

§33 (b) Nulla plane ratio est hoc recurrendi. Etsi non nova sit haec interpretatio, quam alicubi adhibuit et Augustinus quam hic variasse appetet.

§33 (c) at, nisi fallor, etiam Particularistae admittunt, oblationem Christi pro omnibus fuisse sufficientem, valore scilicet suo. Etsi autem satisfactio sit sufficiens, tamen non sunt beneficii participes, nisi qui volunt.

§33 (d) Causae, cur ad omnes non pervenerit notitia Christi aliaque id genus, semper difficultatem parient, sive sacrificii a Christo oblati vis universalis sive particularis esse dicatur: nec aliud responderi potest, quam

ized, as that good only obtains from the concurrence of other inclinations to the good. For what must obtain and what the inclination requires, in virtue of the concurrence, is always realized. And one must consider those things that were said above in §3. Something moving, which is tending toward some more remote point, is sometimes able to arrive at some nearer point toward which it also certainly tends; it is sufficient for something to be extended toward a certain point, that it is closer to that point than it was before, even in the case of something that swerves away from that point before it gets there; such principles also apply in the composition of motions.

§32 (b) These are merely disputes about words. It can be truly said that Christ died for all, as the scripture so often states—and as was certainly explained a little before by the degrees of intention—even if the fruit of his death does not extend to all. And still it can be truly said that his death is only for those for whom his death did some good, having seen the full or consequent intention of God.

§32 (c) Since in one place it is said that God loved the world and in another place it is said that Christ did not pray for the world, but only for the elect, it can easily be understood that these are reconciled through diverse degrees of willing.⁹⁶ It is certain that Christ spoke to the Father for the lost when he said: “Father, forgive them for they know not what they do.”⁹⁷ For who would say that all of those people, by whose zeal and cries he was nailed to the cross, came to faith or to salvation? And so it should be clear that God wills in diverse ways and Christ similarly prays in diverse ways.

§33 (a) It is much better to say that the words of Christ were fulfilled in their total extent, but not on the spot or all together and at one moment. For the proclamation of the gospel reached all nations or will reach all nations gradually.

§33 (b) Plainly there is no reason for reverting to this, even if this interpretation, which Augustine employed somewhere and on which he appears to have wavered, is not new.

§33 (c) But, if I am not mistaken, even Particularists⁹⁸ admit that the sacrifice of Christ was sufficient for all, specifically, *by its valor*. However, even if the satisfaction is sufficient for all, still all do not partake of the benefits but only those who want it.

§33 (d) The reason why knowledge of Christ and other things of this sort have not reached all nations always raises a problem, whether it is said that the power of the sacrifice of Christ’s oblation is universal or particu-

exactissimis justitiae, sanctitatis, bonitatis regulis consentanea esse, quae Deus facit. Si quid contra apparet, id nobis parum nosci.

§34 (a) Certum est, nostram voluntatem concurrere, sed a gratia praeveniente excitatam. Interim in diversis diversus est voluntatis concursus; et majore vel minore gratiae mensura utitur Deus ad movendam voluntatem. Interdum gratia est per se victoriosa, talis scilicet, ut in quocunque cum plerisque impedimentis et circumstantiis sit praevalitura. Interdum est per se efficax, sed ita ut per accidens inefficax reddi possit impedimentis nempe, hominis internis vel externis. Interdum non nisi per accidens sit efficax, ita ut hanc sufficiat non impediri, sed etiam opus sit juvari eam; quod fit cum in hominem incidit in favorabilibus circumstantiis positum. Per accidens hic intelligitur aliquid fieri, non respectu largientis Auxilium DEI, sed respectu naturae ipsius in se Auxilii, cui accidit concurrere circumstantias faventes quibus successus adjuvatur add. §9d. Nec ratio est, cur dicamus, homines uno tantum horum modorum ad conversionem perduci; cum modi tres esse possint: gratiae per se victoriosae, gratiae per se efficacis (quae posset quidem impediri per accidens, sed tamen in praesenti casu non impeditur) et gratiae per circumstantias efficacis. Et fieri potest, ut ipsa etiam gratia victoriosa tantum ad conversionem, non ideo perseverantiam operetur ad salutem. Et frustra nos divinarum viarum parum gnari Deo regulos certas praescribimus, quas sequi debeat, exclusis aliis non minus aptis pro ratione subjectorum et circumstantiarum. Duplex autem Gratia interna est, lux in intellecto, inclinatio in voluntate, quae interdum in quodam suavitatis sensu consistit. Caeterum ut notavit Thomas lib. 3 contra gent. c. 159 licet aliquis per motum liberi arbitrii divinam gratiam nec promerer nec acquirere possit, potest tamen seipsum impedire, ne eam recipiat.

§34 (b) si comparatio cum massa figuli nimium extendatur, habebit se homo conversione et salvificatione instar trunci. Nec video quomodo ex loco hoc Pauli inferatur, gratiam esse semper absolutam et per se victricem. Hoc tantum innuitur, non nostram dignitatem sed divinam benignitatem esse rationem electionis; neque illud, quo discernuntur homines inter se, sufficere ad salutem. Interim ne figulus quidem plane indistincte

lar. One cannot respond otherwise than that God does those things that are most consistent with the most exact rules of justice, holiness, and goodness. If something appears to the contrary it is too little understood by us.

§34 (a) It is certain that our will concurs, but only when excited by prevenient grace. However, this concurrence with the will is different in different cases. God uses a greater or lesser measure of grace to move the will. Sometimes grace is victorious *per se*, in such a way, however, that it would certainly prevail in anyone regardless of impediments and circumstances. Sometimes it is efficacious *per se*, but in such a way that it can certainly be rendered ineffectual *per accidens* by impediments, both internal and external to the person. Sometimes it is efficacious only *per accidens* so that it is sufficient that this grace not be impeded, but it is also necessary that it be assisted; this happens when it comes upon a person placed in favorable circumstances. “Per Accidens” efficaciousness is understood as something brought about not with respect to God bestowing aids, but with respect to the very nature of the aid in itself, with which, it turns out, the favorable circumstances concur and through which success is aided. See §9d. There is no reason why we should say that men are brought to conversion by only one of these means, when there can be three means: graces victorious *per se*, graces efficacious *per se* (which could be impeded *per accidens* but still are not impeded in the present case), and graces efficacious through the circumstances. And it can happen that victorious grace operates only in conversion but not in the perseverance of salvation. And it is in vain that we who are too little acquainted with divine ways prescribe to God certain rules that he must follow, to the exclusion of others that are no less apt by reason of the subject or the circumstances. However, internal grace is twofold: light in the intellect and inclination in the will, which sometimes consists in a certain “sweet sense.” Moreover, as Thomas notes in book 3 of the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, c. 159, while one could neither merit nor call forth divine grace through a motion of free choice, still one can impede it so that one does not receive it.

§34 (b) If the comparison with the potter’s clay is extended too far, man will regard himself in a distorted way when it comes to conversion and salvation.⁹⁹ I do not see how it is inferred from the words of Paul in this place that grace is always absolute and victorious *per se*. It is only agreed that the reason for election is not to be found in our worth but in divine favor, and that those factors by which men are distinguished among themselves are not sufficient for salvation. Meanwhile, not even the potter uses the

utitur argilla: aliaque materia aut mixtura opus est, cum vasae majori igni resistere debent. Nec dubium est, Deum materiam aptissime eligere aut praeparare ad structuram civitatis suae: interdumque arenam et calcem, alibi terram coctam, mox marmor adhibere: non nunquam et saxis rudioribus uti; interdumque rejici, quod est naturae excellentioris viliore praelato, quod magis ad certum scopum facit, velut supra notatum est. §30g.

§34 (c) His verbis maximam vim amoris divini indicavit Paulus. Bonum cum satis percipitur, animum infallibiliter determinat, praesertim si bonum sit maximum. Haec determinatio, quae libertati et spontaneitati vim nullam facit coactio populari sermone, sed improprie appellatur. Et pari sensu Deus dicitur cogi et vinci. Nempe summa intelligentia infallibiliter ex optimi consideratione determinatur: et tanto quisque est liberior, quanto magis sic determinatur. Libertas cum indifferentia aliqua conjuncta est, sed non cum indifferentia equilibrata, ubi, scilicet nulla sit ratio ad alterutrum magis inclinans, qualis indifferentiae status chimaericus est, (ut Buridani Asinus) et fangi potest (ab iis, qui rerum fundum non satis inspiciunt), existere non potest.

§35 (a) Haec sunt verissima et plane ad mentem meam.

§35 (b) Verissime omnia et aptissime, quae in hoc paragrapho referuntur. Hac interim determinatione non obstante Agens liberum manet, non tantum a coactione, sed etiam a necessitate. Unde etiam Thomistae rejectioni quinque propositionum Iansenio tributarum non male assensere. add. §17c. Deus ipse, etsi ad optimum determinatissimus, tamen est liberrimus, non tantum a coactione sed etiam a necessitate. Inclinant rationes sapientem non necessitant. Posset aliter agere, sed certum est, non esse facturum.

§36 (a) Qui homini admit libertatem, is etiam Deo aliquid demit. Conservandum est absolutum Dei dominium, sed abstinendum ab usu Dominii Despotico, illaudabili utique et rationis expertise. Praetextu divinae libertatis independentiaeque servanda nihil est divinae sapientiae justitiaeque detrahendum.

§36 (b) Internum aliquid et efficax animis indi, cum illuminantur, dubitari non potest. Illud quaeritur, an semper ad salutem debeat esse per se effi-

clay in exactly the same manner each time; different materials or mixtures are needed when the vessels must resist a greater fire. There is no doubt that God chooses the materials and plans to construct his city in the best way. Sometimes he uses sand and pebbles, in another place terra-cotta and then marble, and he sometimes uses an uncultivated stone; sometimes, when a cheaper material is preferred, the one that is of a better nature is rejected because the cheaper one is better for achieving a certain goal, as is noted above. §30g.

§34 (c) By these words Paul indicates the great power of divine love. Good, when it is sufficiently perceived, determines the mind infallibly, especially if the perceived good is the highest good. This determination, which takes away nothing of our freedom or spontaneity, is called “coercion” by the folk, but is improperly so called. And in a similar sense God is said to be compelled and conquered [by the good]. Certainly the supreme intelligence is infallibly determined through the consideration of what is best: and the more one is free, so much more is he determined [in this way]. Freedom is conjoined with a certain indifference but not with “the indifference of equilibrium,” where, namely, there is no reason for inclining more to one alternative, which state of indifference is chimerical, and (as in Buridan’s ass) can be imagined (by those who do not carefully enough inspect the ground of things) but cannot exist.

§35 (a) These things are most true and plain to my mind.

§35 (b) Everything mentioned in this paragraph is most true and most aptly put. This determination notwithstanding, the agent remains free, not only from coercion, but also from necessity. This is why even the Thomists, having rejected the five propositions attributed to Jansen, agreed that they were harmful (see §17c). God himself, even if he is maximally determined to the good, is nonetheless most free, not only from coercion but also from necessity. Reasons incline the wise man but they do not necessitate him. It would be possible for him to act differently, but it is certain that he will not do so.

§36 (a) He who attributes freedom to men, also takes away something from God. One must maintain the absolute dominion of God, but refrain from use of the despotic ruler who is unpraiseworthy and also has no part in reason. One must not take anything from the divine wisdom and justice under the pretext of saving divine liberty and independence.

§36 (b) It cannot be doubted that something internal and efficacious is introduced when they are illuminated. It is asked whether that which God

cax, quod Deus supernaturaliter confert salvandis, an potius fiat efficax demum, si simul cum naturalibus circumstantiis domisque sumatur, quibus animi praeparantur.

§36 (c) Semper rejici externa media, si gratiam (per se) victricem non habeant comitem; nescio quo jure dicatur. Vincere potest gratia, dum incidit in minus resistentem, aut per naturales circumstantias magis adiutum, etsi ex se victrix non sit.

§36 (d) quidni hoc etiam de gratia interna resistibili accipi possit?

§36 (e) Dei aliquid plene volentis proposito quis resistat?

§37 (a) Hanc necessariam consequentiam non agnosco, si scilicet sensus est, eos, qui semel vere conversi ac justificati sunt, semper esse finaliter perseverantes seu electos: Talia dogmata hominum arbitrio recepta sunt, nec ratione vel scriptura firmantur.

§37 (b) Haec omnia nihil aliud efficiunt quam Electos nunquam desinere esse Electos. Deus non est uti homo, ut eum poeniteat. Nec si homo semel conversus iterum gratia excidat, hinc sequitur Deum facti poenitere; non magis quam si semel probus in improbitatem labatur, imo non magis quam si semel vivens aliquando moriatur.

§37 (c) Horrorem incutientia quae dicuntur in scripturis, vera sunt, et hoc quod sequitur vere inculcant: scelesti agentes Dei gratia excidere et demonem sequi; ita tamen, ut aliquando reducendi sint in viam, et ex inferni potestate liberandi, si sint ex numero Electorum. De caetero horror frustra incuteretur ad cavendam totalem Apostasiam, si homines aliquo certo indicio absolute cognoscere possent, se esse Electos. Talibus enim Apostasia haec utique metuenda non esset. Sed quae filiale metum injiciunt curamque in certamine legitime absolvendo, ea suavissimo in piis sensui divinae benignitatis non obstant, quo rapitur animus ad coelestia, et spes ac fiducia salutis stabilitur. Recte Hunnius (Tom. 1 Opp. p. 951) de salute homini vere pio ne tantillum quidem dubitandum est, quantumvis non nisi sub perseverantiae determinatione promittatur, dummodo firmum propositum habeat cavendi sibi a peccatis contra conscientiam. Certus

confers supernaturally on those to be saved must always be efficacious per se to salvation, or whether instead it becomes efficacious in the end if the natural circumstances and state in which the souls are prepared are added in.

§36 (c) External means are always rejected if they are not accompanied by grace that is victorious (per se); I do not know by what right this is said. Grace is able to conquer when it comes upon the one who is less resistant, or is helped through natural circumstances, even if it is not, of itself, victorious.

§36 (d) But why could this not also be held concerning internal resistible grace?

§36 (e) Who resists something plainly proposed to the will by God?

§37 (a) I do not admit this necessary consequence if the sense is that those who are at some time truly converted and justified are always elect, that is, finally persevere. Such dogmas are accepted by the choice of men, but they are not established by reason or scripture.

§37 (b) All of these things amount to nothing more than that the elect never stop being the elect. God is not like man, in the sense that he repents. It no more follows that God repents of his actions when a man once converted falls away from grace than it does when an upright man falls into depravity, or when something living finally dies.

§37 (c) Those things “striking terror” in people that are spoken of in scripture are true, and they teach us those lessons that surely follow from them, namely, that those who act wickedly fall away from the grace of God and follow the devil; but nonetheless if they are among the elect then at last they will be brought back into the way and freed from the power of the inferno. The horror in those who think about “the fall into total Apostasy” would be without reason, if men are able to know by some absolutely certain sign that they themselves were elect.¹⁰⁰ For to such people, apostasy would not have to be feared. But those things which inspire filial fear and concern in the legitimate struggle to be set free from sin do not oppose that most sweet sense of divine goodness that exists in the pious, by which the soul is caught up into heaven, and faith and hope for salvation are established. Concerning salvation, Hunnius¹⁰¹ (Tom. 1 Opp. p. 951) should not be doubted in any respect by a truly pious person, insofar as salvation is not promised except under a determination to persevere, and provided that one has a firm plan to avoid falling away by sinning against conscience. For it is certain that, if one does not by his own action turn him-

enim est, si non sponte se a Deo avertat, vi divinarum promissionum nullam creaturam fore tam validam, quae ipsum ex manu Dei eripere, aut a dilectione; quae est in Christo Iesu, separare queat: citatque loca scripturae, in quibus sunt conditionalia promissa. Et Menzer disp. 3 de Elect. n. 264 Certitudo, inquit, absoluta non nisi de eo est, quod aliter se non potest habere: Iam vero qui pro praesenti est in statu gratiae, potest ea excludere et damnari, et alibi: qui est absolute certus, in eo non habet locum timor. Itaque bene Hülsemann supplem. Breviarii c. 14, quod certitudo salutis nostrae a parte Dei est indubitata, sed a parte hominis ante finem vitae non est infallibilis.

§37 (d) Hoc verum est. Perinde enim est, ac si quis dicat, nullum Electorum perire. Sed nihil inde ad rem inferri potest.

§38 (a) Haec sanctitas Electorum intelligenda est, perpetuo debita; Si vero de actu quaeratur, non utique in omnibus semper perdurans, sed tamen finalis et coronans: nec necesse est nescio quam sanctitatem non interruptam inutili doctrinae novitate comminisci etiam in gravissime lapsis; quae adeo nullis indiciis cognosci potest, ut aliquando contraria potius omnia appareant. Et frustra statuitur sanctitas habitualis perseverans in electis; cum experientia constet, semel conversos posse non tantum labi, sed et habitum contrahere criminorum actionum: unde tamen non nulli iterum liberantur. Frustra et sine ratione fingitur, Deum hic a naturae humanae modo et consuetudine recessisse.

§38 (b) uti duplex vocatio alia plurium, alia electorum, quae dicitur secundum propositum: ita quoque duplex justificatio est (non forma quidem sed objecto) una omnium vere creditum (etsi forte iterum excidant) altera electorum. Sed uti vocatio non Electorum sincera est, ita et conversio τῶν πρόσκαιρων vera esse potest. Et velle, nullam esse veram fidem, quae non bono fine coronetur, omniaque beneficia ad solos Electos restringere, est hypotheses comminisci fundamento carentes experientiaeque pugnantes, et maximaee parti Ecclesiae ab antiquo inprobatas, neque omnino periculi expertes: quoniam, si non datur certitudo remissionis peccatorum, nisi detur simul et electionis, verendum est, ne vel homines plerosque sem-

self away from God, by the strength of divine promises, there is no creature so strong that it could snatch him from the hand of God, nor from the love which is in Christ Jesus; and he cites the places in scripture in which the conditional promises are found. Menzer¹⁰² also, in disp. 3 of *de Elect.*, n. 264, says that such certitude is not absolute except concerning that which cannot be in another condition. But he who is for the present time in a state of grace can fall and be damned, and in another place he says: there is no place for fear in him who is absolutely certain. And so, Hulsemann correctly claims in supplem. Breviarii, c. 14,¹⁰³ that certitude concerning our salvation is indubitable on the part of God, but on man's part it is not infallible before the end of life.

§37 (d) This is true. For it is just as if he said that none of the elect are lost. But nothing can be inferred from that.

§38 (a) The sanctified state of the elect should be thought of as perpetually becoming. But if one asks concerning the fact of the matter in everyday affairs, this condition does not endure in every case. But with respect to final and crowning sanctification, it is not necessary to invent some sort of uninterrupted sanctity even by those who have fallen away most seriously—a useless novelty in doctrine. Moreover, the sanctified state cannot be known by any signs, and so sometimes all the signs indicate something different than what is in fact the case. And it is in vain to set up a habitual sanctity that perseveres in the elect when it is clear from experience that those once converted can not only fall but can even develop a fixed disposition to commit shameful actions, from which nonetheless some are once again liberated. In vain and without reason does one imagine that, in this instance, God has withdrawn (or absented himself) from the manner and experience of human nature.

§38 (b) Just as the call which is said to be given according to his purpose is twofold, one for the elect and one for the masses, so there is also a twofold justification (not by the form but by the object): one for all the truly believing (even if they fall again by chance) and another for the elect. And just as the call of the non-elect is sincere, so too can the true conversion of the transitory ones¹⁰⁴ be. One who says (a) that the willing which is not crowned with a good end was not true faith to begin with, and (b) that all benefits are restricted solely to the elect, invents hypotheses which are lacking any basis, contrary to experience, rejected from antiquity by the greatest part of the church, and not wholly lacking in danger since if certainty concerning remission of sin is not given unless it were given at the same time with election, one should fear that it is necessary either that

per in anxietate versari necesse sit de praesenti suo statu, quandoquidem futuri (nempe finalis perseverantiae) usque adeo certi esse non possunt; vel ne tandem in securitatem labantur, qui electionem certo se scire putant; unde vel desperatio in illis vel vita dissoluta in his consequi posset. add. §42d et §76c. Itaque rectius medianam viam tenentes statuemus (contra Pontificios quidem non paucos) posse nos certos esse nostrae fidei, conversionis, justificationis, quippe ab actibus internis praesentibus pendentium, quorum consciis sumus; et (contra Reformatos nonnullos) non posse nos sine singulari revelatione absolute certos esse nostrae finalis perseverantiae sive Electionis, sed timorem filiale superesse; etsi magna piorum in Christo fiducia sit, quia bonum Dominum habemus.

§38 (c) intellige, finaliter, si electi sumus; item nihil, scilicet extra nos, nil nisi culpa nostra, si semel simus ad Deum sincere conversi.

§38 (d) Ultimas divinorum decretorum consiliorum rationes nobis imperscrutabiles esse, omnes fateri debent.

§39 (a) Haec nil aliud significant, quam hominem imbecillitatis suae conscientium et magnitudinis divinae non ignarum judicare debere, omnia a Deo fieri justissime et sanctissime, etsi nos totius rerum seriei non nisi exiguum partem cognoscentes, et quid faciat et cur faciat, non perspiciamus.

§39 (b) Deum in peccatorum permissione, et in ipso ad id, quod in peccato reale est physicumque, concursu non otiose se habere, sed ut omnia ita et peccata regere; Scripturae sacrae locutionibus significatur. Cum autem circumstantiae interdum serviant ad indurandos homines, imo ad pervertendos, circumstantiae autem sint pars seriei universi, cuius autor Deus, sciendum est non ideo peccati autorem esse Deum. Nam in serie hac possibilium adhuc, ante existendi decretum spectata, jam exhibebantur peccata cum suis causis. Hanc possibilitatem et connexorum possibilium seriem, non decrevit Deus, sed invenit. Cum vero hanc rerum seriem possibilem elegit praeterea aliis tanquam omnium convenientissimam, bona in ea proprie voluit, mala intercurrentia permisit: quod ea series optima deprehenderetur, etiam computatis malis.

§39 (c) cum dicitur Act. XIII, 48 credidisse, qui ad vitam aeternam ordinati erant, non captanda sunt verba. Nam non dicitur eos solos credidisse:

men and others be perpetually anxious concerning their present state, since they cannot be certain of the future (that is of final perseverance), or that those who believe that they know themselves to be elect with certainty, fall into security; whence either there is desperation in the first group or a lax life can befall the second group. See §42d and §76c. And so taking a middle course (against several Papists), we shall hold the more correct view that we can be certain concerning our faith, conversion, and justification, especially by weighing the present internal acts of which we are conscious; and we hold (against some of the Reformed) that we cannot be certain concerning our final perseverance or election without a special revelation, and that filial fear thus remains, even if the faith of the pious in Christ is great, because we have a good God.

§38 (c) One must understand, *finally*, to apply if we are among the elect. As for the word *nothing*, which is extraneous, it means nothing except our fault, if we were once sincerely converted to God.

§38 (d) Everyone must admit that the ultimate reasons for the divine decree and plan are inscrutable to us.

§39 (a) These signify nothing other than that man, conscious of his imbecility and not ignorant of the magnitude of the divine, should reckon that all things are done by God most justly and in a most holy manner, even if we know only the least part of the whole series of things, we do not understand what He does or why He does it.

§39 (b) God, in the permission of sins, maintains a benign concurrence toward that which has real physical existence in the act of sinning, so that he rules in sinning as he does in all things; this is shown by the sayings of sacred scripture. Since, however, circumstances sometimes serve to harden men or even to turn them in the wrong way, and moreover since circumstances are part of the series of the universe, of which God is the author, it should be understood that God is not the author of sin. For in this series of possibles, even seen prior to the decree to existence, the sins were already displayed with their causes. God did not decree this possibility and the series of possible connections, rather he discovered it. But when he chose this possible series of things over the others, since it was most suitable of all, he properly willed the good things in it, while he permitted the intermingled evil because, even after having computed all the evil, this series was judged the best.

§39 (c) When it says in Acts 13:48 that those who were ordained to eternal life had believed, the words were not grasped. For it does not say "only

imo fortasse nec omnes. Quid enim prohibet, ex auditoribus quosdam non ea concione sed alia posteriore conversos. Dici etiam potest, quotquot ad vitam aeternam ordinati sunt, credere tandem fide coronante.

§39 (d) Doctrina absolutae reprobationis positivae plus dicit, quam necesse est, et pari ratiocinatione defendetur etiam, Deum velle peccatum. Diserte scriptura: Deum nolle mortem peccatoris. Ab hac formula similibusque, divino honori rerumque naturae con sentaneis male receditur cum facile aliis scripturae locis concilientur. Sic improbi in mentem reprobam traditi sunt, dum passu se, ut occasiones haberent, quibus augeretur pravitas et exereretur; et ut abessent eae quibus corrigerentur.

§39 (e) Nemo sapiens dicet, poenas a legislatore aequae intendi ac praemia.

§39 (f) Aliud est, non nosse vel cum prius noveris, non cogitare seu oblivisci; aliud non velle cum scias, seu praeterire. Itaque praeterit Deus, quos eum plena seu totali voluntate salvos velle dici nequit. Non vero inde sequitur, enim plena voluntate velle, eos esse non salvos, nisi ob culpam: illud verum est, permittere eum plena illa vel ut vulgo vocant consequente voluntate seu ex omnium partialium voluntatum concursu resultante, ut damnabiles reddantur; quemadmodum et omnia mala, quae in serie possibilium optima a Deo electa intercurrunt, permittit. In hac explicatione nulla admittitur imperfectio scientiae et potentiae, dum conservatur perfectio voluntatis quae est bonitas. Deus quidem nunquam judicium sui intellectus suspendit, sed de omnibus pronunciat de peccatis tamen quae eveniunt, statuit antecedenter non nisi repellendo, consequenter non nisi permittendo add. mox §40b. Caeterum pulchre Keckermann electionem esse actum gratiae; ideo posse positivam esse et absolutam a consideratione dignitatis aut meriti; sed Reprobationem esse Actum justitiae, ideo non esse sic absolutam, sed merito vel potius demerito inniti. Deus igitur mala culpae permittit tantum, cum consequentiis suis nempe poenis: mala poenae vult, sed presuppositis culpis.

those believed [who were ordained]": since perhaps not all [who were ordained] did [believe]. For what prevents the fact that some of those in the audience were converted not by this sermon but by a later one? Still it can be said that all those who are ordained to eternal life finally believe with crowning faith.

§39 (d) The doctrine of absolute positive reprobation says more than is necessary and, by parity of reasoning, it even promotes the belief that God wills sin. Scripture puts the matter eloquently: that God does not desire the death of the sinner. One draws back from this and similar formulas that fit poorly with the divine honor and the nature of things while the various texts of scripture are easily reconciled with one another. Thus the wicked have been handed over to an evil mind, while allowing both that there are occasions by which their sin might be increased and extended, and that those occasions by which they might be corrected were absent.

§39 (e) No wise person would say that punishments and rewards are intended equally by the legislator.

§39 (f) It is one thing not to know something or, if you knew it, not to think about it or *to have forgotten*. It is another thing when you know something and do not will it, that is, *to pass over it*. Thus God passes over those whom he cannot be said to have willed to save, by either a full or total will. From this it does not follow that he wills, even with a full will, that they should not be saved, except because of their own fault. Whence it does not follow that one who wills with a complete volition is not saved except through fault. It is true that he permits that they be rendered damnable by that full consequent will, as it is commonly called, or out of the resulting concurrence of all partial wills, just as he permits all things which intermingle in that best series of possibles chosen by God. In this explanation no imperfection of knowledge or power is admitted, while the perfection of the will, which is good, is maintained. Certainly God never suspends the judgment of his intellect, but instead makes pronouncements concerning all things, but when it comes to sin, he established *antecedently* what happens only by repelling and consequently only by permitting. See §40b. Moreover, Keckermann rightly holds that election is an act of grace, and thus that it can be positive and absolute through the consideration of worth or merit; but Reprobation is an act of justice, and as a result it is not thus absolute but depends upon merit or rather demerit. God thus only permits the evils of fault with their consequences, namely, punishments, and he desires the evils of punishment only once the faults are already assumed.

§39 (g) Fatendum est, Supralapsarios in eo non peccare, quod supra lapsus Adami ascendunt. Nam Deus, cum decrevit permettere peccatum Adami, simul decrevit permettere corruptionem massae, ex qua deinde aliquos rursus ad vitam elegit. Sed peccabunt, qui Reprobationem facient consideratione lapsus priorem.

§39 (h) Decretum permittendi lapsus fundatur in excellentia series possibilium, cui ille inest: et in illa possibili serie inclinatio rerum ad lapsus nascitur ex originali imperfectione creaturarum.

§39 (i) Respondebunt sublapsarii, non sequi, quia Deus circa originem mali et lapsus se permissive habuit, eum etiam salutem tali tantum modo decernere aut rem omnem in hominem conferre; cum illud sanctitati ejus conveniat, hoc non conveniat exuberanti bonitati. Nec apparet, cur Sublapsarius decretum absolutum aut gratiam per se efficacem ad bonum negare cogatur, si statuit, Deum se tantum permissive habere ad malum. Illud bene arguitur, sublapsarios (addo ego alios omnes) voluntatis conditio natus aliquando admittere debere add. §26a.

§40 (a) Non probo eorum artes, qui evitant difficultates quibus premuntur ut adversarii impune insultare possint. Et fatendum est, non sufficere ut de Electione ex massa corrupta disseramus, nisi veniamus ad originem corruptionis et, lapsus Protoplasmorum Angelorumque. Et qui doceret absoluto decreto statuisse deum, et omnino voluisse ut Adamus peccaret, (tanquam peccatum per se aliquid haberet quod Placere Deo posset, aut tanquam indifferens saltem sua natura apud Deum esset nec nisi arbitrio divino reatum seu ut puniretur accepisset) is utique in Sanctitatem divinum injurius esset, licet posterorum, peccata ex massae corruptione derivaret. Itaque constare debet ipsam primam originem peccati Deo imputari non posse. Evidem non liberum tantum sed et facilius erat Adamo integra adhuc natura innocentiam tueri. Lapsarum tamen vidit Deus in ea possibilium serie quam in summa aliis praferendum ob harmoniam universalum judicavit. Hinc apparet ultimam peccati originem imperfectioni originali possibilium creaturarum deberi quae non patiebatur ut a serie tota possibili caeteris summatim potiore omne peccatum abesse. Interim ea peccatis natura est ut in Voluntatem Dei antecedentem non

§39 (g) It should be admitted that *supralapsarians* do not sin in going back before Adam's fall. For God, when he decided to permit the sin of Adam, at the same time decided to permit the corruption of the masses, out of which he then chose some back to life. But those who make reprobation prior to the consideration of the fall will err.

§39 (h) The decree *to permit* the fall is founded in the best series of possibles in which it is contained, and the inclination of things to fall in this possible series is born out of the original imperfection of the creatures.

§39 (i) The sublapsarians will respond that since God's relation to the origin of evil and the fall is merely permissive, it does not follow that He decrees salvation only in this way nor that he confers all things [relevant to salvation] upon humanity. While this would be agreeable to his holiness, it would not be to the abounding of his goodness. Nor is it clear why a sublapsarian is thought to deny an absolute decree or grace that is efficacious *per se* to the good, if it was established that God held himself in merely a permissive stance toward evil. It is right to say that the sublapsarians (and, I might add, all others) must admit a certain inborn condition¹⁰⁵ of the will. See §26a.

§40 (a) I do not approve of the skills of those who avoid the difficulties by which they are pressed so that they can insult their adversaries with impunity. And it should be admitted that this discussion concerning election out of the corrupt mass is not sufficient unless we come to the origin of corruption and the fall of the first men and the angels. And whoever would teach that God established by an absolute decree, and furthermore willed wholly that Adam should sin (as if the sin would have something *per se* which can be pleasing to God, or as if the sinning is indifferent to God at least as it is in its own nature, except that, merely by divine choice, God has made it a crime so that it would be punished)—even though out of Adam's posterity God would divert some of those sinning ones out of the corrupt mass—does injury to divine holiness. And so it must be agreed that the primary origin of sin cannot be imputed to God. For not only is it permissible for Adam to keep his innocence while his nature was whole, but this would have been an easy thing to do. Still God saw in this possible series of lapses that which he judged to be preferable to all of the others according to the universal harmony. Thus it is clear that the ultimate origin of sin is due to the original imperfection of the possible creatures which did not allow sin to be absent because, all things considered, it was better on the whole than the other total series of possibles. However, the nature of sin is such that not only does it not fall under the antecedent will

tantum non cadet, sed etiam ab ea refellatur itaque peccatum per se et sua natura divinae voluntati contrarium est, errantque adeo qui positivo quasi jure statutoque dei solum modo malitatem id suam accepisse putant, quae hoc modo in sola punibilitate revera considereret. Interim etsi peccatum aversetur Deus, seu voluntate antecedente repellat, non tamen repellit summo conatu: nam et velle Deum et nolle scimus antecedente voluntate, quae tamen in effectu tandem seu consequenter, aut omittit aut permittit itaque ex concursu omnium voluntatum antecedentium, combinato cum possibilitate rerum fit ut consequenter salus quorundam, quam Deus volebat omittatur, et peccatum quod nolebat permittatur; quia voluntas antecedens est modificata tantum; consequens vero denique seu totalis, et pura (a conditione ac modo) et omnino plena est. Add. supra §3a.

§40 (b) Non est dicendum ab ullo, vel supralapsario, decrevisse Deum, ut Adamus laberetur et genus humanum in ipso, sed dici debet, permisisse: et credibile est non nisi permissivum revera decretum etiam multos Supralapsarios intelligere, etsi parum caute loquantur. Interim fatendum est permissionem non esse otiosam, idque cum alias, tum Calvinum voluisse appareret. Generaliter dici potest: quicquid reperitur in effectu, nec tamen est in voluntate antecedente, id in voluntate Dei consequente reperiri tantum permittendo. Caeterum poenae sunt etiam in voluntate Dei antecedente, sed conditionaliter tantum; culpae autem nullo modo. add. §72b. Ex hac jam notione (quamvis fortasse non ita distincte vulgo expressa) aequus judex intelliget, non effugii causa adhiberi Permissionem aut permissivam voluntatem, sed ab ipsa rei natura afferri; neque ab iis qui de Deo digne loqui, ac formam sanorum verborum sequi volunt, respui posse. Add. §71a.

§40 (c) Libenter affirmabunt, si sapiunt, Deum non decernere aut velle peccatum, cum scriptura dicente: non Deus volens iniquitatem, Tu es.

§40 (d) Hoc sane non male. Homo tunc minus servus erat; interim non plus indifferens erat. Ubi magis confirmatus in bono erit, minus indifferens erit, minusque servus.

§40 (e) imo essentiale discrimen est inter voluntatem et permissionem, ut ex nostra explicatione patet, lit. b.

§40 (f) Deus praescivit lapsum Adami, postquam illam possibilium se-

of God, but the antecedent will even recoils from sin so that it is per se and in itself contrary to the divine will. And those who hold that it was only by some positive law or statute of God that sin became evil, which would in this way constitute its sole reason that sin is liable to punishment, are mistaken. However, even if God is averse to sin or repelled by it through his antecedent will, still he is not repelled in the final inclination. For we know that in these matters God wills for and against things by an antecedent will that in the end or consequently, he either omits or permits, so that he makes one of the combinations of possible things out of the concurrence of all of the antecedent wills, with the result that the salvation of those which God willed is [antecedently] omitted and the sins that he willed against [antecedently] are permitted because the antecedent will was so modified, but the consequent will is final or total, and is pure¹⁰⁶ (in both condition and mode) and entirely complete. See above §3.

§40 (b) It should not be said by anyone, even the supralapsarians, that God decreed that Adam would fall along with the human race in him, but it must be said that he permitted it; and it is not credible that many supralapsarians believe that God decreed this except as a permissive decree, even if they may speak uncautiously. However, it should be held that permission is not useless, as Calvin and others seem to have supposed. It can be said generally that whatever exists in actuality is not in the *antecedent will*, but in the *consequent will* of God, which only *permits*. However, punishments are in the antecedent will of God, though only conditionally, while faults are not in the will of God in any respect. See §72b. Out of this notion (which perhaps is not so clear in the common expression) a fair judge understands that *permission* or permissive will (a) is not invoked as an evasion but rather is brought to bear out of the very nature of the matter, and further (b) cannot be rejected by those who wish to speak rightly about God and to follow the form of sound words. See §71a.

§40 (c) If they are wise, they will gladly support the claim that God does not decree or will sin, as the scriptures have said: It is not God willing iniquity, it is you.¹⁰⁷

§40 (d) This is rightly said and not mistaken. Man then was less a slave, but he was not more indifferent. When one is more confirmed in the good he will be less indifferent, and less a slave.

§40 (e) Nevertheless the difference is essentially between willing and permitting, as is clear from our explanation. See §40b.

§40 (f) God foreknew the lapse of Adam after he chose as best that pos-

riem tanquam optimam elegit, in qua hoc malum continetur. Bonum autem in serie voluit: malum adhaerens permisit, ut jam saepe notatum. Augustino qui inquisitionem supra lapsum non hominiss tantum sed et Angelorum extendit, visum est lib. 12 de Civ. Dei c. 9 his qui stetere Angelis aut perfectiorem datam naturam aut majus adjutorium. Plurimum tamen et in ipsis fuisse, Deumque et in ipsis et in homine primum liberi arbitrii vires experiri voluisse, Angelos bonos per liberum arbitrium stetisse, Diabolos et hominem pravo ejus usu cecidisse. De corrept. et grat. c. 10 Perseverantiae tamen gratiam tanquam coronam in praemium boni certaminis datam Angelis sanctis, ibidem notat. Ut adeo praedestinationem Angelorum praevisis meritis nixam statuere videatur: non sine gratiae tamen adjutorio ad ipsum certamen; adjutorio autem non quo, sed sine quo non. Nescio tamen, annon paulo amplius aliquid exegerint Pius V et Gregorius XIII Pontifices, cum has propositiones censura notarunt: nec Angeli nec primi hominis merita recte vocantur gratiae; item bonis Angelis et primo homini si in statu illo perseverasset, felicitas esset merces non gratia. Quicquid autem sit de Angelorum in bono constantia, saltem ex libero naturae integrae arbitrio solo est lapsus, causaque mali fluxit ex imperfectione creaturarum connata, antequam continuaretur ex pravitate earum acquisita.

§41 (a) Recte omnino. Sunt enim Regulae justitiae non minus aeternae veritatis quam regulae Geometriae, et apud omnem intelligentem valent.

§41 (b) falsa etiam imaginatio est condemnari quenquam ob peccatum alienum.

§41 (c) Haec decreta et consilia falsa sunt Deo indigna, neque etiam a defensoribus decreti absoluti sane loquentibus admittentur.

§41 (d) Malum et peccatum originem habet ex possibilibus. Nam in serie nunc existente, initio spectata tanquam possibili, inerat, nos libere esse peccaturos. Hanc seriem eligendo Deus, ejus naturam non mutavit.

§41 (e) Haud dubie Deus, quantum possibile est, ad maximum bonum maximamque felicitatem tetendit: verbo, optimum elegit.

§41 (f) Existentiae rerum non essentiae vel possibilitates, oriuntur ex de-

sible series in which the evil is contained. However he *willed* the good in the series and he *permitted* the evil depending on it, as has been often noted here. Augustine, who extended the inquiry beyond the fall not only of men, but also of angels, seems to hold in *De civitate Dei*, book 12, chapter 9, that to the angels who remained unfallen there was given either a greater nature or greater helps. But still, given that they had more in the way of nature and aid, and given that God also willed that the angels and the first man experience the powers of free choice, the good angels still stood firm through free choice, while the devils and man fell through the wrong use of it. In *De corruptione et gratia*, chapter 10, he notes that the grace of perseverance is given to the holy angels as a crown for a good fight, so that he seems to hold that the predestination of angels rests on foreseen merits. Still, the struggle to it is not without the help of grace—*helps* however, not *by which it will happen* but *without which it will not happen*. Still I do not know whether Popes Pius V and Gregory XIII¹⁰⁸ wanted something a little more when they marked out these propositions to be censured: neither the merits of angels nor those of the first man are rightly called merits of grace. Further, if anyone would have persevered in that state of the good angels or the first man, their happiness would have been wages and not grace. Whatever way it is that the angels remain committed to the good, still the lapse came solely by the free choice of an uncorrupt nature, and the cause of evil flowed from connatural imperfection of the creatures, until that point when the evil actions were continued in virtue of the creatures' acquired depravity.

§41 (a) This hits the nail on the head. For the rules of justice are no less eternal truths than the rules of geometry, and they have force with all intelligent beings.

§41 (b) It is a false imagination that anyone is to be condemned by the sin of another.

§41 (c) The false decrees and plans are unworthy of God and are not admitted by any well-spoken defenders of the absolute decree.

§41 (d) Evil and sin have their origin in the possibilities. For in the currently existing series, initially seen as possible, we were contained as beings who were going to sin freely. By choosing this series, God did not change its nature.

§41 (e) Certainly God was inclined to the highest good and to maximal felicity, as much as it is possible: in a word, he chose the best.

§41 (f) The existence of things, though not essences or possibilities, arises

creto Dei tanquam prima causa. Itaque omnia oriuntur ex decreto seu voluntate Dei, adjuncto ejus intellectu seu possibilitate rerum.

§41 (g) Deus perfectione operis sui totalis summa delectatur, non vero intercurrentibus imperfectionibus particularium, sine quibus illa non obtinetur. Potest autem cum iis stare illa, si omnibus compensatis sic obtineatur maximum bonum. Ita enim fieri haud dubie statuendum est nobis: alioqui Deus hanc seriem non elegisset. Caeterum res est perinde ut in Musica, ubi non delectant [discordantiae] dissonantiae sed totum, cui intermiscentur.

§41 (h) Nihil frustra aut vane a Deo fit, etsi interdum impraesentiarum scopus obtineri non videatur.

§41 (i) Haud dubie Deus plena voluntate partim ordinante partim permittente, intendit, ut omnia fiant, ut fiunt: idest, nihil Deo vel obrepit inscio vel obtruditur invito.

§41 (k) Hoc fundamentum est solidissimum, et, ut arbitror, omnibus Reformatis (ne exceptis quidem Supralapsariis) admittendum.

§41 (l) certe si nullam divinae justitiae sapientiaeque notionem habemus, quomodo in Deo aut agnoscere eas virtutes aut laudare possemus? Ita sane daremus sine mente sonos.

§41 (m) Hic nimium concluditur: absolutum enim decretum electionis ad vitam cum veris notionibus divinarum perfectionum consistere potest, eo scilicet sensu, quo a nobis ex egregiis apud Reformatos Theologis expositum est.

§42 (a) Non est major hominis libertas quam Dei. At in Deo tantum abest plenam esse indifferentiam, ut potius perpetua sit ad optimum determinatio. Frustra ergo in homine indifferentiam quandam aequilibrii, omnis determinationis inclinantis expertem exegerimus. Statuo interim contingentiam actionis manere, nec necessitatem introduci: hominemque suarum actionum non ideo minus dominum esse, quemadmodum et Deus est dominus suarum, et Angeli beatique, licet confirmati in bono. add.11e.

§42 (b) furiosi et dormientes nesciunt quid faciant, aut cur faciant, nec praemissi poenisque, laude vel culpatione moventur; quod requiritur ad libertatis scopum.

out of the decree of God as their first cause. Thus everything arises out of the decree or will of God, with the help of his intellect, that is, the possibility of things.

§41 (g) God takes complete pleasure in the perfection of the totality of his works, but not in the intermingled imperfections of particular things, without which the best would not obtain. However, the best can exist with the imperfections if, when all things are weighed together, the greatest good would obtain. That it happens this way should be held by us with certainty; otherwise, God would not have chosen this series. Moreover, it is the same in the case of music where people do not delight in dissonance but in the whole in which the dissonances are intermixed.

§41 (h) Nothing is done by God in vain or without effect, even if sometimes it does not seem that the goal is obtained at present.

§41 (i) Certainly God intends through his full will, partly by ordaining and partly by permitting, that all things happen as they happen: that there is nothing that takes God by surprise or that is forced on him unwillingly.

§41 (k) This foundation is most solid and, as I judge it, it should be admitted by all of the Reformed (not excepting even the supralapsarians).

§41 (l) Certainly if we were to have no notion of the divine justice and wisdom, how could we recognize or praise the virtues that are in God? We would say the right words but without meaning.

§41 (m) Too much is concluded here: for the absolute decree of election to life can be made consistent with the true notion of divine perfection by the very sense set out for us by the Reformed theologians in a most excellent way.

§42 (a) Freedom is not greater in man than in God. But complete indifference is so far absent in God that there is a rather perpetual determination to the best. It is false that there exists in man an indifference of equilibrium such that we could act in the absence of all inclining determinations. I hold that necessity is not introduced but that the contingency of actions remain: for man is no less lord over his actions than God is lord of his and the same holds for angels, the blessed, and for all those confirmed in the good. See §11e.

§42 (b) The insane and the sleeping do not know what they do or why they do it, nor are they moved by reward and punishment nor praise or blame, which is required for an act to count as free.

§42 (c) Libertatis gradus necessarius ad poenas et praemia est, ut intellectus adsit bona malaque inter se comparans atque expendens, et facultas secundum deliberata conandi seu volendi: nam alioqui frustra aliquid jubetur aut vetatur, si is, cui jubetur, poenae metu aut spe praemii moveri nequit: id est, si intelligere non potest, majus ex poena malum quam ex peccato commodum esse: aut si ad volendum intellectu suo uti non valet.

§42 (d) Omnia, quae fiunt, certa sunt et hypothetice inevitabilia; nihil necessarium aut inevitabile absolute. Decreta inevitabilia non sunt independenter a liberis actionibus, neque actiones sunt liberae independenter a decretis. Mutuam in his pericorhsin jam aliquoties notavi.

§42 (e) aut necessariis. Evidem si quis nosset etiam hypothetice (seu ex hypothesi hujus systematis) certa, frustra cum iis luctaretur, aut frustra ea ageret, quibus aut mala vitaret aut excideret bonis; quod etiam finalis perseverantiae suae praescientiam omnimodam statuentes considerare debent. Haec vera sunt, quamcumque doctrinam tueare, nisi Deum aut saltem ejus praescientiam tollas. Sed non recte hinc infertur, crimina non debere imputari, aut poenas non debere vitari, cum res sit voluntatis nostrae ac liberationis. Futura utique futura sunt, sed non quicquid agas aut non agas. Certa quidem nobis est veritas majoris propositionis: Quicquid decretum aut praescitum est, infallibiliter fiet. Sed non veritas minoris. Hoc est praescitum. Ideo syllogismus hic nihil ad praxin: nec ignotorum decretorum infallibilitas quicquam ad deliberationes nostras facit. Prudens futuri temporis exitum caliginosa nocte premit Deus. Itaque nec electionis seu boni finis perfecta certitudo nobis prodisset. Interim quod futurum est, non ideo necessarium; neque id quod non est futurum, ideo impossibile est. Et vana hominis argutatio foret, rediretque ad sophisma ignavum, jam veteribus explosum, si quis certitudine futuri peccati, ad excusationem peccati uteretur. Futura tam in temporalibus quam in spiritualibus certa sunt sed una cum nostra electione et cooperatione, culpa et poena. Etsi autem homines ad hujusmodi sophismata proclives sint, quibus stultitiae et ignaviae suae favent: non ideo tamen rejicienda est veritas, qua non nulli per absurdas consequentias abutuntur.

§42 (c) A measure of freedom is necessary for punishments and rewards, and this is why there is an intellect that compares and weighs goods and evils against each other and also a faculty of inclining and willing in accord with one's deliberations; otherwise, you see, things are commanded or prohibited in vain, because the one who is commanded cannot be moved by fear of punishment or hope of rewards: that is, if one cannot understand that a greater ill arises from the punishment than benefit from the sin, or if the use of his understanding has no impact in his willing.

§42 (d) All things that happen are certain and inevitable hypothetically, that is, nothing is absolutely necessary or inevitable. Decrees are not inevitable independently of the free actions, nor are actions free independently of the decrees. They mutually depend on one another, as I have noted several times.

§42 (e) or necessities. Of course if one knew even with hypothetical certainty (or with a certainty on the hypothesis of this system) that he is determined by an inevitable decree, then one would wrestle with these things in vain, or would act in vain with respect to those acts in which one shuns evil or is excited to good, which those who set up the complete foreknowledge of their final perseverance ought to consider. These things are true whatever doctrine one holds, as long as you do not destroy God or at least his foreknowledge. But one does not rightly infer from this that crimes should not be imputed to the wrongdoer or that punishments should be avoided, because the act comes from our own will and deliberation. Future things are certainly future, but not without regard for what one does or does not do. Nevertheless the truth of the major premise is certain for us: "Whatever is foreseen or decreed will happen infallibly." But the truth of the minor is not: "This is foreseen." For that reason, this syllogism means nothing in practice. Nor does the infallibility of unknown decrees bear at all on our deliberations. God wisely buries the end of future time in a dark night. And so perfect certitude of election or of a good end would not be useful to us. However, what is future is not thereby necessary; and that which is not future is not thereby impossible. And if someone used the certainty of future sin as an excuse for sin, this would be the vain squealing of a man and a return to the lazy sophism, rejected already by the ancients. Future things are certain as much in temporal matters as in spiritual ones, but together with our choices and cooperation, with fault and punishment. However, even if men are inclined to this type of sophistry, by which they aid their ignorance and stupidity, still the truth should not be rejected if some abuse it through these absurd consequences.

§42 (f) Quidni possimus, quod facimus? Ab actu ad potentiam valet consequentia.

§42 (g) Consideratio libertatis nostrae facit, ut agamus fortiter, quae praestare possumus; consideratio certitudinis, ut patiamur libenter, quae impedire non valemus: Illa ut simus excitati; haec ut tranquilli: Illud prodest pro futuris obtainendis, hoc pro praesentibus ferendis et in usum vertendis.

§42 (h) Explicanda esset definitio libertatis, ne lis sit de nomine. Si libertas in facultate deliberandi ponitur, et agendi, quae post deliberationem statuentur, ubi vires nostras non excedunt; nemo de liberatate sua dubitare sanus potest. Si libertas collocetur in omnimodi indifferentia aequilibrii, aut rationis inclinando determinantis experte, chimaerica est et nusquam dari potest. Si denique libertas in dominio illo quaeratur mentis super affectus, plus minusve liberi sumus prout ratione utimur: et hoc sensu homo ante lapsum liberior erat, add. §40d.

§43 (a) Si liberum sit spontaneum cum deliberatione, sejunctum a necessitate, est in nobis omnimoda libertas. Sed si liberum oppontatur servo, tantum servimus, quantum affectibus magis quam ratione agimus; in tantum enim externis subjicimur. Utramque significationem conjunxit Hugo a S. Victore (Summ. Sent. tr. 3 c. 9) Non est (inquit) amissa libertas a necessitate sed libertas a peccato. Recte. Verissimum est, nos potuisse aestum affectuum reprimere, spatium deliberandi sumere, inquirere diligentius, objectum mutare, evitare occasiones invitantes, quaerere contrarias, paulatim in alium transire habitum. Neque umquam in eo statu sumus, ut impossibile sit (absolute scilicet) aliter agi a nobis: etsi omnibus circumstantiis simul sumtis intra et extra nos, certum sit omniscio et infallibile, aliter nos non esse acturos, quam agemus, uti etiam Durandus animadvertis. vid. §16a. Itaque quae de fato, de inevitabile, de irresistibili dicuntur, vera aut falsa sunt, prout accipiuntur: vera si de infallibili, certo, determinato; falsa, si de necessario, aut cujus oppositum sit impossibile. semper inclinamur, numquam necessitamur, quando libere agimus.

§43 (b) Non utique frustraneae sunt promissiones, comminationes, exhortationes, cum eae ipsae saepe causa sint voluntatis, et partem magnam

§42 (f) Are we unable to do what we in fact do? The inference from act to potency is valid.

§42 (g) When we consider our freedom the result is that we act vigorously and by this we are able to excel; but when we consider the certitude [of divine knowledge] the result is that we suffer willingly those things that we are not able to impede. By the former we are aroused, by the latter we are made tranquil. The former is useful for taking hold of the future, the latter for bearing the present and for understanding in practice.

§42 (h) The definition of “freedom” should have been explained, lest there be a dispute about the word. If freedom is placed in the faculty of deliberation and in doing that which is established after deliberation, where these things do not exceed our powers, then no sane person can doubt his own freedom. If freedom is regarded as an equilibrium of indifference, or as the absence of an “inclination” of determining reason, then it is chimerical and cannot be allowed. If, finally, liberty is sought in the power of the mind over the passions, we are more or less free insofar as we use our reason, and in this sense man was more free before the fall. See §40d.

§43 (a) If a free act is a spontaneous action with deliberation, apart from necessity, then freedom is in us in every way. But if the free act is contrasted with a compelled act, then as much as we are acted upon more by passion than by reason, to that extent we are enslaved to external things. Hugo of St. Victor joined together both meanings rightly (in *Summ. Sent. tr. 3, c. 9*):¹⁰⁹ “freedom is not,” he said, “lost by necessity, but by sin.” This is correct. It is most true that we could restrain the heat of passion, take a moment for deliberating, inquire more diligently, change the object, avoid the alluring occasions, inquire into contrary choices, and gradually transform one habit into another. We are never in such a state, that it is impossible (i.e., absolutely) for us to act otherwise, even if, when all the circumstances taken together at the same time, both internal and external to us, it is certain to an omniscient and infallible knower that we would not act otherwise than we will in fact act, as Durandus observed. See §16a. And so those things that are said concerning fate, inevitability, and irresistibility are true or false, depending on how they are received: They are true insofar as they concern infallibility, certainty, and determinateness but false insofar as they concern necessity, or that from which the opposite is impossible. We are always *inclined*, never *necessitated* when we act freely.

§43 (b) Certainly promises, commands, and exhortations are not in vain as these are often causes of the will, and they constitute a good deal of the

faciant moventium circumstantiarum. De quo ne illi quidem dubitant, qui necessitatem omnimodam tueruntur.

§43 (c) Exhortationes irritae ostendunt; majorem esse malitiam resistenter: etsi hic non sit proprius earum scopus.

§43 (d) Cum damnatio a Deo per se non intendatur, etiam non intendetur damnationis aggravatio. Contra cum a Deo salus omnium aliquo voluntatis gradu intendatur, intendetur ab eo, ut gratia et media gratiae eis prosint, quibus offeruntur. Et cum resistantia illa, qua oblata rejiciuntur, a majore pravitate ad praesentes circumstantias relativa oriatur (absolute enim omnes aequae pravi sunt, licet diversimode pro circumstantiis et objectis, add. §9d.) non solent augere malitiam oblata media sed indicare: adeoque non aggravare damnationem, sed convictionem: quanquam nec hoc inter fines sibi proponat Deus. add. §7e.

§44 (a) Contrariae non sunt, sed disparatae; et de contrariis, sed diverso volendi modo.

§44 (b) Recte Deus numquam decernit, ut peccemus, sed tantum permittit, ut saepe dictum est.

§44 (c) Voluntas Dei, ut non peccemus, saepe est inefficax, et tunc voluntas ejus, quae peccatum permittit, efficax est et infallibilis. Sed nulla est omnino ejus voluntas, ut peccemus, aut quae nos faciat peccare.

§44 (d) Rectissime monetur, eos, qui credunt Deum despoticē agere in hominibus reprobantis et ad instar tyranni, Deum representare sub indigno habitu, et homines etiam a sapientia et caritate reddere alieniores.

§45 (a) id est, si actus creaturarum liberi, quos Deus non ipse vult exercere sed juvare tantum aut permittere, non sunt tam independentes nec tam plene ab ipso fluentes quam alii ejus actus; id utique non ex defectu aliquo actus divini oritur, sed ex ordine rerum, qui postulat, aliquid etiam pertinere ad creaturas.

§45 (b) Revera, quicquid absolute realitatis seu perfectionis est etiam in actibus creaturarum liberis, bonis vel malis, a Deo profluit: ita, ut non minus sint a Deo dependentes quoad perfectionem quam continent quam alii omnes. Sed quoad imperfectionem, quam involvunt, a Deo non fluunt.

influence of circumstances. Not even the champions of absolute necessity doubt this.

§43 (c) They show that exhortations are empty and that the evil of resistance is greater, even if this is not their purpose here.

§43 (d) Because damnation is not intended by God *per se*, he would not then intend the aggravation of damnation. On the contrary, because the salvation of all is intended by God by a certain grade of will, he intends that grace and the means of grace are useful to those to whom they are offered. And because this resistance, by which the graces offered are rejected, arises out of a greater depravity relative to the present circumstances (for absolutely speaking all men are equally depraved, although in diverse ways depending upon circumstances and objects, see §9d), the offered means do not usually increase the evil but only highlight it. And so damnation is not made more severe, but the proof is, although this is not among the ends that God proposes to Himself [in offering the graces and aids]. See §7e.

§44 (a) They are not contrary wills but disparate wills; and they are not from contrary but rather diverse modes of willing.

§44 (b) It is rightly said that God decrees not that we sin, but that he permits such, as has been said often.

§44 (c) The will of God that we not sin is often inefficacious, and then His will, by which His permits sin, is efficacious and infallibly so. But it is absolutely not his will that we will sin or that he would make us to sin.

§44 (d) It is most rightly warned that those who believe that God acts despotically in damning men represent God like a tyrant with an unworthy character, and render men more alien from wisdom and esteem.

§45 (a) That is, if the acts of creatures are free, then God does not himself will those acts but rather he assists or merely permits them; and so they are not so independent or complete as others of his acts which flow directly from him; to be sure, such a creaturely act does not arise out of some defect of the divine act, but out of the order of things, which requires that something be up to the creatures.

§45 (b) Nevertheless, whatever there is of absolute reality or perfection in the free acts of creatures, whether good or evil, flows forth from God so that they are no less dependent on God for the perfection that they contain than all others. But concerning the imperfections that the acts involve, these do not flow from God.

§46 (a) vel potius summa sapientia.

§46 (b) Talia non nisi in speciem inordinata sunt: altius omnia noscenti ordo et pulchritudo apparet, etiam in his, quae irregularia et monstrosa habentur.

§46 (c) Deus corpora gubernat, ut artifex machinas: sed mentes gubernat ut Rex subditos. Id tamen interest, quod Rex non aequa in animos subditorum influit ac Deus in actus mentium: et commune est corporibus ac mentibus, ut omnes in ipsis perfectiones continue a Deo fluant.

§47 (a) Etiam sine prophetiis, ex ipsa natura rerum judicare possumus, futurorum contingentium esse determinatam veritatem: v. §48.

§47 (b) Fundamentum est in serie sumta ut possibili, quam Deus elegit, et cui haec inesse per spexit add. §16a.

§48 (a) id est, per certitudinem necessitatis.

§48 (b) Etsi nulla sit necessitas futurorum: dicendum tamen est, futura in suis causis quodammodo contineri per earum determinationem saltem inclinantem. Pro certo enim statuendum est, nihil unquam fieri, quin ratio sit in causis, cur potius fiat quam non fiat, et sic potius quam aliter fiat. Add. §16a.

§49 (a) Praescientia conditionata seu scientia media oritur ex simplici Dei intelligentia seu cognitione possibilitatum, etiam earum, quae non traducuntur in actum, quemadmodum supra expositum est.

§50 (a) Verissimum est, Deum facienti quod in se est, non denegare gratiam: et cum dicitur, non semper esse volentis neque currentis; non significatur, eum qui serio velit, non posse, sed non omnem voluntatem sufficere, praesertim si luce careat; neque etiam omnem voluntatem satis esse constantem. Deinde cum adjicitur, non esse volentis hominis sed miserantis Dei; non ideo negatur, data voluntate bona miserationem sequi. Praeterea nec ipsum recte velle hominis convertendi est nisi Deo excitante.

§50 (b) Pro certo statuendum est Deum omnibus dare gratiam sufficientem, ut nemo nisi culpa sua pereat. Interim in quo gratia illa consistat, non semper nobis apparet. Add. supra §29.

§46 (a) Or rather the height of wisdom.

§46 (b) Such things are confused only in appearance:¹¹⁰ for him who understands all things more deeply, the order and beauty are clear, even in these things which are held to be irregular and monstrous.

§46 (c) God governs bodies as the craftsman does one of his machines, but he governs the mind as the king does his subject. Still, there is a difference because the king does not flow equally into the souls of the subjects as God does into the acts of the mind. And it is common to both bodies and minds that all perfections in them continually flow from God.

§47 (a) And even without the prophets we can determine from the nature of things that the truth of future contingents is determinate. See §48.

§47 (b) The foundation is in the series taken as possible which God chooses and in which He has observed them present within. See §16a.

§48 (a) That is, through a certitude of necessity.

§48 (b) Even if there is no necessity for the future, it should still be said that future things are contained in their causes in a certain way through an *inclining determination* of them. It should be established with certainty that nothing ever happens that lacks a reason in its causes with respect to why it happened rather than not, and why it happened this way rather than some other. See §16a.

§49 (a) Conditional foreknowledge or *middle knowledge* arises out of the divine knowledge of simple intelligence or cognition of the possibilities, even with respect to those that are not brought into actuality, just as it was explained above.

§50 (a) It is most true that God does not deny grace to him who is doing that which is in him. And when it is said that it is not always “by willing nor running,”¹¹¹ this does not mean that he who wills in earnest is unable, but rather that his whole will does not suffice, especially if he lacks the light; nor is the will sufficiently constant. Finally, when he is aided, it is not by the will of man but by the mercy of God; as a result it is not denied that when a good will is given, mercy follows. Further, the right willing of man in conversion is not brought about without the excitation of God.

§50 (b) It should be established for certain that God gives sufficient grace to all so that no one perishes except by his own fault. However, what this grace consists in is not always clear to us. See what was said above in §29.

§50 (c) add. §27d.

§51 (a) Haec probe.

§51 (b) talis bonitas cum caeteris bonitatibus hujus universi stare non potuit: alioqui exitum habuisset.

§53 (a) Quidni? Eadem est difficultas, sive de singulis sive de populis accipias Paulum: utrobique abyssus sapientiae et divitiarum.

§53 (b) Induratio cum Deo tribuitur, intelligenda est de causis externis circumstantiisque, quas exhibet series rerum, non de interno cujusdam antigratiae influxu.

§54 (a) Haec interpretationes longioris sunt discussionis. Interim de rebus ipsis satis per se constat, nobis hic prolixis esse non licet.

§55 (a) Dubium nullum est, quin sit gratia, cui resistitur, et potentia in nobis, quae resistit. Sed non sequitur inde, nullam esse gratiam per se efficacem.

§56 (a) Exceptis forte Remonstrantibus quibusdam et omnibus Socinianis et Socinianizantibus: Caeteri etiam Evangelici, imo et Scholastici Molinistae, non negant concursum Dei cum positivo peccati; imo nec continuum emanationem a Deo eius perfectionis, quae inest in actu peccaminoso.

§56 (b) Peccatum non consistit in mera negatione, sed imperfectio tantum peccati est quiddam negativum ut tarditas corporis impulsi impressionem impellentis refringit. Vis est ab impellente, tarditas a recipiente, nec aliud est quam privativum.

§56 (c) Cum Deus Physice praedeterminat hominem, hoc intelligendum est quoad perfectiones actus, et quatenus possibilitatibus tribuit realitatem.

§56 (d) Deus non est autor peccati vel actionis peccaminosae, ut impellens non est causa tarditatis. Navis, quae a flumine defertur, eo tardius moveatur, quo magis onerata est. Vis ergo est a flumine impellente, tarditas ab inertia impulsi.

§57 (a) Creatura se ipsam determinat ad actionis imperfectionem, ut massa impulsa se determinat ad tarditatem. Intelligentes creature se determi-

§50 (c) See §27d.

§51 (a) These things are well put.

§51 (b) Such a good could not occur with the other goods of this universe or else it would have.

§53 (a) Why not? The same difficulty arises whether you understand Paul as addressing single individuals or nations; either way it amounts to the depths of wisdom and riches.¹¹²

§53 (b) When hardness [of heart] is assigned by God it should be understood as arising from external causes and circumstances that the series of things produces and not from an internal influx of some anti-grace.

§54 (a) These interpretations are for a longer discussion. Meanwhile, concerning these things we have said enough, so we are not allowed to be prolix.

§55 (a) There is no doubt but that there is grace which is resisted, there is a power in us which resists. But it does not follow that no grace is efficacious *per se*.

§56 (a) With the exception of these Remonstrants and all Socinians and their followers, the rest of the Evangelicals and indeed the Scholastic Molinists do not deny the concurrence of God with positive sin; nor indeed do they deny the continuous emanation from God of his perfection which is found even in the least act of sin.

§56 (b) Sin does not consist merely in negation, but the imperfection of sin is a certain restraint just as the slowness of a struck body resists the impression of the impelling force. The force is from the impelling element, the slowness from the recipient, and this is nothing other than privative.

§56 (c) When God physically predetermines a man, this should be understood concerning the perfections of the act and as far as he grants reality to the possibilities.

§56 (d) God is not the author of sin nor of the most sinful act, just as the impelling force is not the cause of slowness. A ship that is brought downstream by a river is moved more slowly the more heavily it is loaded. So the force is from the impelling river, the slowness from the inertial resistance of the moved body.

§57 (a) The creature determines itself with respect to the imperfection of an action as an impelled mass determines itself with respect to slowness.

nant voluntarie, caeterae quadam bruta ratione. Beneque Augustinus et Thomas (vide hunc 1. 2. q. 9 art. 9) animam dum impressis a Deo in creaturas vestigiis incitatur ad summum bonum, inertia sua et velut mole destituere impetum et adhaerescere creaturis. Ex quo colligo opus esse vel a Deo augeri impulsu pro praewisit impedimentis, vel minui impedimentorum occursus resistentiasque aut adhaesiones.

§58 (a) Humanam naturam a Gratia ita fuisse immutatam, ut ejus respectu mutabilis esse defierit, nulla ratione nititur, et novo miraculo indiget, quod nulla nos revelatio docet. Omnis habitus sive naturalis sive supernaturalis in hac vita contrariis actionibus labefactari potest: nam et supernaturalis, licet origine talis sit, subjecto tamen eodem modo inest ut naturalis, et cum recipiat augmentationem a piis exercitiis, recipiet etiam diminutionem ab exercitiis contrariis: quod nimis verum esse experimenta quotidiana confirmant. Qui secus sentiunt, et rationem et experientiam, et scripturam et perpetuum totius Ecclesiae Catholicae consensum habent reclamantem; ut mirum sit, quemquam huc opinionis devenire potuisse, qua nullam putaret veram esse conversionem nisi perseverantium atque electorum. Sed fortasse magis dissensus est in verbis quam in rebus, quod vellem.

§59 (a) Modierni sectatores Calvini contingentiam futurorum (credo) non negant, adeoque nec contingentium praescientiam.

§60 (a) Quoniam scilicet pro magna parte utrinque simul stat veritas, sed in diversis.

§60 (b) Magis hic erratur in alienis rejiciendis quam in propriis asserendis.

§60 (c) Facile conjungi possunt probarique potiora momenta utriusque partis; abstinendo a quibusdam excessibus, quos multi ejusdem partis non probant.

§61 (a) Recte additur: facile. Nam alioqui putem, nihil esse pro vero tenendum, quod objectionibus prematur, quibus responderi non possit. Quo enim, quaeso, jure aliquid pro certo demonstratoque admittimus, nisi quia argumentis, quibus firmatur respondere non possumus? Quo ergo jure stabilitur affirmativa, eo stabilietur et negativa. Ut autem simul hoc pro af-

Intelligent creatures determine themselves voluntarily, other creatures by a certain brute cause. And Augustine and St. Thomas rightly said (see thus *Summa Theologica* 1.2 q. 9, art. 9)¹¹³ that the soul, while it is incited to the highest good by the traces pressed into creatures by God, abandons the impetus of its own inertia or, as it were, power, and adheres to creatures.¹¹⁴ From this I conclude that it is necessary either that the impulse be increased by God according to the foreseen impediments, or that the impediments and resistance, or the attachment to created things, be diminished by him.

§58 (a) The view that human nature was so unchanged by grace that it fails¹¹⁵ to be changeable in this respect is without reason and would require a new miracle, something no revelation teaches us. Dispositions in all things, whether natural or supernatural, can be weakened in this life by contrary actions. For supernatural habits, despite their origins, are still in the subject in the same way as natural habits, and just as it would receive augmentation from pious exercises, it will also be weakened from contrary exercises. Everyday experiences prove that this is expressly true. Those who feel otherwise have reason, experience, scripture, and the perpetual consensus of the whole Catholic church crying out against them; so that it is a miracle that one would have nevertheless arrived at opinions that held that there is no true conversion except of those who persevere and of the elect. But perhaps it is a dissent more in words than in substance, as I hope.

§59 (a) Modern Calvinist sectarians do not deny the contingency of the future (I believe), nor, furthermore, the prescience of contingent things.

§60 (a) Because the truth is established on both sides in great measure, although in diverse ways.

§60 (b) One errs more in rejecting others' views than in protecting one's own positions.

§60 (c) The better parts of each party can easily be reconciled and proven; one should abstain from all of those excesses that many from the same faction reject.

§61 (a) He has rightly added "easily." For I would hold rather that one should not take anything as true when objections are urged to which one cannot respond. By what right, I ask, are we to admit something as certain and demonstrated except because we cannot undermine the arguments by which it is supported? And the grounds on which an affirmative claim is established also work with respect to the negative. But that an affirmative

firmatione et negatione contingat, vix fiet, nisi apud hominem valde imbecillem, qui alternabit sententias, ut ineptus ille et jocularis in *Comoedia judex*. Secus tamen se res habet, cum utrinque verisimilibus argumentis certatur, quae saepe in aequilibrio esse videntur, cum desit nobis statera rationum.

§62 (a) Deus etsi independens, agit tamen secundum rerum naturas. Absoluti dominii pro despotismo accepti idea falsa est et Deo indigna, si nempe ultra summae potentiae attributum ad jus extendatur: tanquam jus esset in potentia, veluti Poeta *Tragicus* ait: *jus est in armis*. Sane apud Deum, quod libet, licet: sed illi non libet nisi sapienter, juste, sancte agere.

§62 (b) Objectiones insolubiles veritati opponi non possunt.

§63 (a) Miror a multis opponi infinitam perfectionem et independentiam bonitati caeterisque divinis virtutibus, tanquam ulla ratione inter se pugnare videantur.

§64 (a) Mihi videtur neutram ex his viis alteri esse praferendam, sed ambas pari jure conjungendas.

§64 (b) Interim fieri nequit, ut utraque pars ex certis principiis per legitimas consequentias opposita ducat. Ergo defectus erit aut principiis aut in consequentiis aut in oppositione. Infra §67. Errorem alicubi in consequentiis haerere agnoscitur: sed non raro est et in oppositione, ut aliquoties jam notatum.

§65 (a) Re tamen accurate considerata nulla hic ratio horroris. Gratiam libero arbitrio subjectam phasis est odiosa. Deum, ut omnem sapientem, sua decreta, sua media pervenienti ad fines decretos accommodare objectis, non est dubitandum: neque hoc est subjcere artificem objecto, cum artifex potius objectum, dum ei se accommodat, subjciat sibi. Meritum mortis Christi non est frustraneum, licet aliquando non plus possit, quam homines volunt ut praestet. neque tamen in ipsis solis est, ut velint. Hominem nunc a Deo dilectum, mox odio habitum, sunt modi loquendi, quorum difficultas explicatione cessat. Deus in homine amat sua dona, fidem, virtutem: odit in homine intestinam corruptionem ejusque effectus. Nihil hic imperfectionis aut impotentiae nisi in phasi, si incommode, id est humano more accipiatur.

position and its denial be held at the same time will hardly happen except by some very stupid person, who will shift in his thinking like that inept and laughable judge in a comedy. However, it is a different matter when something is disputed from both sides by probable arguments, which many times seem to be equally balanced and in that case falling short of the “balance of reason” for us.

§62 (a) Even if God is *independent*, still he acts in accordance with the natures of things. The idea of taking God’s *absolute dominion* as *despotism* is false and unworthy of God, if one extends the idea beyond the attribution of highest power to include justice; for then rightness would be in power, just as the tragic poet said: justice lies in weapons.¹¹⁶ It is true concerning God that he allows what pleases him: but nothing pleases him except to act wisely, justly, and in a holy manner.

§62 (b) Insoluble objections cannot be opposed to the truth.

§63 (a) I am astonished that many set infinite perfection and independence in opposition to goodness and the other divine virtues as if, for some reason, they seem to conflict with one another.

§64 (a) It seems to me that neither of these two ways is to be preferred to the other, but both can rightly be made agreeable with one another.

§64 (b) However, it cannot happen that these views draw opposing conclusions from certain premises through proper inferences. Thus, there will be defects in the premises, the arguments, or the opposition between the two. See below §67. It is well known that an error is found somewhere in the argument, but the same is also often true of the opposing argument, as has been noted several times.

§65 (a) Still, when these things are considered accurately, there is no cause for alarm. The phrase “that grace is subject to free choice” is offensive. It should not be doubted that God, knowing everything, accommodates his decrees and his means of arriving at decreed ends to objects; and this is not to subject the artist to the object, but rather the artist subjects the object to himself, while he accommodates himself to it. The merit of Christ’s death is not thwarted, although in some cases it cannot accomplish more than men will, as is preferable. Still, it is not up to them to will this. “Now beloved of God” and then “held in contempt by God” are manners of speaking whose difficulty dissolves through proper explanation. God loves his gifts in man, that is, faith and virtue; he hates in men the internal corruption and its effects. There is no imperfection or inability here unless the words are understood improperly, that is, by the human way of understanding.

§66 (a) Absoluta reprobatio, determinatio necessitans ad peccatum, negatio gratiae sufficientis, merito rejiciuntur, neque ex independentia divina ullo modo fluunt, ex qua nihil sequitur imperfectionis aut injustitiae, nisi incongruae phrases aut durae sine dextra interpretatione adhibeantur.

§67 (a) aut potius diversi ejusdem ideae respectus, unus magis physicus, alter magis moralis: dum alii magis Deum considerant ut Architectum rectoremque universi, alii magis ut Regem mentium; quorum utrumque perfectissime substantiae competit.

§67 (b) Dum scilicet non satis consideratur, Deum omnium rationem habere tanta arte, tantoque successu, ut ipsum universum serviat ejus regno in mentes, mentesque vicissim ornamento universi.

§67 (c) Si quaedam intolerabilia cessent, (uti certe jam tum fere cessare videntur) veluti ab una parte, Deum velle peccatum; velle perditionem absolute, sine respectu peccati; juste posse damnare innocentem, pro jure et ratione stare voluntatem (seu justitiam et moralitatem esse rem arbitriam) preces, studium et curam frustra adhiberi; negligentiam, licentiam non nocere; Electionem nobis esse absolute certam, seu quicquid agas aut non agas, nec alias certam conversionem: ab altera; Bonos motus non indigere auxilio divinae gratiae; hominem ob meritum suum vel dignitatem divina auxilia obtinere; Deum non concurrere ad actus quosdam creaturarum; futura contingentia non cadere sub praescientiam aut praeordinationem nullam revera Electionem esse seu designationem particularem salvandorum; talia, inquam, si absint in plerisque conveniet inter duas partes, et lites, quae supererunt, non erunt magni momenti.

§68 (a) Interim non sufficit ad veram acquiescentiam in Deo, ut agnoscamus, nos ab eo pendere et in ejus potestate esse; coacta haec patientia est: ita et tyranno acquiesceremus. Sed opus est etiam agnoscere, sapientissime eum et justissime agere. Debemus non tantum summissi, sed et contenti esse: hoc postulat amor Dei et fiducia in eo collocanda.

§68 (b) ex sententia adversariorum, sed non satis fundata. Nam id ipsum ut vigilemus, a Deo est, praevisumque profuit in schemate providentiae, et ad bonos effectus a Deo cum caeteris rebus determinatur, quorum fructus etiam pervenit ad nos ipsos.

§66 (a) Absolute reprobation, the determination of which necessitates that one sins, and the denial of sufficient grace, are all three rejected on their merits, and they do not flow out of the divine independence in any way, and thus no imperfection or injustice follows unless inconsistent or hard phrases are treated without skillful interpretation.

§67 (a) Or rather diverse aspects of the same idea, one more physical, the other more moral. While some consider God more as the architect and ruler of the universe, others consider him more as ruler of the mind; both are perfectly suitable when it comes to the substance of the matter.

§67 (b) But it has not been considered enough that God holds the reason for all things with so much skill and success that the universe is subject to his rule in the case of minds, and these minds in turn serve as ornaments of the universe.

§67 (c) If certain intolerable sayings stop (as it certainly seems that they almost do) as for example, *from one side*: that God wills sin, that he wills perdition absolutely without respect to sin, that he is able to justly damn an innocent, that his will substitutes for right and reason (or that justice or morality is an arbitrary thing), and that prayers, study, and attention are applied in vain, that negligence and licentiousness do not harm, that our election is absolutely certain whatever you do or do not do, nor for other reasons is our conversion certain; and *from the other side*: that good acts do not need the aid of divine grace, that a man obtains divine aid because of his merit or worth, that God does not concur with the acts of the creatures, that future contingents do not fall under foreknowledge or preordination, that there is certainly no election or particular designation of the saved. If such sayings disappear, I say, there will be agreement in many things between the two parties and any quarrels which remain will not be of much importance.

§68 (a) Meanwhile, knowing that we depend on him and that we are in his power is not sufficient for *finding true acquiescence to God*; such submission is coerced in the way our acquiescence to a tyrant would be. But one needs to acknowledge that God acts most wisely and justly. We should not only be subjected, but also be contented; this requires love toward God and placing faith in him.

§68 (b) But [this watchfulness and concern for oneself] cannot be justified by the opposing view either [i.e., by the Remonstrants]. For our being watchful is from God, and it has been usefully foreseen in the scheme of providence, and determined to good effects and other things by God, the fruit of which is passed on to us.

§68 (c) Quae in alterutro systemate commendantur, in utroque esse debent, et salvis ejus principiis esse possunt. Non minus conditionalis, quam Absolutus, humilis, Deo summissus, in divinam voluntatem resignatus, fiducia divinae gratiae laetus in precibus assiduus esse potest. Vicissim non minus Absolutus quam conditionalis potest esse vigilans, ad profectus spirituales attentus, in vitandis peccatorum occasionibus circumspectus.

§68 (d) Potest unus inflari et in securitatem prolabi opinione falsa divinae gratiae, alter Pharisaica vaitate habitus in virtutis exercitio confirmati. Potest unus desperare, quod non satis in se sentit gratiae auxilium; alter, quod non percipit propriae voluntatis ardorem. Uterque male: sed nullo partis suaे praejudicio, modo ne talia ex ejus fundamentis rite colligantur.

§69 (a) Uterque in his ultra sua principia tendit, solito hominibus more excedendi in alter utram partem. Eventus nostri non sejunctim praedeterminati fiunt, sed positis simul actionibus nostris; neque in nobis quicquam boni est, quod non a Deo sit datum; neque quisquam ad eum statum gratiae se venisse putare debet, in quo non magna cura opus habeat, ut certamen bono fine coronet.

§69 (b) Revera Reformatus non tollit libertatem, nisi quis chimaericam illam postulet, quae in perfecti aequilibrii indifferentia consistat: quam si tuetur Remonstrans errat: uti vicissim errat Reformatus, si tollit contingentiam, et substituit absolutam necessitatem. Nihil est prorsus necessarium in vita, nihil prorsus indeterminatum.

§70 (a) Consequentiae legitimae hominibus non agnoscentibus tribui non possunt: dogmati ipsi possunt, ex quo sequuntur. Fatendum etiam est, suspectos nonnihil pravi dogmatis redi, qui tuentur sententiam, ex qua rite deducitur. Sed tanto minor est haec suspicio, quanto major est rei difficultas. Interim in his quidem quaestionibus putem adhibita moderatione et attentione plerumque difficultatibus exiri posse, quae magis ex hominum perplexis cogitationibus expressionibusque, quam rebus ipsis nascuntur.

§71 (a) Recte illi et vere. Expressiones sunt non tantum molliores, sed et convenientiores et veriores add. §.40.b. Nulla etiam Reprobatio est positiva,

§68 (c) Those things are commended in each system. Indeed they ought to be in each, and they can be while each continues to safeguard its own foundational principles. It can be established no less in the case of conditional decrees than absolute ones with respect to humility, submission to God, resignation to the divine will, faith in divine grace, and happiness in prayer. In turn, one can be no less vigilant when it comes to absolute decrees than in the case of conditional ones when it comes to attention to spiritual development and to the occasions of sin in this life.

§68 (d) It is possible that one can be puffed up and fall into a sense of security by a false understanding of divine grace, while another, in the grip of Pharisaic vanity can come to ruin by the exercise of confident virtue. One can be without hope because one does not feel the help of grace enough in oneself, another because he doesn't perceive the intensity of his own will. Both of them are wrong, with no prejudice to his party, provided such things are not rightly deduced from the fundamental principles of each [party].

§69 (a)¹¹⁷ In these matters both tend to go beyond their principles following the usual custom among men of going on to either extreme. Events concerning us do not become predetermined separately, but only once our actions have been posited collectively. And there is nothing in us of the good that is not given by God; and no one should think that he has come to that state of grace in which he no longer must show great care in order that he might crown his struggle with a good end.

§69 (b) In fact, the Reformed do not destroy freedom except when they put forward the chimera that consists in indifference of perfect equilibrium: if a Remonstrant holds this, he is mistaken. As, in turn, a Reformed thinker is in error if he destroys contingency and substitutes absolute necessity. Nothing is wholly necessary in this life and nothing is wholly indeterminate.

§70 (a) Legitimate consequences cannot be ascribed to men who do not understand them, but they can be ascribed to the doctrine from which they follow. This must also be said of those who are suspected of defending a corrupt dogma, and who defend the position from which it may properly be deduced. This suspicion is proportionately diminished as the difficulty of the subject matter becomes greater. In these questions I would say that one can get beyond these difficulties by applying some care and moderation. For they arise more from the confused thoughts and expressions of men than from the matters themselves.

§71 (a) Those things are most rightly and truly said. The expressions are not only softer but more agreeable and true. See §40b. No reprobation is

a pravitate Reprobandi hominis independens seu absoluta, neque ea est opus.

§71 (b) Sed tamen restat, (fateor) quaestio de rationibus peccati suis Adami de quo supra satis. Caeterum nemo ob Adami peccatum damnatur, sed ob suum.

§71 (c) Non appareat, quae sint illae consequentiae ex absoluta electione, quas evitare debeant et non possint.

§72 (a) Ratio diversitatis optime peti potest ex dictis Keckermannii et similium, de quibus supra §39. Electio ad salutem, cum sit actus gratiae, a merito et qualitatibus laudabilibus Electi independens esse potest: Reprobatio ad damnationem, cum sit actus justitiae, a culpa seu demerito independens absolutaque esse non potest.

§72 (b) Rectissime istud; ostendimusque discrimen, tum respectu concursus Dei, qui non est nisi ad id, quod in malo bonum est; tum respectu decretorum divinorum, quae ad malum culpae non nisi permissive, ad malum poenae non absolute se habent. add. §40b.

§72 (bb) Hoc ad eos pertinet, quos vitae ratio ab his discutiendis eximit non ad eos quos professio vel ratio studiorum ad satisfaciendum difficultibus invitat.

§72 (c) Et evitantur et expediuntur, ni fallor, difficultates, si quis superioribus conciliationibus insistat; illis quaestionibus exceptis, quibus speciatim satisfacere nec opus est, nec licet, quia seriem rerum et infinitum involvunt: veluti, cur Deus permiserit aliqua mala, cur alios pree aliis perire sinat: quanquam in his quoque quid generatim dicendum sit satis appetat ex dictis.

§73 (a) quin etiam inter diversos homines ejusdem nationis et loci. add. §53a.

§73 (b) aut quo eventus ita absolute praefiniti sint, ut sequi debeant, quicquid agas aut non agas. add. §11b.

§73 (c) quippe quae obedientibus eo ipso affutura est sufficienter. add. §29a.

§75 (a) Praedestinationem certe non adhibet, nisi quae est ad vitam.

positive, that is, absolute or independent of the depravity of the man to be damned, nor is there need of it.

§71 (b) But this leaves (I admit) the question concerning the reason for Adam's sin (concerning which enough has been said above). No one is damned because of the sin of Adam but only because their own sin.

§71 (c) It is not clear which consequences of the doctrine of absolute election they ought to avoid and which cannot be avoided.

§72 (a) The reason for this diversity can best be derived from what is said by Keckermann¹¹⁸ and similar figures of whom I spoke above in §39. Election to salvation, when it is by an act of grace, can be independent of merit and of the praiseworthy qualities of the elect. Reprobation to damnation, because it is an act of justice, cannot be independent of and unrelated to faults or demerits.

§72 (b) This is exactly right. And we make a distinction, on the one hand, with respect to the divine concurrence that does not operate except with respect to what is good in the evil acts, and on the other hand, concerning the divine decrees that are not directed toward evils of fault except in a permissive way, and that are directed at the evil of punishment in a manner that is not absolute. See §40b.

§72 (bb) This pertains to those whose course of life exempts them from discussing these matters but not those whose profession or aim in study invites them to deal with these difficulties.

§72 (c) Unless I am mistaken, these difficulties would be avoided and disentangled if one follows the reconciliation set out above; having put aside these questions, it is not necessary or permissible to resolve this matter *specifically* because it involves the series of things and infinity, as is the case with those questions concerning why God permitted certain evils or allowed these individuals rather than those to fall. Although in these matters also what should be said *generally* is clear enough from what has been said already.

§73 (a) Rather, among diverse men in the same nation and place. See §53a.

§73 (b) Or that events are appointed beforehand in a manner so absolute that they must follow no matter what you do or do not do. See §11b.

§73 (c) Indeed, because for those who are obedient the grace will be, by this very fact, sufficient. See §29a.

§75 (a) It certainly does not concern predestination, except predestination to life.

§75 (b) Videtur fortasse sed non satis manifeste, si scilicet quaeratur de gratia per se efficaci. Nam omnia etiam ad gratiam cum circumstantiis efficacem accommodari possunt.

§75 (c) si sane intelligantur, non pugnare ostensum est et alibi passim.

§75 (d) Erunt, qui credent, consentire haec magis cum doctrina gratiae universalis et promisso bonam voluntatem habentibus auxilio. Quibus non obstet Praedestinatio vel Electio, etiam Universalistis admittenda.

§75 (e) Aliquoties notavi, hanc objectionem fieri posse etiam contra decretum non absolutum, et contra omnem certitudinem futurorum: sed sophistical esse, cum illa certitudo apud Deum solum locum habeat, non apud nos; adeoque in praxin influere non possit: neque a causis seu mediis eventum producentibus independens aut absoluta sit eventus certitudo; nam causae eventus non minus sunt certae. Itaque cautela de evitanda desperatione et securitate utriusque parti (licet inaequaliter add. §38b) opus est, et utrobique salvis primariis fundamentis locum habet.

§75 (f) Hoc non decrevit, sed praevidit ac permisit, etiam ex sententia Reformatorum sane loquentium.

§76 (a) Revera nulla propositio est in toto articulo, quam non utraque pars admittere possit. vid. §21.

§76 (b) Pro hac sententia apud Anglos Wardus aliqui viri docti scripsere. Contrarium defendit Gatakerus cum nonnullis rigidioribus.

§76 (c) Sunt etiam Reformati extra Angliam, qui agnoscunt, posse veram fidem justificantem in illis quoque hominibus excitari, qui postea rursus hac gratia excedant, imo tandem damnentur: eaque doctrina salvo decreto absoluto optime ab iis defendi potest. Qui dissentire se ostendunt, praeter morem in Ecclesia ab antiquo receptum loquuntur: sed fortasse magis verbis quam re a reliquis recedunt; dumque conversionem, fidem, justificationem negant tois proskairois sive temporariis, et ad solos electos restringunt, videntur intelligere sublimiores quosdam horum Dei beneficiorum gradus; quanquam ita eos explicare nequeant, ut in praxi satis discerni possint. Unde nullus est hujus tam novae doctrinae usus, periculum vero non nullum. add. §38b.

§75 (b) But perhaps it is not seen clearly enough, if, that is, one inquires concerning grace which is efficacious *per se*. For everything can be made consistent with grace of a sort that is efficacious via the circumstances.

§75 (c) If these things are understood rightly, they do not contradict what has been shown in various other places.

§75 (d) There will be those who believe that this agrees more with a doctrine of universal grace and the promise of help to those having a good will. But predestination or election does not oppose those doctrines, as even the universalists must admit.

§75 (e) I have noted several times that this objection can be made against a nonabsolute decree, and against all certitude of future things, but it is sophistical because this certitude is found in God alone and not in us; what is more, these things cannot have relevance in practice. The certitude of an event is not absolute or independent of the cause or means of producing the event, for causes of events are no less certain. And so both sides need caution to avoid desperation and smugness (although unequally; §38b) and caution has its place on both sides once the fundamental first principles are safeguarded.

§75 (f) God did not decree it, but foresaw and permitted it even according to the soundly formulated opinions of the Reformed.

§76 (a) In truth there is no proposition in the whole article to which both parties cannot subscribe. See §21.

§76 (b) The Englishman Ward¹¹⁹ and other learned men wrote in favor of this opinion. Gatakerus¹²⁰ defends the contrary position along with some others who hold more rigid views.

§76 (c) There are Reformed, outside of England, who recognize that true justifying faith can be excited in these men also, who thereafter fall away from this grace and are certainly damned; and this doctrine can be best defended by those maintaining the absolute decree intact. Those who declare that they dissent from this speak contrary to a custom received in the church from antiquity, though perhaps they depart from the others more in words than in substance. And when they deny conversion, faith, and justification for a time¹²¹ and restrict these things to the elect only, they seem to understand that there are certain higher grades of these divine benefits; nevertheless, they are unable to explain these grades, so that they can be discerned sufficiently in practice. Whence there is no use for such new doctrine, and some danger as well. See §38b.

§77 (a) nempe praefatione totius Commentarii in 39 Ecclesiae Anglicanae articulos.

§77 (b) Itaque et hoc ubique tenendum est, nostras annotationes nuspia
autori, viro perspicacia et doctrina incomparabili, sed his opponi, quorum
sententias repraesentat. Refutavimus autem non ipsa fundamenta utriusque
partis, quae sana et conciliabilia sunt; sed sententias odiosas inde male de-
ductas, et neutri parti imputendas aut adoptandas.

§77 (a) Certainly in the preface to the whole *Commentary on the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England*.

§77 (b) And so this should be held at every point: that our annotations never are opposed to the author, a man of incomparable insight and teaching, but they are opposed to those whose teachings he refers to. We did not refute the foundations of either side, which are themselves sound and can be reconciled with one another; we refuted the offensive views that have been deduced in error from these foundations, errors which should not be imputed to nor adopted by either party.

Notes

Introduction

I would like to thank Eric Watkins and Robert Sleigh for help in piecing together the historical data contained herein and for other helpful remarks on earlier drafts of this introduction.

1. Found at least at Jacques Bénigne Bossuet, *Oeuvres*, volume XVII (Paris: P. Leiller, 1845–46), 360. A summary of the *Regulae* can be found in Jordan 55–62.

2. As in the Council of Constance, the authority of which was much in dispute in the Assembly of the French Clergy of 1682.

3. The correspondence between Leibniz and Bossuet is revived in 1699 for a time. During this two-year period, the focus is largely on the canonicity of the so-called apocryphal books of the Hebrew Bible. Again, the exchange concludes without any ground being given by either party in 1702. Bossuet died two years later.

4. *An Exposition of the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England* (London: R. Roberts, 1699).

5. According to the Act of Naturalization, passed by Parliament in May 1706, the descendants of the electress Sophie, including both bride and groom, retained the rights of British citizens.

6. All biblical quotations are taken from the *New International Version* unless otherwise noted.

7. Often, the points of doctrine set forth in the Canons are listed with the doctrine of total depravity first with the remainder following in order, in order to generate the acronym “Tulip.” I have set them out here in the order that they were originally proposed by the Synod in order to show the parallel to the Articles of Remonstrance to which they were a reply. The complete text of the Canons can be found in translation on “The Canons of the Synods of Dort,” in Philip Schaff, *The Creeds of Christendom, Vol. 3: The Evangelical Protestant Creeds, with Translations* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1977). Online at Christian Classics Ethereal Library, <http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/creeds3.iv.xvi.html>.

8. The likely reason is that the Canons of Dort are actually set forth in four “articles,” the third of which contains the third and fourth points of doctrine. Thus, Burnet sets up the topic by treating the four canons, rather than the five “points of doctrine.”

9. For a discussion of supralapsarianism by one of the leading Reformed theologians of the late seventeenth century, the reader can consult the extremely valuable and influential work by Francis Turretin, *Institutio theologiae elencticae*, 1679–85, topic 4, Q. 18. A translation of this work has been published: George Giger, trans., *Institutes of Elenctic Theology* (Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 1992). The reference cited above can be found in volume 1, p. 418.

10. For a presentation of this objection by a Calvinist from roughly our period, consult Turretin, *Institutio*, Topic 4, Q. 11, §361.

11. This presumes, of course, that both worlds are “actualizable” by God. See

Alvin Plantinga, *God, Freedom, and Evil* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W. B. Eerdmans, 1974).

12. Leibniz develops an analogy making a similar point in §9b.

13. Notice that the sense of control is robust enough that one might even be able to endorse an Arminian version of supralapsarianism. For it could be the case that God first decrees to make a certain set of individuals among the elect and certain others among the reprobate, and then looks for a world in which just those creatures exist and freely choose to accept or reject the offer of sufficient grace in such a way that God's decrees of election and reprobation are realized.

14. I will say more about the specific role that middle knowledge is supposed to play in this picture below.

15. As Leibniz himself makes clear, he is not the author of the distinction. In addition, this very distinction had been employed by Arminius himself to explain how it is that God can intend the salvation of all while securing it only in the case of some. See, for example, James Arminius, *Writings*, volume 3 (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1956), 281.

16. Turretin, *Institutio*, topic 3, Q. 16.

17. Though again, in slightly different senses. Arminians may be forced to admit that certain possible worlds are not actualizable by God if it turns out that some possible creature will not perform a certain act freely, no matter what God creates. Such a limitation has been set out clearly by Alvin Plantinga in, for example, *God, Freedom, and Evil*.

18. As we will see below, this can be most carefully put by saying that propositions concerning creaturely responses to grace have their truth postvolitionally, not prevolitionally.

19. Session 6, Canon 13, 14. For Arminians see John Arnaldus Corvinus, *Petri Molinae novi anatomici mala Encheiresis* (Frankfurt am Main, 1622), 690.

20. Undoubtedly there are other routes Leibniz takes in arguing for spontaneity as well. Thus, for example, whatever provides Leibniz with good grounds for denying intersubstantial causation will also provide him with grounds for affirming spontaneity in all substances.

21. I provide a complete discussion of spontaneity and its role in Leibniz's conception of freedom in "Spontaneity and Freedom in Leibniz," in *Leibniz: Nature and Freedom*, ed. Jan Cover and Donald Rutherford (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

22. Equivalent remarks about human freedom and spontaneity can be found in Grua 480 and Huggard *Causa Dei* §108 (G.vi.455).

23. Graeme Hunter, "Leibniz and Secondary Causes," in *Leibniz Tradition und Aktualität: V. Internationaler Leibniz Kongreß* (Hanover: Leibniz Gesellschaft, 1988), 375.

24. The view has its origins in Saint Thomas Aquinas. See *De Veritate* Q. 22, a.13, resp. and a.15, resp.; *Summa Theologiae* Ia Q. 82, a.3 ad 2.

25. No doubt, many writers in this camp adopt a view of freedom which incorporates both of these positions. There are, however, significant problems with each strategy, which are beyond the scope of the present volume.

26. Similarly in Letter to Coste, AG 195.

27. Interestingly, this response to the Buridan's ass example is not Leibniz's invention. It is found at least as far back as Suarez, who provides a response quite similar to Leibniz's. See Francisco Suarez, *On Efficient Causality: Metaphysical Disputations 17, 18, & 19*. trans. Alfred Freddoso (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 277.

28. In fact, this characterization is itself an oversimplification of Leibniz's view. Leibniz argues that the choice of the will is fixed by the deliverances of practical reason in God, the angels, and the blessed. Human beings in this life are, however, subject to the force of passion. For Leibniz, passions are themselves desires that result from unconscious or confused perceptions or apprehensions. Because of this, the will is going to have a natural desire or conatus for passions just as it does for the deliverances of practical intellect, since both turn out to be apprehensions that a certain object or course of action is good, unconscious apprehensions in the former case, and conscious ones in the latter. This explains why one sometimes finds Leibniz asserting that the judgment of the practical intellect is not always effective in moving the will to choice. Thus, while choice is not determined by the deliverances of practical reason, it is determined by the deliverances of perception *tout court* including adequate ideas, which figure into deliberation, and confused imperceptible ideas, which give rise to passions (see AG 194). So, Leibniz's more nuanced view leads him to say the following: "Besides, we do not always follow the latest judgment of the practical understanding when we resolve to will; but we always follow, in our willing, the result of all the inclinations that come from the direction both of reasons and passions, and this often happens without an express judgment of the understanding" (Huggard §51; G.vi.130).

29. See Michael Murray, "Intellect, Will, and Freedom: Leibniz and His Precursors" *Leibniz Review* 6 (December 1996): 25–60.

30. This account is distilled from A.6.3.129–31.

31. This assumes that "willing" is closed under entailment. While this might be problematic as a general assumption, it should not be an issue concerning the acts of will of an omniscient being who is occurrently aware of all of his willings.

32. One might think that Leibniz, and any defender of the postvolitional view, could attempt to escape the problem I am raising at this very point. The reason is this. If some part of the circumstances in which Peter finds himself is the result of a free act of a creature, then it might well be the case that God does not will that C obtain, but merely permits C's obtaining. Furthermore, if it is not the case that God wills that C obtain, it is not the case that God wills that Peter exist in C. Thus, the postvolitionalist would surrender (11). But responding in this way raises a number of difficulties. First, there are two kinds of prior free choices that might figure into C, the free choices of Peter, and the free choices of other beings. If it is the free choices of other beings, one might say that it is still in God's control, at creation, to determine whether or not Peter will get mixed up in the circumstances brought about by the free choices of others. Thus, C could obtain without Peter ever having been created. And thus, if C includes only the free acts of those other than Peter, it appears that (11) cannot be surrounded for the reasons I ascribed to the postvolitionalist above. But what

if the free acts in C include prior free acts of Peter? One cannot then say that it was (entirely) up to God whether or not Peter is in C, since by creating Peter, God created a world in which Peter will be in C, and the explanation of this fact must include certain prior free acts of Peter. In this case, one might be tempted to say that Peter's being in C is not something which can be ascribed entirely to an act of God's will. It is something that, presumably, God wills in part and permits in part. The problem with this way of attempting to avoid (11) is that for each creature there are going to be some free choices that are made in circumstances which include no prior free choices of that creature. At least in these cases, the fact that the creature is in C is going to be something that God can be said to will purely.

33. I cannot make the historical case here, though I do so in detail in “Spontaneity and Freedom in Leibniz,” in *Leibniz: Nature and Freedom*. The crucial transition in Leibniz’s thought can be seen, I argue, in a text found at Grua 312–13, A.6.4.1600–1602. The transition becomes clear when one notes the radical shift from the postvolitional view in the first draft to the prevolitional one in the second. Texts from roughly the same period seem to contend with the same topic. Of importance are (1) “Aus Ludovicus a Dola, De Modo Conjunctionis Concursum Dei et Creaturum” A.6.4.1789–92 and (2) “De Libertate et Gratia.” In Grua 384–88, this is displayed as two essays, entitled “Contra Indifferentiam” and “An Causa Secunda Determinet Primam,” that may or may not be part of the same work. The editors of the Academy edition have put these together as one essay with the title listed in the text above (A.6.4.1459–60).

34. As opposed to “deciding,” as the postvolitionalist would have it.

35. In the present text see §§16a and 39b. Elsewhere see: (1) Grua 227, a piece dated May 1684 (?) by Grua but dated by the Academy editors as April–May 1686 (A.6.4.2659–60); (2) Grua 230, where Leibniz does not use the “discovery” language but where he denies the intrinsic efficacy of grace, a claim tantamount to denying the postvolitionalist view, dated 1685 by Grua; (3) Grua 232, dated 1687–90 by the Academy editors (A.6.4.2661); (4) “Primary Truths,” AG 32, dated as 1686 (?) by Ariew and Garber, but dated by the Academy editors to the second half of 1689 (A.6.4.1643–49); (5) C 23–24, a notoriously difficult piece to date but regarded by all as 1686 or later (primarily because of the invocation of infinite analysis); (6) letter to Jacquelot, 4 September 1704, G.vi.559.

36. See, e.g., Huggard, *Causa Dei* §69 and Grua 326.

37. “Rationale Fidei Catholicae,” A.6.4.2321–22.

38. For more on Leibniz’s transition to prevolitionalism in this period and its implications see my “Spontaneity and Freedom in Leibniz.”

Dissertation on Predestination and Grace

1. Saint John Damascene (676–749).
2. Saint John Chrysostom (c. 347–c. 407). The “Homilies on the Letter to the Ephesians” can be found in *Patrologie grecque*, ed. J.-P. Migne (Paris, 1857–66), volume 62.

3. Theophylactus of Ochrida, Archbishop of Bulgaria (c. 1050–c. 1109). The complete works of Theophylactus can be found in *Patrologie grecque*, ed. J.-P. Migne (Paris, 1857–66), volumes 123–26.

4. An English translation is available in *The Trinity*, trans. Edmund Hill (Brooklyn, N.Y.: New City Press, 1991).

5. A reference to Paul's exclamation in Romans 11:33 that the reasons for divine predestination are hidden in the depths of *divine* wisdom.

6. Matthew 11:21–23. In this text Jesus tells his Galilean audience that if others, for example the inhabitants of the condemned and destroyed city of Sodom, had been witness to the same miracles that Jesus performed among the Galileans, they would have repented and been spared. Leibniz uses this as a way of harnessing biblical evidence in favor of his claim that individuals are liable to respond to God's grace in different ways in part because of their differing circumstances.

7. *The Book of Concord*, printed in 1580, aimed to reconcile disputing factions within Lutheranism. The final section of the book, called the Formula of Concord, is a reworking of the Augsburg Confession in light of this factionalism. A translation of the complete Book of Concord can be found in *The Book of Concord*, trans. Theodore G. Tappert (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959).

8. Johannes Musaeus (1613–81) was a Lutheran theologian. The work cited here is *De aeterno electionis decreto an eius aliqua extra Deum causa impulsiva detur necne* (Jena, 1668).

9. Johann Hulsemann, 1602–61. The work referred to here is *Vindiciae s. scripturae per loca classica systematis theologici: praelectiones academicae in librum concordiae: Patrologia succincta, vice appendicis loci de ecclesia repraesentativa: annotationes ad breviarium theologicum . . .* (Leipzig, 1679).

10. Saint Hilary, Bishop of Poitiers (d. 367?). A translation of this work can be found in *The Trinity*, trans. Stephen McKenna (New York: Fathers of the Church, 1954).

11. Origen (c. 185–c. 253). A translation of this work can be found in *Homilies on Genesis and Exodus*, trans. Ronald E. Heine (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1982).

12. Eusebius of Caesarea, Bishop of Caesarea (c. 260–c. 340). A translation of this work can be found in *Preparation for the Gospel*, trans. Edwin Hamilton Gifford (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1981).

13. The work referred to here is Judah Halevi's twelfth-century work *Kuzari*. A translation is available in *The Kuzari*, trans. Hartwig Hirschfeld (New York: Schocken Books, 1971).

14. Compare §29a.

15. A reference to Romans 9:16.

16. Saint Prosper of Aquitaine (c. 390–c. 463) The complete works can be found at *Divi Prosperti Acquitarici, episcopi Rheiensi, viri eruditissimi, Opera* (Coloniae Agrippae, 1609).

17. “Predestinarianism” is the name of a heresy which is known to us only through the anonymous work *Praedestinatus* and the history of the monk Gott-

schalk. *Praedestinatus* is a three-volume, mid-fifth-century work written by a Pelagian thinker, possibly Arnobius the Younger. The second volume, a work which the author reports to have been written by an Augustinian, sets forth the position of the Predestinarians, a view criticized in the third volume. The central theme of Predestinarianism is twofold: (a) that God makes a positive predestining decree concerning all men, consigning each either to justice and salvation, or to sin and damnation, and (b) that all the acts of men, good and evil, in this life depend on this predestining decree. The author sets out this view by means of seven points. Many of these positions are later adopted by either Jansen or Baius or both, though neither knew of this work. The three-volume work was first published by J. Sirmond in 1643, and the affinities to Jansen were obvious to all. Predestinarianism was condemned at the Second Council of Orange but later revived by Gottschalk, a monk of Orbais, in a work of 848. Gottschalk himself was condemned to burn his books and recant his views by the Council of Quiercy in 849 at the instigation of Hincmar, archbishop of Reims. Gottschalk retracted his views, but Hincmar, still unsatisfied, engaged John Scotus Erigena to undertake a refutation of the errors. In 853 the Council of Quiercy, presided over by Hincmar, attempted to decide the issue against the Predestinarians by affirming four definitions, as follows. (1) God chose those elected to life from the *massa perditionis* “according to foreknowledge” while leaving the rest in the *massa*. The damnation of those who are condemned was, however, only foreseen, not predestined. (2) In Christ we recover the freedom that was lost in Adam. (3) God has a universal salvific will and those who are saved are saved by God’s gift, not by its absence. (4) That Christ suffered for all men without exception. However, two years later the council of Valence seemed to contradict many of the pronouncements of Quiercy. Most of Gottschalk’s writings have been lost (to flames no doubt). Those that remain, along with other texts relevant to the dispute concerning his teaching, can be found in *Oeuvres théologiques et grammaticales de Godescalc d’Orbais*, ed. D. C. Lamont, O.S.B. (Louvain: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1945). Gottschalk became well-known in the seventeenth century primarily through three works: two published by Jacques Sirmond, the first containing the epistles of Rabanus Maurus (Archbishop of Mainz, 784?–856), *Rabani Archeepiscopi Moguntini de preaedestinatione Dei ad versus Gothescalcum epistolae III*, 1647, and the second entitled *Amolonis ad Gottescalcum Epistola*, 1649; and a work of Cellot, *Historia Gotteschalci praedestinatiani* (Paris, 1655).

18. James Ussher (1580–1656), Anglican archbishop of Armagh (Ireland). The work Leibniz refers to here is *Goteschalchi et praedestinationae contrversiae ab eo motae historia* (Dublin, 1631).

19. Cornelius Jansen (1585–1638), bishop of Ypres whose posthumous work *Augustinus* (Amsterdam, 1640) spawned the Jansenist movement.

20. See note 16.

21. Saint Fulgentius, bishop of Ruspa (Carthage) (468–533).

22. See note 17.

23. See note 17.

24. Gilbert Mauguin (d. 1674), a French Jesuit, in his *Veterum auctorum qui IX saeculo de praedestinatione et gratia* (1650).

25. Like Sirmond, Louis Cellot (1588–1658), a French Jesuit, was an opponent of Jansenism who published a history of the controversy concerning Gottschalk, *Historia Gotteschalci praedestinationi* (Paris, 1655). An excerpt of Leibniz’s reading notes on this work can be found in Grua 214. The complete text is found at LH I, i, 4, Bl. 47 (not 74 as indicated by Grua). See note 14.

26. Lothar (?–855), Louis (“the German”) (?–876), and Charles (“the Bald”) (823–875) were the three grandchildren of Charlemagne among whom the Carolingian empire was divided at the death of Charlemagne’s son Louis.

27. William Durandus de Saint-Pourçain (?–1333), a Dominican bishop, first at Puy, then at Meaux. Here Leibniz refers to his *In sententias Petri Lombardi commentariorum libri quattor* (Lyon, 1508).

28. Thomas Bradwardine (1290–1349) was the most famed English theologian of the fourteenth century and became the archbishop of Canterbury. Here Leibniz refers to his work *Archiepiscopi olim Cantuariensis de causa dei* (reprinted Frankfurt: Minerva, 1964).

29. Etienne Tempier (?–1279), bishop of Paris. He derives much of his renown for having condemned a number of theses concerning Aristotelianism and Latin Averroism in 1270 and 1277.

30. Hugo Grotius (1583–1645).

31. A reference to Genesis 16:12.

32. John Wyclif (1324–87).

33. *De Veritate*, art. 5, ad 3. A translation is available in *Truth*, Robert W. Mullich, S.J., trans. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994).

34. Johann Adam Scherzer (1628–83), a Lutheran theologian. The work referred to here is *Disputationes Anti-Calvinianae* (1684, 1704).

35. Louis of Dole (?–1636) was a Capuchin whose only work was *Disputatio doctissima quadripartita de modo conjunctionis concursum Dei* (Lyon, 1634). Some supporters were Jean Launoy, who reproduced Louis’ opinions in a book, *Syllabus rationum quibus causa Durandi* (Paris, 1636), and François Bernier (see note 37). Leibniz’s reading notes on Dole can be found at LH I, 9, Bl. 387. See also Leibniz’s *Theodicy* §27 (G.vi.118).

36. François Bernier (1620–88). The work referred to here is *Traité du libre et du volontaire* (Amsterdam, 1685). See Leibniz’s *Theodicy* §27 (G.vi.118).

37. Theophilus Raynauld (1583–1663), a Jesuit, in “Nova liberta Gibieufana discussa,” Pars II, cap. 4 (*Opera Omnia*, t. 18, Lyon, 1665, pp. 97–116). Leibniz has reading notes on this work in LH I, 1, 4 Bl. 62–65. See Leibniz’s *Theodicy* §371 (G.vi.335).

38. Thomas de Vio Cajetan (1469–1534), a Dominican theologian and cardinal.

39. Sylvester Prierasa, O.P. (1460–1526), a Dominican theologian who is credited as the first Roman theologian to respond to Luther publicly. The complete works can be found in *Summa Sylvestrina*, ed. P. Vendramenus (Venice, 1606).

40. Gregory of Rimini (d. 1358).

41. Gabriel Biel (1420–95).

42. François Vargas (1484–1560) was a Spanish jurisconsult who acted as an advisor to church officials concerning numerous matters at the Council of Trent. The work referred to here is *Lettres et mémoires de François de Vargas* (Amsterdam, 1700).

43. Michael Baius (1513–89).

44. Jacques Lainez (1512–65).

45. Claudio Aquaviva (1543–1615) was elected the fifth general of the Jesuits in 1581. Under him the Jesuits suffered weakening of their power, experienced factionalism due to nationalistic concerns, and moved away from Thomism, igniting a dispute with the Dominicans.

46. Adam Tanner (1572–1632) was an Austrian Jesuit who taught theology at various universities. Leibniz here refers to his *Universa theologiae scholastica* (Ingolstadt, 1626) vol. 2.

47. Camillo Borghese (1550–1621) was elected pope on 16 May 1605, following Leo XI.

48. Alfonso Salmeron (1515–85).

49. Ambrosius Catharinus, archbishop of Conza (1483–1553), Dominican. The view referred to here is defended in *Summa doctrinae de praedestinatione* [. . .] *adiicitur et lucubratio De veritate enunciationum; Summa idem doctrinae de peccato originali, adiicitur et dialogus de justificatione* (Rome, 1550).

50. Albert Pighius (1490–1542), Catholic theologian, scientist, and mathematician. On the matter discussed here see his *De libero hominis arbitrio et divine gratia libri X* (Cologne, 1542).

51. Alfonso Salmeron, *Alfonsi Salmeronis Toetanti . . . Commentarii in Evangelicam historiam, et in Acta Apostolorum* (Coloniae Agrippinae, 1602–4). The commentary on Romans is found in volumes 13 and 14 of this sixteen-volume edition.

52. Pedro de Fonseca (1528–99) was a Jesuit philosopher and theologian who is credited with introducing the notion of middle knowledge.

53. Leibniz also discusses this view of Durandus of Saint-Pourçain in *Theodicy* §360–61 (G.vi.328–29).

54. Leibniz here refers to a widely discussed commentary on Cajetan by Ambrosius Catharinus, archbishop of Conza (also known as Lancelotto Politi, O.P.) 1484–1553. The work, entitled *De praescientia et providentia Dei* (Paris, 1535), contains a discussion of predestination, election, and the truth of future contingents.

55. This is an errant reference since this question has only six articles. Leibniz could be referring to the respective sections in articles 2, 3, or 6, all of which are relevant to the topic under discussion here.

56. Together with Henricus Calenus, canon of the church at Ypres, Fromond, professor at the Louvain, was the literary executor of Jansen. He brought the *Augustinus* to press despite the Roman prohibition against publishing any works concerning issues of grace.

57. The work referred to here was written by Jansen and published in 1635 under

the title *Alexandri Patricii Armacani Theologi Mars Gallicus seu de justitia armorum regis Galliae libri duo*. The book was a satirical treatment of the foreign policy of Cardinal Richelieu who, as a member of the French Council of Ministers, was notorious for forging much criticized alliances with foreign Protestants.

58. Cardinal Panfili (1574–1655) became Pope Innocent X on 15 September 1644, following Urban VIII. In 1642 Urban had pronounced a general condemnation on Jansen's work *Augustinus*. Critics took the condemnation to be motivated by Jesuit disapproval of Jansen's work. As no specific claims of Jansen were singled out for condemnation, those favoring Jansen felt at liberty to discuss and even commend many of the controversial claims in Jansen's work. Dissatisfied with this outcome, Nicolas Cornet, Syndic of the University of Paris, extracted five central theses from the *Augustinus* and submitted them to the faculty of theology at the Sorbonne for review in 1649. In light of the favor shown toward Jansenists by Parliament, church officials were reluctant to rule on the five propositions. Thus in 1651, eighty-five bishops appealed to Rome to issue a definitive pronouncement on them. That pronouncement came in the 1653 papal bull *Cum occasione* in which Innocent formally condemned the five propositions. Here Leibniz refers to the controversy that ensued. A few Jansenists, among them Pascal, decided to flout the papal decree. But most, following the lead of Arnauld, declared that while the propositions condemned by Urban VIII were indeed worthy of condemnation, the propositions were not to be found in Jansen's writings. This allowed Jansenists to support the teachings found in *Augustinus* while holding to the letter, if not the spirit, of the condemnation. This strategy led Pope Alexander VII to issue in turn the bull *Ad Sanctam Petri Sedem* in which the five propositions were again condemned and in which it was further affirmed that the five condemned propositions were indeed endorsed by Jansen in the *Augustinus*. This bull thus opened up a further dispute about whether the church's infallibility extended beyond matters of *right* to matters of *fact* as well. The five propositions condemned are as follows: (1) Some of God's commands are impossible to just men who wish and strive to keep them, considering the powers they actually have; the grace by which these precepts may become possible for them is also lacking. (2) In the state of fallen nature, no one ever resists interior grace. (3) For merit or demerit in the fallen state of nature we must be free from all external constraint, but not from interior necessity; the Semi-Pelagians admitted the necessity of interior preventing graces for all acts, even for the beginning of faith; but they fell into heresy in pretending that this grace is such that men may either follow or resist it. (5) To say that Christ died or shed his blood for all men is a feature of semi-Pelagianism.

59. Antonio Pignatelli (1615–1700). He was elected pope on 12 July 1691, following Alexander VIII.

60. A French pope elected in 1667 who resolved some of the initial Jansenist tensions by engineering the so-called Peace of the Church in 1668. As a result, Arnauld, Lalane, and Nicole were given recognition. All further disputing between Jansenists and opponents was forbidden, and finally, the ban against the convent of Port-Royal was lifted.

61. Emilio Altieri (?–1676) succeeded Clement IX and was elected pope on 29 April 1670.

62. Benedetto Odescalchi (1611–89) was elected pope on 21 September 1676, following Clement X.

63. Celestino Sfondratus (1644–96) was a Benedictine cardinal and author of *Nodus praedestinationis ex sac. litteris doctrina que SS. Augustinae et Thomae quantum homini licet dissoluta* (Rome, 1697). The work defends a Molinist position on predestination.

64. Giovanni Francesco Albani (1649–1721) was elected pope on 23 November 1700, following Innocent XII.

65. Leandro Colloredo (1639–1709) was of a noble family and was made archbishop and then cardinal by Innocent XI. His benefactor was Cosimo III, the grand duke of Tuscany.

66. The Master of the Sacred Palace is a Dominican who serves as a special theological advisor to the pope. In the sixteenth century the master was responsible for the condemnation of unorthodox works. When this power was transferred to the Congregation of the Inquisition, the master was made an ex officio member of this body.

67. Paul Sarpi (1552–1623) was a theologian of Venice, and a formidable enemy of Rome. The work referred to here is his *Istoria del Concilio tridentino*, 1626. An English edition of this work is available, *The History of the Council of Trent*, John Herringman and Henry Herringman, trans. (London: J. Macock 1676).

68. The “China affair” refers to the Chinese rites controversy, which extended through the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The central question in the controversy was whether or not Confucian rites honoring Confucius and the ancestors were consistent with orthodox Christian practice. The issue was of crucial importance to Roman Catholic missionaries in China because seventeenth-century Chinese emperors were insistent that missionary activity not disrupt Chinese civil servants from performing the rites and ceremonies pertaining to their offices. Jesuits appealed the ban and it was subsequently revoked in 1656. It was this position that Leibniz regarded as moderate. However, at the time at which Leibniz was composing this work, Clement XI was in the process of issuing a new condemnation of the practice, a condemnation that would be reaffirmed in 1715.

69. Philipp Melanchthon (1497–1560).

70. Georg Calixt (1586–1656) was a Lutheran theologian who taught at Helmsted and Brunswick.

71. Konrad Hornejus (1590–1649) was a Lutheran theologian and a student and ally of Calixt.

72. An allusion to Romans 11:33.

73. John Bramhall (1593–1663) was the Anglican bishop of Londonderry, subsequently appointed the archbishop of Armagh. Here Leibniz refers to Hobbes’s *An Answer to a Book Published by Dr. Bramhall . . . called, The Catching of the Leviathan* (London: Crooke, 1682). See also Hobbes’s *The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance Clearly Stated and Debated between Dr. Bramhall,*

Bishop of Derry, and Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury (London, 1656). For Leibniz reading notes on the latter see LH I, 1, 4 Bl. 18–19. Also see *Theodicy*, “Reflections on Hobbes” (G.vi.388–99).

74. Reading “omnis” for “omni.”

75. Reading “mereat” for “merat.”

76. John Piscator (1546–1625) was a Calvinist who defended the absolute decree. See his *These theologicae de praedestinatione* (Herborn, 1602), bk. 5, pp. 137, 153.

77. Paul Pellisson-Fontanier (1624–93) came from a line of French Protestants who converted to Catholicism and he subsequently held several positions in the church. Leibniz’s correspondence with Pellison is found in A.1.7.129–334 and A.1.8.115–220.

78. “The divine beings have their own justice.” From Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, book IX, line 500.

79. Peter d’Ailly (1350–1420) was a Roman cardinal.

80. Theodore Beza (Théodore de Bèze, 1519–1605), Daniel Chamier (1565–1621), William Whitaker (1548–95), and Moïse Amyraut (1596–1664) were Calvinist thinkers.

81. The term means “not liable to give an account.” It was used to describe Athenian officials who were not subject to public examination for their conduct.

82. “Res judicata” is a technical legal term referring to a case that has been tried and settled by the court.

83. Reading “intelligere potest” for “intelligere.”

84. Again, a reference to Saint Paul’s exclamation concerning the inscrutability of God’s ways in matters of predestination in Romans 11:33.

85. Hugh of Saint Victor (1096–1141) was a French Augustinian.

86. Here Leibniz refers to the text of Romans 9:13.

87. Celio Secondo Curione (1503–69) was a much persecuted Italian Protestant who taught, if not universal salvation, at least that the saved would far outnumber the damned. The work referred to here is *De amplitudine beati regni Dei dialogi II* (Poschiavo in the Grisons, 1554).

88. See note 28.

89. Benedictus Aretius (1505–74) was a Swiss botanist and Calvinist theologian. Leibniz here refers to his *S.S. Theogiae Problemata* (1617), Locus VI.

90. Johann Crocius (1590–1659) was a German Calvinist professor of theology.

91. Leibniz here refers to the claims of Jesus in Matthew 11:20–24.

92. These phrases are various renderings of the phrase from Ephesians 1:4–10 rendered in English “good pleasure.” Evangelicals and the Reformed used the phrase to refer to the unknown or unknowable motives that motivate God’s choices. See the Introduction, 2.A.

93. Leibniz uses the word “conatus” (here translated “effort”), a word which is used both in his writings on physics and metaphysics. In this instance the word is meant to signify the “vector sum” of all of the inclinations of the will, a sum which generates the act of will.

94. André Rivet (1572–1651) was a French Calvinist and pastor of a church at Tours. Here Leibniz refers to his *Theologicae & scholasticae exercitationes CXC in Genesin* (Leiden: Batavorum, 1633).

95. See note 34.

96. Here Leibniz refers to two biblical texts, John 3:16 and John 17:9, respectively.

97. Luke 23:34.

98. See Introduction, section 3A.

99. A reference to Romans 9:20–21 in which Saint Paul likens human creatures to clay that can be shaped at the will of the potter.

100. Leibniz here refers to the biblical text at Hebrews 6:4–6, a controversial passage that appears to say that those who fall away into apostasy are irrevocably damned.

101. Aegidius Hunnius (1550–1603) was a Lutheran theologian who taught the resistability of grace. The work referred to here is *Tomus Primus Operum Latino-rum* (Wittenberg, 1607–9).

102. Balthasar Mentzer the Older (1565–1627) was a Lutheran theologian. His works were gathered together in *Opera theologica Latina* (1669). Leibniz here refers to *Disputationes theologice & scholasticae XIV* (Marburg, 1600).

103. See note 9.

104. A reference to the “parable of the sower” found in Matthew 13:3–13 et passim. The parable refers to the different reactions that people have to the Christian message. Of the four reactions noted in the parable, one is that some believe for a while but cease believing when persecution arises. Their belief is merely temporary (προσκατηρος), Jesus declares.

105. Reading “conditionem natam” for “conditio natus.”

106. “Purificatio conditionis” is a technical expression of middle knowledge theorists meaning “the actualization of the state of affairs described in the antecedent,” so that the state of affairs described in the consequent will be realized also.

107. James 1:13–14.

108. Michael Baius, whose works shared many theological similarities with the later works of Jansen, held, among other things, that using the distinction Leibniz mentions here would allow one to hold that foreseen merits might play a role in predestination without being a cause of predestination. That is, on this understanding, they might be conditions without which salvation would not happen, without being conditions by which salvation is effected. This distinction, which later surfaces in Jansenism, was condemned by Pius V (pope from 1566 to 1572) in *Ex omnibus afflictionibus* in 1567 and again by his successor Gregory XIII (pope from 1572 to 1585) in *Provisionis nostrae* in 1579.

109. Leibniz here refers to *Summa Sententiarum*, a work whose authenticity is regarded as doubtful today. The work can be found in *Patrologie latine* (Paris, 1844–55), volume 176.

110. Reading “specia” for “speciam” (in light of Leibniz’s correction of “ordinata” to “inordinata”).

111. Romans 9:16.

112. Romans 11:33.

113. There is no such reference in the *Summa theologica*. Leibniz must have in mind IaIIae Q.10 a.1 resp.

114. The sentiment expressed in this overwrought sentence is simpler than it might appear. The point is simply that while God impressed on the wills of creatures a natural desire to love their creator, creatures turned instead to love and serve created things instead.

115. Reading “defieret” for “defierit.”

116. Seneca, *Hercules Furens*, CCLI. Often translated “Might makes right.”

117. Leibniz gives no insertion point in the Burnet text for this comment, though it presumably applies to the paragraph as a whole.

118. Bartholomew Keckermann (1571–1608) was a Reformed theologian. On this point see his *Systema theologicum* (1602).

119. Samuel Ward (d. 1643), a Calvinist, defends the view in *Opera nunulla* (London, 1658).

120. Thomas Gataker (1574–1654) was an Anglican divine. His collected works are found in *Opera Critica*, ed. H. Witsius (Utrecht, 1697–99).

121. See note 104.

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Dissertation on Predestination and Grace

G. W. Leibniz

Translated, Edited, and with an Introduction by Michael J. Murray

Additional Contributions by George Wright

In this book G. W. Leibniz presents not only his reflections on predestination and election but also a more detailed account of the problem of evil than is found in any of his other works apart from the *Theodicy*. Surprisingly, his *Dissertation on Predestination and Grace* has never before been published in any form. Michael J. Murray's project of translating, editing, and providing commentary for the volume will therefore attract great interest among scholars and students of Leibniz's philosophy and theology. Leibniz addresses such topics as free will, moral responsibility, divine causation, justice, punishment, divine foreknowledge, and human freedom, revealing crucial aspects of the genesis of his mature metaphysics and the theological motivations behind it.

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